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HISTORIC AL PERSPEC TIVE

They were elated.

Such a diplomatic feat had rarely been

accomplished in the annals of international negotiations.

Surely

the 1958 Geneva Conventiors would stand for years as a milestone
in maritime affairs.

The Geneva Conventions served the interests

of the signing members very well.

Most developed maritime powers

saw the Conventions in terms of their continued dominance of the
world maritime scene.
A precedent, set in 1945, was to aid the destruction of the
Geneva Conventions as workable instruments.

The united States

of America extended its jurisdiction out to 200 meters on the continental shelf and claimed the right to create an exclusive fishing zone beyond its territorial sea. 1

This was followed by many

States declaring different types of zones over different areas
of ocean space. 2

Even before the Geneva Conference was convened,

it was doomed to failure because it could not settle the budding
issues of the day.

1. The so-called Truman declarationr
"Prec. 2668, Policy of
the united States with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in certain
Areas of the High Seas", Federal Register, Oct. 2, 1945; "Exec.
Order 9634, Providing for the Establishment of Fishery Conservation Zones", Federal Register, sept. 28, 1945; "Exec. Order 9633,
Reserving and Placing certain Resources of the Continental Shelf
Under the Control and Jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Interior", Federal Register, Sept. 28, 1945.
2. See Table I.

1

The Geneva Conventions did not fit the realities of the time.
The territorial sea was given no definite limit but was understood
to be three nautical miles through customary law.

A contiguous

zone was created next to the territorial sea of no more than
twelve nautical miles in width from the territorial sea baselines.

3

In the fpllowing decade many states established unilaterally a
4
territorial sea of twelve nautical miles and more.
The Continental Shelf Convention became equally inapplicable
due to the rapid advances of science and technology in the following decade.

In defining the edge of the continental shelf as:

..the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the territorial
sea~ to .a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits
of the exploitation of natural resources of the said
area.,,5
no allowance was made for the rapidly developing technologies
that made the Convention obsolete almost before it was signed.
States that had the technology could claim areas far out onto
the abyssal plain as a portion of their continental shelves.
This was clearly an intolerable situation.
Next to be over taken by changing world events was the fish.

erles

.

6

Convent~on.

Large

.

fore~gn

factory

.

sh~ps

soon replaced small

coastal fishermen as the prime harvesters of fish off many coasts,
seriously depleting fish resources.

Coastal States had little

3. "Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,
Done at Geneva on 29 April 1958" in Lay et al, New Directions in
Law of the Sea, (New York, Oceana Publications Inc., 1973), P.I.
4. See Table I.
April

5. "Convention on the Continental Shelf, Done at Geneva on 29
1958~" in Lay et a I , P. 101.

6. "C onvent ion on Fishing and C onservat ion of the Living ReSources of the High Seas, Done at Geneva, on 29 April 1958," in
2

,

recourse except under Article six which entitled coastal States
to require negotiations with all fishing states off their coasts
tc ~rescribe measures to conserve the living resources of the
high seas.

Few distant water fishing States ratified this Con-

vention and few coastal states felt they had the power to safeguard their fish stocks and fishing industries.

Unilateral ex-

tensions of fishing limits became the only answer.
Unilateral extensions of national jurisdiction erOded the legal
base of the Convention on the High seas.

7

The freedoms of naviga-

tion, fishing, overflight and the laying of submarine pipelines
and cables became increasingly impaired as conflicts arose.

Dis-

pute settlement mechanisms and the International Court of Justice
were inadequate to peacefully decide most conflicts.

The structure

of the Convention could not be maintained.
Far-sighted men recognized the inadequacies of the Geneva
conventions in 1958 and attempted to renegotiate them in 1960.
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea ended
in dismal failure.
One major obstacle to the creation of a comprehensive ocean
treaty was related to the conflict between the colonialistic
attitudes of post-war Europe and North America and the newly

Lay et aI, p. 353.
7. ''C onvention on the High Seas, Done at Geneva on 29
April 1958," in Lay et al, P. 257.

3

•

independent states of the developing world.
In 1958, eighty-four States attended the Geneva Conference
8
out of ninety-six world states.
It was not until 1964 that the
conventions came into force.

By 1971 twelve developed States,

nineteen developing States and eight socialist States had ratified
the convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, for a
total of thirty-nine States.

Twelve developed States, twenty-

four developing States and ten socialist States had ratified the
High Seas Convention for a total of forty-six States.

Fourteen

developed states, twenty-one developing States and nine socialist
states had ratified the Continental Shelf Convention for a total
of forty-four States, and eight developed States, twenty developing states, and one socialist State had ratified the Fisheries.
Convention.

Only four African, one-Asian, one Western European

and one Socialist landlocked States, or seven landlocked States,
had ratified anyone of the conventions.

9

The number of sovereign states grew tremendously in the 1960's
so that at the start of the Third united Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea in 1974, 147 10world States were participating.
Roughly one-third of the

worldt~

States by this date had actually

participated in the Geneva Conference of 1958 and thus the convent ions were not considered valid by the majority of world States.

8. Personal communications Dr. Alexander, Chairman of the
Department of Geography, University of Rhode Island.
9. E.D.Brown, The Leaal Reaime of Hydrospace, (London:
Stevens and Sons, 1971), ~ 212-214.
10. My estimate.
4

The demands of world politics' on the oceans had substantially
changed by the late 1960's leading Arvid Pardo, in a speech in the
United Nations General Assembly, to call for a new Law of the Sea
Conference and the creation of an ocean regime from which all
states could

.

benef~t.

11

This lead to various General Assembly resolutions establishing the Committee for the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction and eventually to
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

12

The first session of the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea met in New York to plan the procedures to

~

followed at the first substantive session to take place in
Caracas, Venezuela. 13

Caracas was a magical city situated between

lovely mountains near the sea, so we thought.

This image was

quickly shattered with the convening of the second session.

We

were unprepared for the smelly, neisey, polluted atmosphere of
modern Caracas.

Dingy buildings, once multicolored colonial

structures, crowded the streets next to modern skyscrapers.

The delegates were cloistered in the mammoth Parque Centrale,

11. "Statement by Arvid Pardo, Ambassador of Malta to the
United Nations, in the First Committee, Nov. 1, 1967," ins The
Common Heritage, 1.0.1. Occasional Papers No.3, (Malta University
Press, 1975), P. 1.

12. General AssemblY Resolutions 1 2467 (XXIII) of 21 December 1968; 2750 (xxv) of 17 December 1970; 2881 (XXVI) of 21 December 1971; 3029 (XXVII) of 18 December 1972; 3067 (XXVIII) of
16 November 1973.
13. The first session met in New York, December 3 to 15, 1973.
The second session or first substantive session met in Caracas, Venezuela, June 20 to August 29, 1974.

5

·

surrounded by Venezuelan police and military units with submachine
~ guns; always the incessant roar of traffic and the smashing of

colliding cars was heard and yet inside Parque Centrale was a
world totally detached from anything Venezuelan.
For some delegates, the flowering fountains, hanging gardens,
supermarkets, attractive and expensive boutiques and museums of
Parque Centrale became oppressive in a short while.

~et

a guide, downtown Caracas seemed inaccessible and remote.

without
Some

delegates took government sponsored trips, others dared not venture out into the wilds of Caracas street life for fear of becoming
sick eating arepas or of being out-foxed by a smart shop attendant.
still others. went boldly down to the beaches at the foot of the
mountains and saw the wonders of a charming land.

Despite all the

hubbub of Caracas, it was a friendly city if one took the time to
become acquainted with it.
Inside Parque Centrale the tempo of debate was slow and easy.
Many delegates;4 unfamiliar with the preparatory conference;5
expected great success and a final treaty by the end of the second
session.

Others were very pessimistic, feeling that there never

would be a comprehensive ocean treaty with over half the world
barely having the right to exist as sovereign States:

6

Generally, meetings were concerned with expressions of Official
national positions in long, rambling statements.

Behind closed

14. I estimate that approximately 5,000 delegates were present
over the course of the eight-week session.
15. The committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction met from
1969 to 1973.
16. I found this attitude among press people in particular.
6

doors negotiations ac hieved moderate success in the consolidation of those positions.
It seemed that much of the real negotiation was done at the
parties and receptions after the long tedium of the day.

Every-

one lived in close proximity to everyone else in four twentystory t owers that contained the living arrangements, shops and
confer~nce

reigned.

halls.

Parties developed easily and a gala atmosphere

It was a wonder that any work was accomplished at all.

In Caracas, the Conference was surrounded by beautiful women
and idyllic comforts.

Always just outside the windows was the

awesome poverty of the "ranchos".

The contrast was startling for,

after all, the "cornmon heritage of mankind lt was supposed to benefit
these poor people.

As the Conference session continued it became

obvious that national greed would prevail and the larger share of
marine resources would be annexed by a few States. 17 , Delegates
wended their way home exhausted with effort, aware of the problems
and difficUlties ahead and realizing that there were perhaps too
few marine resources to benefit the majority of mankind.
Even so, many were elated at the progress in the session.
They arrived in their countries to the cries of failure in the
press and the scorn of the very few interested citizens.

Few

people were aware that the Conference had taken place and even
fewer cared about its potential significance to a changing world.

17. Arvid Pardo was almost bitter at the crushing of
his ideal. He was no longer the Ambassador from Malta
but just a visiting professor that delegations paid
lip service to and forgot.

7

Amid the demands for a quick and easy settlement to law of the
sea problems, the Geneva session was held up as the final session
of the Conference before the signing of a Convent ion in Caracas.
Geneva.

swirzerland~8 once the light of calvanist Europe,

was a marked contrast to the friendly sumptuousness of Parque
Centrale.

For Geneva, it was just another Conference in a long

line of Conferences and for many delegates, Geneva was old hat.
The expensive restaurants and hotels, the pervasive racism, the
stark cleanliness of the city forced deliberations into a grey
- businesslike pattern.
The spontaneous parties were replaced by serious formal
receptions where men in expensive suits stood over drinks rehashing the events of the day~9 The delegates had changed, too.

Gone

were many familiar faces especially from the developing world.
Negotiations were more substantive and committees were closed
while delegates presented informal positions and debated the
meanings of words.

Proposal on proposal was tabled thereby

leading to the single negotiating text, compiled by the chairpersons of each committee and the President of the Conference.
Delegates again returned home to the cries of failure and
few people not at the session realized that progress had been
achieved.

It became fashinnable to criticize the Conference and

call for an end to the entire ridiculous, money-wasting escapade.
Newspaper editors were less naive in their expectations for the

18. The Third Session of the Conference met in Geneva from
March 17 to May 8, 1975
19. I estimate that 3,000 delegates attended in the course of
the session.

8

fourth session to be held in the

spring~O They condemned it to

failure months ahead of time and wondered at the value of pursuin9 such idealistic rhetoric.

Was it not better to proceed

unilaterally to secure the aims of the nation?21
New York was even worse than Geneva.

There had been no

choice, as no other State had offered to host the Conference.
Delegates22 met amidst the filth and squallor of this COld
industrialized city of cement and glass.
cheaper than

Geneva~

activities available.

Certainly it was

there was less racism and more CUltural
In Geneva it was easy to escape the city

for warmer southern climes or colder snowy slopes.

In New York,

it was next to impossible to escape the clutches of the city in
anything approximating a reasonable amount of time.
Again, new staff took over in many delegations.

Many won-

dered how a comprehensive treaty could ever be concluded when
delegations changed fueir members so frequently.

The half truth

used to justify the rotations was that the capitals of States
made the decisions and not the delegates.

The real truth was

that the expenses of the Conference had weighed heavily on the
diplomatic efforts of many developing States.

It was hard to

believe that many delegations were in constant communication with
their capitals when they rarely stopped at their mission and

20. The fourth session took place in New York, United States
of America~ at United Nations Headquarters from March 15 to May 7,
1976.
21. This was true in most developed States and some developing States.
22. I estimate that 3,000 delegates attended at various times
in the session.
9

and never knew who the other members of their delegations would
be until they arrived in New York to negotiate.
Racially, delegates were more welcome in New York than in
Geneva, but fear of the street bred a closed rnindedness.

To

have this ugly, filthy, dangerous city as the headquarters of the
United Nations seemed incomprehensible to those not used to New
York; but then, there it was.

There we stayed for yet another

session~3 Negotiations became intense and delegations worked
hard to achieve a compromise •.
In looking toward the sixth session~4 there is a desperation that has siezed delegates.

The major confrontations between

the developed and the third world, capitalist and socialist States
and unilateral declarations and the higher aims of world compromise
nave lead to a tremendous pessimism.
-

fail.

Perhaps the Conference will

Perhaps it will be postponed for two years.

Yet the

invest~

ment of time and money as well as the changes in the world order
created by a comprehensive ocean treaty must be enough to foster
agreement and lead to a betterment of mankind.

Perhaps the

principle value of the Conference has been the tremendous educational experiences it has afforded.

This will certainly not be

lost on delegations and future deliberations.

23. T~e fifth session was held in New York from August 2
to September 17, 1976.
24. The sixth session will start May 23, 1977, and will
last approximately eight weeks.
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S1'ROC TURE
The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
. .
. ,
.
25
was dlvlded along llnes establlshed for the preparltory Conference.
The plenary consisted of all delegates of all delegations and
was generally used to make formal what had already been negotiated
in closed sessions.

In the fifth session, it took on a new func-

tion as a forum for debating in closed session proposed articles
on dispute settlement.

In the future,

it will look at drafts

of the preamble and final clauses to the Convention.
Each of three primary committees was empowered with specific
issues to consider, again stemming from the preparitory Conference. 26
Within these committees, SUbcommittees often discussed specific
topics or working groups tried to obtain limited agreement on
articles.

By the Geneva session, the semi-official and unofficial

groups had proliferated to the point where few delegates knew
who _was in what group and what was being discussed.

Many groups

25. The committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean
Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.
26. Mandates as expressed in General Assembly Resolution 2750
(XXV) Sub-<: ommittee I I
"To prepare draft treaty articles embodying
the international regime including international machinery for the
area and the resources of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof. beyond the limite of national jurisdiction, taking
into account equitable sharing by all States in the benefits to be
derived therefrom, bearing in mind the special interests and needs
of developing countries, whether coastal or landlocked, on the basis
of the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean
Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, economic implications resulting from the exploitation of

11

were known to exist somewhere on the fringes of the Conference,
meeting in private apartments.

others, few delegates knew existed.

So~e delegates speculated that the division of the Conference into

so many groups would lead to little progress.

Delegations of sim-

ilar inclination would always talk to each other and not negotiate
with their antagonists.

In retrospect, this time was needed as

common positions were created.
Many groups revolved around similar geographic locations or
common concerns~7 Voting would only take place after States agreed
on articles and minority group concerns were satisfied.

Through

concensus, it was hoped to build a treaty acceptable to all States
and of benefit to the whole of mankind.

If every state received

something from the treaty that it considered vital to its national
interest, chances of ratification and implimentation of the Convention were great.

If only a few States benefited from the Convention,

resources of the area as well as the particular needs and problems
of land-locked countries. n; Sub-Committee II;
"To prepare a comprehensive list of subjects and issues relating to the law of the sea,
including those concerning the regimes of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea (including the question of its
breadth and the question of international straits) and contiguous
zone, fishing and conservation of the living resources of the high
seas (inCluding the question of preferential rights of coastal
States) and to prepare draft treaty artiCles thereon. It is understood that the Sub-Committee may decide to draft articles before
completing the comprehensive list of subjects and issues relating
to the law of the sea."; Sub-c ommittee III z "To deal with the preservation of the marine envi~onment (inclUding inter alia, the
prevention of pollution and scientific research and to prepare
draft treaty artiCles thereon. ". In: Report of the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, VOl.I, General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-Eighth Session, Supplement No. 21, 'A/9021),
New York, United Nations), 1973, P. 6.
27. See Tables II, III, and ~V.

12

it would fail.
As with all i~portant conferences, there existed another negotiating level.

Bilateral and limited mUltilateral negotiations

were undertaken behind the scenes to attempt to settle questions
of

con~ern

to a limited number of States.

Most notable in this

category were discussions between certain developed

State~

and

States c orrc r o l Li.nq crucial world straits.
An additional level of negotiation was used where important
issues Mere to be discussed.

This was the initiative approach.

An expert or minister of a developed state would appear to contact

key delegations of developing States in an attempt to reach a compromise.
Above all, the Third united Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea was politically motivated.

Amid the high-sounding

phrases and the talk of a new world order, States were looking
after their own national interests by taking the largest piece
of ocean wealth for themselves with little heed to equitable distribution.

The age-old practice of territorial conquest was not

destroyed with the end of colonialism but was transformed in
appearance.

No people would be displaced through this conquest,

so there would be no one to cry out over the injustices done •

.

In a resource-short world, the profound implications of which
states controlled large areas of ocean resources was likely to
widen the gap between rich and poor nations, unless radical policy
changes occurred in the international affairs of developed States.
The extension of the rule of law over ocean space would be based on

13

a

~awyers'

compromise_ and few

states would be
,

l.ed • 28

satlsf~
0

28. One is reminded of Joseph Bockrath, Environmental Law
for Enaineers. Scientists and Manaaers, (New York, McGraw-Hill
Book r ompany, 1977), P. 3.:
"The idea of a balance of interests
in determining a result is deeply rooted in all areas of the law
.•. The "right" answer from the law's view is often fUlly satisfactory to neither party."

14

CHAPTER 1

The Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
Th e

.

quest~on

of t h e

.,

terr~tor~al

sea 29 h as for

.

centur~es

an important portion of international maritime law.

b een

However, at

the Caracas session, extension of territorial sea limits to
twelve miles

3 0 was a foregone conclusion.

Three alternative texts

were produced that defined its nature and characteristics and
appeared in C2/WPI.

Formula A provided that the sovereignty of a

state extended beyond its land territory and internal waters to
a belt of sea adjacent to its coast.

Such sovereignty included

the air space over the territorial sea as well as the seabed and
subsoil beneath.
Alternative B added the words "or archipelagic" after the
mention of internal waters.

A further difference allowed for a

plurality of regimes within the territorial sea.

Alternative C

included the ' phrase "and in the case of archipelagic states and
their archipelagic waters," after internal waters.

Two new concepts were immediately introduced at the Caracas

29. Considered here will be drafts; A/Conf. 62/e2/WFI from
Caracas, here e 2/WPl; A/e onz , 6 2/e 2/L8 8 from Geneva, here C 2/L88
submitted by Ecuador; A/e onf , 62/e 2/L90 from Geneva, here C 2/
L90 submitted by Turkey; A/Conf. 62/C2/WP8/Part II from Geneva,
here WP8/Part II; A/Conf. 62/e2/WP8/Rev. l/Part II from New York,
here WP8/Rev. 1.

30. Hereafter, miles will refer to nautical miles.

15

session.

The concept of archipelagic states and their waters

was further

discussed~l The desire to create a plurality of systems

in the territorial sea was to be a focal point of conflict.
first alternative applied to all coastal States.
to all States but specifically

me~tioned

The

The second applied

archipelagos.

Thus, even

.
.
b
'
arch1pelagos
occup1ed
y a fore1gn
power caul d h ave t h'1S status.32

The third approach allowed all coastal States including archipelagic states these privileges.

Dependencies were not included.

The Geneva text, WP8/Part II, combined alternatives A and C and
this was later reflected as an accepted text in WF8/Rev. 1.
Breadth of the Territorial Sea
The second session of the Conference recorded three main positions, in

C2~vPt,

in delimiting the territorial sea.

One alterna-

tive set a twelve mile outer limit to the territorial sea as
measures from appropriate baselines.

Another allowed an outer

limit of 200 nautical miles and the last provided that any State
already having a territorial sea greater than that provided in the
convention would not be subject to limits imposed in the Convention.
WP8/Part II included an outer limit of twelve miles as the
territorial sea boundary.

Alternative proposals in Geneva pro-

vided that States could establish their own territorial seas up

31. See Chapter 6 - Archipelagos.
32. See Chapter 6 - Colonial Uccupation.

16

to a certain unspecified mileage

1~mit33

and a definition of a

200-mile territorial sea in which two zones would be created within
the territorial sea at the discretion of the coastal

State~4 In

the inner zone, ships would have the right of innocent passage and
the coastal state would have specific sovereign rights.

Beyond

the inner zone, a regime of freedom of passage for ships would
exist and notification of the coastal State was required for many
actions, including exploration, exploitation and conservation of
marine resources, preservation of the marine environmen t, marine
scientific research, security of navigation and marine transportat ion.

This was an attempt at reconciliation for States with

territorial seas already declared to be greater than twelve miles.
In the fourth session, WP8/Rev. 1 again expressed a twelvemile territorial sea but compromise seemed near at hand.

One

form or another of a twelve-mile territorial sea would be accepted
, was coupled wlth
'
'
.
as long as ~t
a 2 00 -m~le
economlC
zone. 35

At

the fifth session, there was no discussion of the breadth of
the territorial sea.

Most States seemed to accept a twelve-mile

territorial sea although some of the "territorialist States,,36
still wished to discuss the issue.

33. Proposal of Turkey_ C2/L90.
34. Proposal of Ecuador, C2/L88.
35. See Chapter 3.

36. States Claiming a 200-mile territorial sea.

17

Baselines
The articles on baselines were heavily discussed in Caracas.

The compilation of all the discussion became two articles in '
C2!WPI.

One article defined territorial sea baselines as the

low water line along the coast, except under special circumstances.
The other alternative allowed coastal states to adopt their own
methods of drawing baselines according to the topographic features
of the coast.
WP8/Part II amplified all the articles from the second session.
Baselines were a series of strait lines, particularly applicable
to states with long coastlines in response to differing conditions
of the coastline.

They were not to depart substantially from the

general direction of "the coast and sea areas were to be sufficiently
linked to land as to be internal waters.

Unless perminently estab-

lished installations were present, strait baselines were not to be
drawn to and from low tidal elevations.

Economic interests of

long usage might be taken into account.
Low Tidal Elevations
WP8/Part II defined low tidal elevations as naturally formed
areas of land surrounded by and above water at low tide but submerged at high tide.

Low tidal elevations might be used as base

points for measuring the territorial sea when inside the territorial
sea.

If located outside the territorial sea_ they could not be so

used.

This article was an important compromise between the mari-

time states, wishing to disallow low tidal

e~evation ~ s e

from

territorial sea delimitation_ and island and archipelagic states,
insisting on their use as base points.

The compromise was sub-

stantially accepted at Geneva and reflected in the New York text.
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The Geneva text further defined several special cases.

Island

baselines could be measured from the seaward edge of reefs as
shown on official charts.

Where coastlines were deeply indented

or a fringe of islands was present, strait baselines could be
used.

Another special case allowed States with unstable coastlines

to draw baselines joining points selected along the farthest seaward extension of the low water line.
For all the above cases, States might not draw strait baselines in a way that cut off the high seas, territorial sea, or
economic zone of another State.

A coastal state might also employ

mixed baselines or draw baselines by methods that suited different
conditions.

states were to clearly indicate boundaries on large

scale maps.
WP8/Rev.1 agreed substantially with the Geneva draft but
suppressed the use of mixed baselines in favor of methods suited
to different conditions.

Articles requiring listing of baselines

on charts were supplimented by allowing a list of geographical
coordinates of the base points, specifying geodetic datum, to be
substituted for charts.
Positions of various States were reflected in these provisions.

I~land

States as well as States with deeply indented

coasts were allowed special methods.

States with constantly

changing deltaic coast lines had their special interests considered.

The intent of the articles were to ensure equitable

definition of the territorial sea under conditions flexible
enough to include the special circumstances of all States.

The

provision for states to use methods ,s u i t e d to different conditions
might lead to unreasonable baseline claims.
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Rivers and Bays in the Territorial Sea

The Geneva text gave rivers special consideration in defining

A strait line could be used across the river mouth

baselines.

between points on the low tide line of each bank.

The New York

text agreed with these articles and included others found in
WP8/Part II.
Where a bay belonged to only one State, as a non-historic
bay, a special definition was used.

They were.

"well marked indentations whose penetration is in such
a proportion to the width of its mouth as to contain
landlocked waters and constitutes 'more than a mere curvature of the coast."37
Such an indentation was not a bay unless its area was as large as
or larger than that of a semicircle whose diameter was a line
drawn across the mouth of the indentation.

38

The area of an indentation lay between the low water mark
around the shore and a line joining the low water mark of its
natural entrance point.

Where there was more than one mouth due

to the presence of islands, the semicircle might be drawn as a
line as long as the total lengths of all the lines between the
islands.

Islands within indentations might be considered a part

of the water area.
Where the distance between low water marks of the natural
entrance points of the bay did not exceed twenty-four miles, a
closing line might be drawn between the two water marks

37. Article 9 of WP/8 Part II.
38. See Figure I,
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and the waters enclosed would be considered internal waters.
Where the bay's mouth exceeded twenty-four miles, strait baselines
within the bay might be drawn to enclose the maximum area of water
. h
w~t

iln t h e . length of t h e llne.
.
39

The basic concepts for baselines were developed in Caracas,
many being previously derived at the 1958 Geneva Conference." C onsideration of these baseline definitions took place in the fourth

By the fifth session, these art-

session but little was changed.

icles seemed to be accepted by most States.
Harbor Works and Roadsteads
WPB/Part II and WPB/Rev.l again reflected articles discussed
in Caracas.

In delimiting the territorial sea, permanent harbor

works, forming an integral part of the harbor system, were
dered as part of the COast.

consi~

Offshore installations or artificial

islands were not permanent harbor works.

Roadsteads used for normal

shipping functions and laying outside the territorial sea were
considered part of the territorial sea.
The fundamental problem of where the demarcations lines
should be placed was well described in these articles.

Road-

steads were of particular interest to States with canals used for
international shipping.

Frequently, hundreds of ships would .wa i t

in a roadstead to go through the canal.

They represented a

security hazard and a liability for c03stal states and states
wished protection from actions of vessels or damage that might arise.

39. See Figure I.

21

opposite and Adjacent states

CZ/WPI listed various alternatives to delimitation of the
territorial sea between opposite and adjacent states.

One prevent-

ed extension of the territorial sea beyond the median line.
Another called for such delimitation according to equitable principles using a combination of delimitation methods.

A further

suggestion based such delimitations on mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, equality and reciprocity.
The Geneva text, WP8/Part II, reflected an additional formula
of C2/WPl.

Where opposite and adjacent states did not agree on

territorial sea delimitation, neither State was entitled to extend
its territorial sea beyond the median line, every point of which
was equidistant for the nearest points of the territorial sea
baseline.

This provision was not applicable to special circum-

stances including those of historic rights.
Little progress was made on these articles in the fourth
session and WP8/Rev.l remained identical with the previous draft.
Some States thought that the emphasis was placed on solutions of
such disputes through equitable principles instead of the median
line principle.

In the fifth session, articles were presented

to strengthen the median line as a basis for delimitation.

Res-

olution of this issue will depend on the solutions achieved with
respect to delimitation of the economic zone between opposite and
.
S tates.40
a d Jacent

40. See Chapter 3 - Opposite and Adjacent States
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Coastal States' Law-Making Powers
Again WP8/Fart II incorporated the formulas of CZ/WPl into a
compromise.

It gave coastal States the right to make regulations

and laws concerning safety of navigation. regulation of marine
traffic,designation of sea lanes. traffic separation schemes.
protection of navigational aids and facilities. protection of
resource exploration and exploitation facilities. protection of
cables and piQelines, conservation of living resources, prevention of infringement of fisheries' regulations, preservation of
the marine environment, prevention of pollution, marine scientific
research, hydrographic surveys, and prevention of infringement
of customs, fiscal, immigration, quarantinejsanitary, or phytosanitary regulations of the coastal State.
Also produced in Geneva was draft C2/L88.

This allowed for

coastal State control over the internal zone created by the territorialist States in their 200-mile territorial sea.

In t ne exter-

nal zone, coastal states had competence over exploration, exploitation, conservation and administration of all resources, either
economic activity, including energy production using water,
currents and winds, laying of pipelines and cables, preservation
of the marine environment, pollution control, authorization and
control of scientific research, emplacement and use of artificial
islands, installations, structures and devices, customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitary pOlicies and other inherent rights of
coastal State sovereignty.
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The New York text was essentially the same as WP8/Part II
but included prevention of infringement of fisheries' regulations
under the coropetences of coastal states.

The difference between

these texts and CZ/L88 was the width of the territorial sea zone.
Rules for All ShiRs in the Territorial Sea
A great point of conflict was the rights to be given to
. . 1n
.
'h
"
sh1ps
trans1t
t roug h t h e terr1tor1al
sea. 41

F orrou 1 a A 0 f

C2/WPI allowed all ships to enjoy the right of innocent passage
through the territorial sea.

Formula B as amplified by the terr-

itorialist States in C2/L88 fixed an unspecified limit near the
coast within which all ships would enjoy innocent passage.

Beyond

that limit, freedom of passage would exist.
WP8/Part II gave ships the right of

continuous and exped-

itious navigation through the territorial sea without entering
internal waters or calling at roadsteads or facilities outside
internal waters or proceeding from or to internal waters.

Inno-

cent passage included stopping and anchoring if these actions
were incidental to ordinary navigation, were rendered necessary
by Force maieure or for rendering assistance to parties in distress.

These articles were also found in WP8/Rev.l.

Non-innocent Passage
The crux of the territorial sea passage question was defining what was meant by non-innocent passage so that States could
be sure of their competences.

All the formulas expressed in

41. See Chapter 7 - Preservation of the Marine Environment.

24

C2/WPl were incorporated into the Geneva text.
certain actions as non-innocent.

WP8/Part II listed

These included actions prejudi-

cial to the peace, good order and security of the coastal state,
actions threatening or using force against the territory or political independence of coastal states and actions violating the
United Nations Charter.

Actions involving exercise or practice

with weapons and collection of information prejudicial to the
defense of coastal states were listed as well as propaganda
aimed at affecting the defense or security of coastal states,
the launching, landing or taking aboard of aircraft or military
devices or the embarkation or debarkation of currency, commodities or people contrary to the customs, fiscal and sanitary regulations of the state.

Also included in non-innocent passage

were marine research and survey, wilfull pollution, interference
with communications systems or other facilities, and actions not
bearing on the passage of vessels.

Any non-innocent activities could be carried out with the consent of the.' coastal State.

In cases of Force majeure, distress

or rendering assistance, foreign ships were required to inform
the coastal State promptly of its actions.

Submarines and under-

water vehicles were required to navigate on the surface and show
their flags.
The New York text agreed with WP8/Part II but changed the
mention of wilfull pollution to read wilfull and serious pollUtion, contrary to the convention and included fishing activities
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as non-innocent.
In these texts, coastal States were g~ven substantial powers
to determine what was non-innocent passage; but, international
guidelines were to be followed.

This seemed to represent a fair

compromise between coastal states, wishing to decide for themselves what passage was innocent, and mercantile States, insisting
on a minimum of interference with shipping.

It is unclear whether

this definition has been accepted by all States.
C2!WPl, WP8/Part II, and WP8/Rev.l all provided that innocent
passage regUlations were not to apply to design, construction,
manning or equipment of foreign vessels.

Publication of all regu-

lations and foreign vessels' compliance was mandatory.

Coastal

States were also to pUblicize dangers to navigation in the territorial sea and abstain from discrimination against foreign vessels.
WP8/Part I I and WP8/Rev.l included a section allowing coastal
States to

t ~mporarily

suspend innocent passage in specific areas

of the territorial sea for security reasons.

Imposition of regu-

lations that denied the right of innocent passage was forbidden.
Sea Lanes and Traffic Separation
Consideration of traffic separation schemes started in Caracas
and was reflected in several formUlas of C2/WP1.

One formUla

required tankers and ships carrying inherently dangerous and noxious substances to notify coastal States of their passage and confine their passage to previously designated sea lanes.

A

tanker

was defined as a ship used for bulk carriage of liquid petroleum,
natural gas, or any highly inflamable, explosive or pollutive substance.
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A second formula in C2/WPl listed the types of special ships
whose passage could be regulated in the territorial sea.

These

included nuclear powered ships, ships carrying nuclear arms, marine
research and hydrographic survey ships, oil tankers, chemical tankers
carrying harmful or noxious liquid substances in bulk, and ships
carrying nuclear substances and materials.

The coastal state

might require prior notification or authorization for passage of
these ships.
From the beginning a split was created between developed maritime States, excepting coastal State control of tankers, and developing states, insisting on control over every type of dangerous
ship, including warships.

Their desire for a right of authoriza-

tion of passage for such ships implied a right of refusal.

Devel-

oped States could not accept provisions that would inhibit maritime
passage.
The Geneva text reduced these alternatives to a compromise.
It used the term ships with special characteristics and gave coastal
States the right to require foreign shipping to use clearly demarcated sea lanes and traffic separation schemes.

WP8/Part II indi-

cated that ships carrying special cargos or inherently dangerous
and noxious substances use specified sea lanes.

Nucle~r

powered

ships or ships transporting nuclear substances were to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures, established by
international agreement.
The text allowed coastal states to modify traffic separation
schemes after due publicity anq to consider recommendations of
competent international organizations, channels customariLy used
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for international shipping and the' special characteristics of particular ships and channels.
WP8/Rev. 1 changed the ~mphasis of the articles· in favor of
the maritime states.

Coastal states might require sea lanes and

traffic separation schemes where necessary for safe navigation.
Coastal states t rights to change sea lanes were not included.
Coastal states were to consider the density of traffic in establishing sea lanes.

Under the New York text, both nuclear ships

and ships carrying dangerous and noxious substances were required
to carry documents and observe special precautionary measures
established by international agreement.
Thus, coastal States were only able to designate sea lanes
if specific criteria were met.

This was a long way from the coastal

State control envisioned in the Caracas draft.

Coastal States

were unable to prevent such vessels from traversing their territorial sea.
None of the formulas seem to cover all the possible problems
that will arise.

A referenceID or a list of harmfUl and noxious

substances will be necessary if coastal States are to have any
protection.

Transport of such substances must be carefully mon-

itored before, during, and after transport to minimize the dangers.
Notification of all States into whose territorial seas such cargos
will pass as well as timetables and course determinations shOUld
be filed' with a competent international organization and the coastal
States involved.
Included in WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev. 1 were articles not
found in the Caracas draft.

Where ships exercising the right of
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innocent passage in the territorial sea did not comply with the
laws and regulations concerning navigation, they were liable
for damages caused to the coastal State.

If the coastal State

acted in a manner contrary to the convention, loss or damage resulting from application of its laws over foreign vessels was to
be paid by the coastal state to the owners of the ship.
This article seems reasonable in protecting the rights of
both the coastal State and the ship owner from unjustified damage
or hindrance.

It would be better to include absolute liability

provisions for damage from nuclear ships or ships carrying noxious
or harmful substances.
WP8/Rev.l moved an article found in the section on merchant
vessels in WP8/Part II to this section concerning all ships.

It

prevented the levying of charges upon foreign ships solely due to
innocent passage through the territorial sea.

Non-discriminate

charges were permitted for specific services rendered by the
coastal State to the foreign vessel.
Merchant Ships
The problems of passage for me r c h a n t ships in the territorial
•
sea were thought by mercantile States to be complicated enough without introduction of more regulations.

They felt that because

9~~

of the world's goods moved by sea, any hindrance would cause world
economic paralasis.

Coastal States feared that a guaranteed free-

dom of movement for ships might lead, as in the past, to environmental abuses or espionage and military actions.
C2/WP1, WP8/P?rt II, and WP8/Rev.l provided that coastal
State criminal jurisdiction could only be exercised on board a
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foreign ship passing through the territorial sea to arrest persons
or investigate actions where the crime committed had consequences
extending to the coastal State.

If the crime disturbed the peace

or good order of the country and the territorial sea , if as s i.at ance-.
had been requested by the ships' captain or consular officer of
the flag state, or if illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances was involved.
Where vessels passed through the territorial sea after leaving
internal

waters~

the coastal state could investigate or make arrests

on board the vessel.
required~

Notification of the consular officer was

upon the captain's request 7 of all actions taken; in

emergency cases 7 notification could be communicated while action
was in progress.
Foreign vessels were not to be stopped or diverted by coastal
States while passing through the territorial sea for civil jurisdiction.

Ships could not be arrested for the purpose of civil

proceedings, save only for obligations or liabilities assumed or
incurred by the ship itself in the course of its voyage through
the waters of the coastal state.

Coastal States could arrest and

execute civil proceedings against vessels passing from their
internal waters to the territorial sea.
Government Ships
The Caracas. Geneva and Ne w York texts created special regimes
for government ships.

If these ships were operating

commercially~

the rules for all ships and merchant ships would apply.
ula reflected in

C2~~Pl

One form-

gave government ships operating for commer-

cial purposes immunity from regUlation.
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This was quickly rejected

by

most states.
Warships were another case.

Many States felt that warships

threatened their security just by passing through their territorial
waters.

The naval powers insisted that their presence was necess-

ary for world peace and security.

Warships were defined in the

Caracas and subsequent texts as ships belonging to the armed forces
of a State bearing distinguishing external markings, under the
command of a duly commissioned officer, whose name appeared

~n

the

appropriate service list Or its equivalent, and manned by a crew
under regular armed forces discipline.

The rules applicable to

all ships were also applied to warships.
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l amplified the Caracas draft in
stating that warship non-compliance with coastal State laws and
regUlations in the territorial sea and disregard of requests for
such compliance might result in demands for the warship to leave
the territorial sea by a safe and expeditious route
the coastal state.

determine~

by

The flag State was held liable for damage to

the coastal State or its property caused by the warship.
A very sticky issue appeared in Caracas.

Coastal States

wanted the power to require prior notification or authorization
for foreign warship passage through its territorial sea, as reflected in one Caracas alternative.

Maritime States succeeded

in eliminating all mention of prior authorization for warship
passage for succeeding texts.
These formulas on warship passage through the territorial
sea are not realistic.

If warships and governments are truly to

be held accountable for their actions, something more than the
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right to tell a violator to leave the territorial sea and a request
for damages will be required.

It is not unrealistic for states,

fearing for their own security, to require prior authorization or
notification of warship passage.

Smaller States insist that the

naval powers do not indiscriminantly sail into the territorial sea
of other large naval powers.
war.

This would be considered an act of

Prior notification and authorization is required.
Smaller States insist that they should have the same privileges

as large naval powers because they are sovereign equals.

Today,

few developing States have the fire power to challenge a warship
entering its territorial sea.

One day, this may not be the case.

The best sOlution is to allow warships to pass through the territorial sea but bind them to prior notification, and authorization,
and require them to use specific sea lanes.
All these arguments do not make sense in light of the traditional interpretation of a territorial sea.

Under the three-

mile territorial sea regime, the territorial sea was equivalent to
the land territory in terms of coastal State jurisdiction.

The

right of innocent passage of vessels was the only exception to
this rule and that right did not include warships.

It would seem

that with the extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles,
naval powers and maritime States are attempting to limit the competence of the coastal State in the

terr~torial

sea by specifying

specific rules that coastal States and passing vessels must observe,
and by defining innocent passage as to benefit passage of military
vessels.

It is unclear whether this is meant to be a plurality

of regimes in a twelve-mile territorial sea or whether coastal
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states will be unable to prevent foreign powers from encroaching on
their territorial waters.

Perhaps all the discussion over compe-

tences in the territorial sea is a means of reassuring States
that their powers in a twelve-mile territorial sea will be identical with what they now enjoy in a three-mile territorial sea.
The (' ontiouous Zone
The necessity of creating a contiguous zone beyond the territorial sea was debated during many Conference sessions.

In Caracas,

some States wanted the contiguous zone to be part of the territorial sea.

Others wanted a zone beyond the territorial sea from

twelve to fifty miles to protect ships waiting in roadsteads and
their own security.
zone beyond the

still other States talked abaut a contiguous

200-mil~

limit.

WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l utilized what most delegations con-

-= sidered to be an acceptable text, providirg there was an adequate
definition of the territorial sea and the economic zone.

It pro-

vided for a zone contiguous to the territorial sea where coastal
States might exercise customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitation
regulations and punish infringement of such regUlations.

The

i.ontiguous zone was not to extend beyond twenty-four miles from
territorial sea baselines.
It is difficUlt for this observer to understand why this zone
is necessary.

Under these articles, the coastal State has firm

control out to twelve miles.

It is

u~likely

that coastal State

concerns will not be accommodated in the economic zone.

33

commentary
In the Caracas session, a half-hearted attempt was made by
some of the defense departments of the major naval powers to prevent extension of the territorial sea to twelve miles.
They argued .t h a t this extension would place 116 critical
straits 4 2 under the total sovereignty of coastal States.

Accommo-

dation of this viewpoint created separate consideration of the
.
reglme
of s t ra1' t S. 43

The positions of states at the Conference were a function of
their perceptions of the realities of the world.

Extension of

territorial sea jurisdiction had taken place sine the Truman Declaration of 1945.

By 1973, fifty-five states claimed a twelve-

mile territorial sea, thirty-five states claimed the traditional
three miles, nine states claimed six miles, one state claimed ten,
four others eleven miles, and one
a territorial sea.

Stat~

claimed eighteen miles as

Twenty-four States with territorial sea juris-

dictions less than twelve miles claimed fishing zones or other jurisdictions beyond twelve miles. 4 4

In addition, twenty States

claimed territorial seas beyond twelve miles.

45

These States

42. See Table V.
43 See Chapter 2.
44. Limits in the Seal National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction,
No. 36, (Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
1974) •
45. See Table I.
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frequently incorporated their territorial sea limits in their constitutions and could not accept an international convention that
would force them to start the difficult process of constitutional
amendment.

Clearly any attempt to limit the territorial sea to

less than twelve miles was impossible.
Even the twelve-mile territorial sea limit was unacceptable
to many states.

By the fifth session, most states had accepted

the substative portions of the territorial sea articles, but had
difficulty with its distance from shore.
There is little doubt that a territorial sea limit of twelve
miles will be adopted either through the Convention or unilaterallY.
What worries observers more is the likely extension of jurisdiction
beyond the twelve-mile limit if the Conference fails.
Recent actions taken by the United States of America have
created a worldwide stampede to extend fisheries'
200 miles. 46

jurisdictions to

These actions will only strengthen the claims of the

territorialist States to a 200-mile territorial sea.

It is likely

tha t most of the south and Central American states not Claiming a
200-mile territorial sea will do so within the next few years if no
Convention is forthcoming.

certain African and Asian States may

also follow suit. 4 7

46. Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
47. See the commentary under the economic zone in Chapter 3.

CHAPTER 2
straits Used for International Navigation
The regime of

.

stra~ts

.
.
used for ~nternat~onal

.

t i

nav~ga ~on
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a major point of conflict in considering the territorial sea.

Most

developed States insisted that freedom of passage through straits
was essential for maritime commerce and the health of the world
economy.

Many developing states saw no difference between a strait

and any other area lying within the territorial sea or economic
zone and felt the regimes should be the same.

They feared oil

spills and security threats and viewed control over straits as a
matter of self-defense.
Definition of Straits
The Caracas session produced four alternative definitions of
a strait used for international navigation.

The first defined a

strait as a stretch of water used for international navigation connecting two parts of the high seas.

The second definition had the

strait being a stretch of water connecting two parts of the high
seas or the high seas with the territorial sea of one or more
foreign states.

The third definition deleted reference to connect-

ing two parts of the high seas and used the connection between the

48. Documents dealt with in this section ares A/Conf.62/WPl
compiled in Caracas, here C 2/WP1; A/C onf , 62/HP8/Part II from Geneva,
here WP8/Part II; A/Conf.62/WF8/Rev.l/Part II from New York, here
WP8/Rev.l.
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~ea of one or more foreign States.

high seas and the territorial

The fourth definition held that a strait was a natural passage
between two land formations which lay within the territorial sea
of one or more states and joined unspecified zones of jurisdiction.
The requirement of being traditionally used for international navigation was also included.
Some care had been taken in the second session to outline the
main perceptions on the definition of straits, depending on the
width of the jurisdictional zones each State supported.

In the

Third session, WP8/Part II defined a strait as applying to areas
used for international navigation between one area of the high seas
or an exclusive economic zone and another area of the high seas or
exclusive economic zone.

These articles did not apply where a

high seas or economic zone route of similar convenience existed.
Strait States had the right to determine whether such routes were
of similar convenience and, if so, regulate the strait.
Emphasis, in WP8/Part II, was placed on the rights of strait
states to control a strait for resource exploitation and other
purposes.

The status of internal waters within a strait was not

affected unless prior to drawing strait baselines it had been part
of

th e terr1tor1al sea or h1g
O

•

•

•

h
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seas.

The status of waters beyond

t h e territorial sea and that of straits in which passage had been
regUlated by long-standing agreement was not to be effected by the
convention.

Strait States were defined as States bordering a strait.

49. See definition of baselines in Chapter 1.
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The third session produced many new concepts showing a profound
study by delegations of the problems of defining a strait.

Strait

states were given clear control of straits for resource and other
exploitat ion uses.

straits falling within the territorial sea

would be controlled by strait states but those falling in the economic zone or the high seas would have a special regime.
Although few States were happy with the articles as they stood,
little change appeared in the fourth session.

Intense behind-the-

scenes negotiations took place leading to minor changes in WP8/Rev.l.
Areas of internal waters within straits were seen as identical to
any internal waters of a state except where establishing of straight
baselines enclosed areas not previously considered as internal
waters.

There was no change in these articles in the fifth session,

although behind-thE-scenes negotiations continued.
Tynes of Passaae
The difficUlt question throughout the negotiations involved
what type of passage vessels would assume when going through
straits and the power of coastal states over those vessels.

The

Caracas session produced several alternatives concerning such
powers.

One formula made no distinction between strait passage

and that of the territorial sea, reflecting the position of most
strait states.

Another formula applied innocent passage to straits

no more that six miles wide.

Here an attempt was made by maritime

states to create different passage regimes for different widths of
straits.

Another formula limited the regime of innocent passage

to straits leading from the high seas to the territorial sea and
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prohibited its suspension.

An additional formula made straits

.

'

lying within the territorial sea an inseparable part of the territorial sea.

The last formula divided passage into categories

depending on the type of strait J some requ iring transit passage J
others innocent passage.
The maritime State approach J as modified under the last Caracas formula J was reinforced in WP8/Part II.

The innocent passage

regime applied to straits other than those under the regime of transit
passage.

It also applied between one area of the high seas or econ-

ornic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.
cent passage regime was considered non-suspendable.

The innoAll ships

and aircrnft were given the right of unimpeded transit passage
through straits.
This attempt at compromise gave strait states substantial
control over straits within the territorial sea and other straits
not having a transit passage regime.

It was unclear in Geneva

what transit passage wasJ but was considered to be a regime between
the extremes of innocent passage and freedom of passage.

It was

defined in WP8/Part II as the exercise of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for continuous and expeditious transit
of a strait.

It did not preclude passage through straits for the

purpose of entering J leaving or returning from a State bordering
the strait.
Maritime states were unhappy with this compromise because the
innocent passage regime might still apply to the same critical
straits and vessels would be subject to the whims of coastal
States.

Strait States were unhappy with transit passage because

39

it represented a freedom of passage regime that excluded the discretionary power of the strait state over most straits.
Articles in WP8/Rev.l were essentially the same as in the previous text.
olution.

Debate continued at the fourth session with little res-

In the fifth session, a leading strait state group pro-

posed a compromise that introduced elements of an innocent passage
regime into the transit passage formUla.
rejected, but discussion was

delay~d

The proposal was not

until the sixth session.

Strait State Obliaations
One Caracas formula obliged strait states to presume that all
merchant vessels were innocent and would enjoy speedy, expeditious
and non-discriminatory passage.

Strait states could not place

facilities, structures or devices of any kind that might hamper or
obstruct ship passage in navigable channels or a strait ana all
obstacles were to be given publicity.
Another formula in C2/WPl called for cooperation between
users of straits and strait states in maintaining and marketing
of the strait but allowed strait states a free hand in placing
facilities in navigable channels.

States were not to hamper transit

passage and were to publicize dangers in the strait.
other Caracas formulas granted strait States the right to
designate specific corridors of transit under a " freedom of passage
regime.

WP8/Part II gave strait States the right to make laws

and regulations with regard to safety of navigation, regulation of
maritime traffic, the prevention of pollution, fishing vessels,
the prevention of fiShing, stowage of fishing gear and the taking
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aboard of any commodity, currency or person in contravention of
customs, fiscal immigration or sanitary regulations of the stra it
States.

Such laws were not to be discriminatory or hamper transit.

The fourth session of the Law of the Sea Conference produc~
only slight modification in these articles.

Negotiations in the

fifth session did not resolve the conflicts.

In one proposal,

coastal State power was made more specific with regard to the making
of laws and regulations.

Sea Lanes were defined and a specific

under keel clearance was specified for some straits.

Such proposals

will be discussed at the sixth session.
Duties of Vessels
The Caracas session was very concerned with prohibiting actions
of warships affecting the coastal states.

These included engaging

in gunfire, weapons exercises, launching or landing of craft, or
the undertaking of hydrographic work.
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l.

This was deleted from

Note, however, that many similar articles

appear in the two drafts concerning prohibitions of actions in the
'
.
"
t err1' t
or1al
sea b y fore1gn
m111tary
vessels. 50

Established in Caracas were articles dealing with transit
passage that were later incorporated into the Geneva and New York
texts.

Transit passage was to be without delay.

Vessels were

prohibited from any threat or use of force against the strait
State and from violating the United Nations Charter.

They could

50. See the commentary at the end of this Chapter.

41

not engage in activities other than those related to normal modes
of continuous and expeditious transit unless rendered ~ecessary by
Force majeure or by distress.

Compliance with general international

and strait State regulations, procedures, and practices for safety
at sea, prevention and control of pollution from ships, and prevention of COllisions was manditory.
Aircraft were required to observe the rules of the International
civil Aviation Organization and at all times monitor their appropriate radio frequency or international distress frequency.

Air-

craft were to remain in designated corridors and at altitudes
determined by the coastal state.

Overflight of the coastal State's

territory and threats to its security were prohibited.

These articles

were generally accepted by the end of the fourth session by most
delegations.
Sea Lanes and Traffic Separation
Three formulas appeared in C2/WP1, all of which were incorporated into the Geneva and New York texts.

They allowed strait

states to designate sea lanes and prescribe traffic separation
schemes.

states, after giving due publicity to their decisions,

might substitute other sea lanes or traffic separation schemes
for those being used.
Ships in transit were required to respect such sea lanes and
traffic separation schemes.

An international organization was to

approve such schemes proposed by the strait State.

One formula

mentioned the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.
Under WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l, the coastal State was given
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more power.

The competent international organization could adopt

traffic proposals only in agreement with the strait State after
which the strait State would designate or prescribe them.
Observers expressed dount, particularly at the Geneva session,
that many coastal states had the competence to Qesign effective
traffic separation schemes.

Technical studies were required and

the costs of navigational aids and services would be high.

It

was pointed out that international organizations could supply the
appropriate specialists for the required studies and bear some of
the expenses.

A more practical solution is already in operation

in many of the world's key maritime straits.

Each vessel is charged

a duty for the maintenance of navigational aids and clear passages.
This duty is frequently quite high and allows for adequate strait
maintenance and personnel training.
Liability
C2/WPl dealt with liability for damage caused by ships entitled
to sovereign immunity by assigning it to the flag State.
reflected in all future texts.

This was

Liability for damage or loss to the

strait state by other vessels rested with the owners of the ship or
other persons in C2/WPI.

If they were unable to pay compensation,

the flag State was held liable.

In addition, coastal States were

to compensate owners for loss or damage to foreign shipping resulting
from their activities.
texts.

These articles were deleted from future

Note, however, that WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l included

similar articles in reference to the territorial sea.
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Commentary
At the fifth Conference session, tremendous ambiguity still
existed in the texts under consideration.

Deletion of the mention

of warship rules and liability rules for other vessels from the
~

Geneva and New York texts led to one of two conclusions.

It might

be assumed that warships and other vessels in straits could not be
held accountable for their actions if the strait was perceived as
a totally separate entity from the territorial sea or the economic
zone.

It is unlikely that such freedoms were intended for these

vessels, leading to the only other conclusion .•. that the regime of
straits should apply the same articles on liability of vessels and
warships as are enumerated under the territorial sea articles.
It could be argued that since these articles were identical
but not specifically mentioned under the regime of straits, they
implied that the regime of straits and that of the territorial
sea were identical.

Furthermore, it is unclear in the texts what

straits are to apply the regimes of innocent passage or transit
passage.

All vessels are given the right of transit passage

through all straits, yet under the definition of straits, straits
not applying rransit passage are to apply innocent passage.
This ambiguity of texts is a reflection of the conflict between
the maritime States, insisting on freedom of passage, and the
strait States, viewing the regimes of the territorial sea and straits
as identical, thus requiring innocent passage for all vessels.
Proposed compromises will center on the creation of sea lanes. 5 1

51. This will be discussed in Chapter 6, under Archipelagos.
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It is unlikely that merchant traffic will be significantly affected
by a regime giving substantial power to strait states.

If a Conven-

tion is created, guidelines will insure the rights of all states
in straits.

If there is no Convention produced, strait states will most
likely extend their jurisdictions unilaterally to include straits.
Fees might be charged for the right of transit or vessels might
be barred from the strait for political reasons.

Different rules

and regulations for each strait would seriously hamper vessels'
passage and opposition to warship passage will certainly cause conflicts.

The potential conflicts arising from a failure of the

Conference are staggering, although most developed States are confident that they can conclude reasonable bilateral agreements for

strait use.
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CHAPTER 3
.
52
T h e EconomLc Zone
The Caracas alternative draft was the basis for many articles
in later texts on the economic zone.
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where it differs from subsequent drafts.

It will be considered only
The drafts presented by

the Group of 77 and the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged

States~4(LGDS), gave the coastal State the right to establish,
adjacent to its territorial sea, an economic zone of unspecified
width.

This distance was later defined in the drafts of the

Anonymous group, the Group of 77, WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l as
a zone of 200 miles as measured from appropriate baselines.
By the end of the Geneva session, there seemed to be general
agreement that a 200 nautical mile zone would be established.

The

LGDS were unwilling to agree to this zone without some compensation
and more specificity as to the rights of coastal states within the
zone.

They would loose rights already held under international law

52. WP8/part II and WP8/Rev.l do not include artiCles on Coastal
State Preferent"ial Rights or Other Non-Exclusive Jurisdiction Over
Resources Beyond the Territorial Sea. Although these articles were
extensive in the Caracas draft, they will not be discussed here
be~ause the future acceptance of an economic zone will make them
unnecessary.

53. Considered in this sec~ion will be: A/Conf.62/C2/WPI from
Caracas; Group of 77 draft from Geneva - developing states; Anonymous
group draft from Geneva - participants from all regions ·a n d groups;
Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States draft from Geneva LGDS; A/conf.62/WP8/Part I I from Geneva; A/Conf.62/WP8/Rev.l/Part I I
from New York.
54. The draft of the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
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to the coastal States and required that the resources and responsibilities of the zone be share~ among adjacent States.
Coastal State Riqhts
The crux of the dispute lay in the powers to be exerted by
the coastal state in the economic zone and the rights given to
LGDS.

The Caracas draft listed many alternative texts, most Of

which were subsumed under succeeding drafts.

It did distinguish

differences between juriSdiction, control, sovereignty, and rights
of a State.

In Geneva, the Group of 77 draft allowed coastal

State economic activity and economic rights if due regard was
paid to the rights of other States in the economic zone.
The Anonymous draft, WP8/Part II, and WP8/Rev.l granted the
c o a s t a l State sovereign rights for the purpose of exploiting and
exploring, conserving and managing all the resources within the
econom1C zone.

Sovereignty implied that coastal States could exer-

cise the same rights and controls in the economic zone over resources
as over resources within their land territory.

LGDS were afraid

that such sovereignty would lead to more unilateral action, completely denying their rights in the economic zone.
The draft of the Group of 77 and the Anonymous draft gave
coastal States juriSdiction over all economic activities in the
economic zone, inclUding the preservation of the marine environment,
scientific research, establishment and use of islands and install-

States will be discussed more fUlly in Chapter 5 - Landlocked
and Geographically Disadvantaged States.
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ations and customs, fiscal, health, and immigration matters.
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l included all the above and added jurisdiction over activities such as energy production from winds, currents
and water.
By the end of the Geneva session, coastal States had secured
effective control over all economic activities in the economic
zone under terms of sovereignty or jurisdiction.

This was tempered

by the requirement that coastal States consider the rights and duties
of other States in the zone.
Freedoms in the Economic Zone
Much debate took place in Caracas anq Geneva on what was to
be included as a freedom in the economic zone.

It became generally

accepted in Geneva that they should include navigation, overflight,
the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to navigation and communication.

The New York text concurred.
Various States took exception to this definition of freedom

in the economic zone.

The "territorialist states", Claiming a

200-mile territorial sea, insisted on an innocent passage regime
for navigation in an area within 200 miles as fixed by the coastal
State.

Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states, while

supporting strong coastal State powers, wanted to be sure that
their interests would be considerGd.
In the fifth session of the Conference, one .ma i n negotiating
group was devoted to consideration of the legal status of the economic Zone.

Some developed states insisted that the economic zone
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should have a high seas status for everything but resource exploitation.

The "territorialist States" wanted the zone to have the

status of the territorial sea.

Most states rejected these extremes

and favored a separate status for the economic zone, distinct
from that of the territorial sea or the high seas.
All the drafts agreed that in cases where the Convention did
not attribute rights or jurisdiction to the coastal state or other
states and conflicts arose, the conflict was to be settled on the
basis of equity and in the light of all relevant circumstances.
The LGDS draft provided that the dispute settlement mechanisms
handle such disputes.
Artifirial Islands
The articles· dealing - with artificial islands were quite consistent with those found in CZ/WP1.

The Anonymous draft, WPB/Part

II and WPB/Rev.l gave coastal states the exclusive right to construct, operate, authorize, regUlate, and use artificial islands,
installations and structures in the economic zone.

A safety zone

not exceeding 500 meters was required, in compliance with international standards.

These structures could not have any jurisdic-

tional zones around them.
Fisheries Resources
The Anonymous text, WP8/Part II, and WP8/Rev.l all gave coastal
States exclusive rights over the living resources of the economic
zone.

The coastal State was to determine the allowable catch and

insure against over exploitation of any stock through global,
regional, subregional, and bilateral agreements.

49

The goal was to

restore and maintain populations of harvestable species at the maximum sustainable yield, as quaLified by relevant environmental and
economic factors, including the economic needs of coastal fishing
communities and the special requirements of developing states.
Minimum subregional, regional, and global standards were called
for to deal with fishing patterns and the interdependence of stocks.
All the drafts provided that available scientific data, catch
and fishing effort statistics, and other relevant fish conservation
data be exchanged on a regular basis through global, regional, and
subregional organizations.

Effects of harvesting one species on

another dependent stock were also to be consicered as well as the
maintenance and restoration of that species.
The coastal state, after determining its capacity to harvest
the living resources of the zone, and, where it was unable to
harvest the entire catch, was required to grant access to the surplus catch to other states.
The choosing of the States to be granted access to the surplus stork was based on all relevant factors inCluding the significance of the resource to the economy of the State, the requirements
of developing states of the region, and the need to minimize dislocation of the economies of countries who have traditionally
fished in those waters.

Coastal state regUlations were to include

the licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels and equipment, payment
of fees and other forms of remuneration l

including compensation

in financing, equipment, and technOlogy related to the
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fishing industry.
Coastal states could also regulate the species caught, the
catch quota, catch per vessel, the season and areas of fishing,
and the types, sizes and amount of gear to be used.
Regulation of the age and size of fish to be caught and the
bi-catch was possible as well as requirements on the fishing
vessels, catch and effort statistics and the position of vessels.
Specific fisheries' programs and research were to be conducted
under the control of the coastal state and observers and trainees
could be placed on fishing vessels.

The landing of all or part

of the catch in the coastal States could be required and regulations on terms and conditions of joint ventures and cooperation
were to be set.
Where the same stock or stock of associate species were
found in the economic zones of two or more States, their manage~ent

was made the direct responsibility of both States.

Agree-

ment on the measures necessary to coordinate and insure the conservation and development of the stocks was required.

Where the

same stock occurred both within the economic zone and beyond, in
an adjacent zone, the coastal state and the fishing States of
the area were to seek stock conservation measures.
Highly Migratory species
· h ly mlgra
.
t ory specles
.
55 presen t eo. a spec1al
.
H 19
pro b lem for
\

la~akers

because of their wide migration patterns across man-

made boundaries.

In Caracas, two different formulas were evolved

55. See Table VI.
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to regulate and conserve these species.

The first formula gave

management of the species to the coastal State while the species
was within the economic zone and to the flag state of the fishing
vessel beyond the economic zone.

The creation of an international

organization was also required in which all fishing states would·
be represented.

This organization would regulate fishing for the

species, determine the allowable catch and the allocation insuring
fUll utilization of the species.

The special interest of the

coastal State and the economic impact on the region was to be
considered.

Reasonable fees were to be paid to the coastal state

for species caught within its economic zone according to collection and payment rules established by the regional organization.
The regional organization would col lect fees itself on species
caught within and outside of the economic zone.

Settlement pro-

cedures and interum measures were cited as the mechanism to be used
in disputes.
The second formula generated in C2/WPl required the Director
General of the Food and Agriculture Organization to decide whether
species management required the creation of an international organization.

If so, all fishing States were required to create such

an organization, empowering it to issue regulations, to conserve
and manage the species, and f o allocate quotas.

A two-thirds

majority vote was necessary for decision-making in the absence
of other agreements.

Coastal States were given priority over

other States in harvesting regulated species within the economic
zone.

Haximum sustainable yield was the Objective but traditional
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harvesting patterns and the avoidance of severe economic dislocation to States were to be considered.
Fees~ decided

by the international

organization~ from catches

inside and outside the economic zone were to defray the expenses
of the organization.

Coastal states were to receive a uniform

fee for catches in t ne economic zone.and were not obliged to pay
for their own vessel catches within the zone.

Contributions to

the international organization by all members might be required.
In Geneva~ most of these ideas went unused as WP8/Part II
tried to reconcile the two approaches.

Coastal States were given

the responsibility to regUlate the . species in the economic zone.
All the participants in the fishery were to cooperate bilaterally
and through international organizations.

The international organ-

ization was responsible for the fishery outside the economic zone.
Both coastal States and the international organization were empowered to prohibit, regUlate, and limit the exploitation of marine
animals in their respective areas.
The New York text did little to change t h i s approach but separated reference to marine animals into another artiCle.

It estab-

lished optimal utilization and conservation of stocks as objectives.
Discussion in the fifth session resulted in the dissatisfaction
of all parties.

Coas tal States wanted strong controls over the

fishery within their economic zones while distant water fishing
States wanted a more regional approach to conservation.
Neither approach is really satisfactory.

If coastal States

are granted a contrOlling hand in the economic zone, there may
be competition among COastal States to attract fees paid by
foreign vessels.

No uniform method of conservation will be adopted

so that a pOlicy of depletion of the stock in one State will affect
54

all States concerned.

On the other hand, any international organ-

ization is only as good as the States making the decisions.
Where fishing States are the only members, overfishing will be the
probable outcome.

An international organization must have the

money and power to set and enforce catch quotas according to
scientific data and not political whim.
It is no wonder that international organizations are seen
by coastal states as a method of insuring distant water fishing
supremacy in migratory fisheries.

Likewise, coastal states make

no bones about using migratory resources as a means to gain revenue
or developing their own fishery capacity to the exclusion of
foreign" vessels.

After all, migratory species are really just

another fishery resource that should be under exclusive coastal
State jurisdiction in the economic zone.
A solution must lie between these two extremes.

A system

of minimum international quotas or regulations on vessels size,
gear size, fishing effort and horsepower will go a long way to
conserve the stock.

In addition, coastal states could develop

their own standards and fishing capabilities in the economic zone.
Participation of landlocked States as a non-vested interest in
regUlatory decisions could provide a balance to fishing State
desires to exploit the stocks.

Clearly, an over fished migratory

fishery will De of use to no one.
Anadromous Species
The Caracas text included two extreme positions in the regUlation of anadromous species.

One required all States fishing

for such a species to participate in regional management and its
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regulation.

The other allowed the State of origin to totally con-

trol the stock throughout its migration, even seaward of 200 miles.
WP8/Part II and the Anonymous draft agreed closely that the
coastal State in whose rivers anadramous fish originate had the
primary interest and responsibility for such stocks.
Anadromous species were to be taken only in the economic
zone under coastal State supervision.

The State of origin was

required to minimize any severe · economic dislocations resulting
from such control.

Enforcement of regulations regarding anadro-

mous stocks beyond the economic zone was left to agreements between
the state of origin and other concerned states.

Where anadromous

species migrated through more than one economic zone, each state
was required to cooperate with the state of origin to conserve
and manage the stocks.
WP8/Rev.l made one important change in this text.

It listed

the State in whose waters anadromous species originated as the
State of origin.

Note that it was not required that the coastal

State be the State of origin.

Under certain conditions, anadro-

mous species might spawn in the rivers of landlocked States.
Whether these states would have primary control over the stocks
and their relationships to states through whose economic zones
the stock passed was unclear.
In most cases, anadromous fishing affects only a few developed
States and agreements have been signed.

States of origin do not

wish to spend large sums of money to build up anadromous stocks,
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only to have them depleted by high seas fishing.

The solution

seems to lie in allotting to distant water States a portion of
any surplus catch in the economic zone or river of the State of
origin.

It is unlikely that this will be a major issue at the

Third united Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Catadromous Species
The fifth session of the Conference approved articles on catadromous species that had been essentially the same since Caracas.
These articles delegated to the coastal State J in whose waters
catadromous species spend the greater part of their life cycle J
responsibility for managing and insuring ingress and egress of
the migrating fish.

All harvesting was to be within the economic

zone and where a species migrated through several economic zones J
management and harvesting was to be by agreement between the concerned States.
Fisheries Enforcement
The Caracas draft did not deal comprehensively with fisheries
enforcement. ' Th e Anonymous draft, WP8/Part II J and WP8/Rev.l gave
the coastal state the power to board J inspect, arrest and judicially proceed to insure compliance with coastal State regulations
on the living resources in the economic zone.

Arrested crews and

vessels were to be promptly released on posting of a reasonable
bond or security.

Penalties for fishery violations were not to

include corporal puniShment or imprisonment J and all arrests and
penalties were to be reported to the flag State.
In New York. certain coastal states were still insisting
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that imprisonment for fishing violations was possible.

Such

arrests were reflected in their legislation and was a disputed
point in bilateral negotiations.

Conflicts on these articles are

considered to be very minor and will not endanger agreement among
States.
Delimitation Between Opposite and Adjacent states
Conflicting methods of delimiting boundaries between OpposIte
and adjacent States surfaced quickly in Caracas but were considered
to be a more minor question until later sessions.

The Geneva text

cal1ed for delimitation of the economic zone in such cases to be
effected in accordance with equitable principles, employing where
appropriate, the median line principle and considering other relevant

circumst~nces.

It provided an unspecified time limit after

which dispute settlement procedures would be employed to reach a
settlement.
States were prohibited from extending their economic zones
beyond the median line and the median line was defined as the line
every point of which was equidistant from the nearest points of
the territorial sea baselines.

Where argeements were already in

force between states, delimitation of the economic zone was to
proceed in accordance with those agreements.
The New York text deleted the prohibition . on States of extending their economic zones beyond the median line.

It substituted

a clause requiring the establishment of provisional agreements
using equitable principles and the median line principle where
appropriate.
Reaction to WP8/Rev.l came In the fifth session where the
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issue of delimitation between opposite and adjacent states was
given the status of a major issue.
e~onomic

One proposal delimited the

zone by the median line method but took into account

special ~ircumstances in order to reach an equitable result.
Another proposa i stressed that no State was allowed to extend
its economic zone beyond the median line until a settlement was
reached.
Many States will encounter difficulties with such delimitations because the majority of States have small economic zones
and close borders.

The dispute over delimitation by the median

line principle or delimitation by equitable arrangements will
most probably have to wait for regional or bilateral negotiations.
A general f o rmu La is not likely to result in an acceptable Convention, although further discussion will take place in the sixth
session.
Cbmmentar¥l

Geography

Unlike the territorial sea extensions, extensions of national
jurisdiction for resource purposes and beyond twelve miles were
less common before the convening of the Law of the Sea Conferences.
Fourteen such extensions were centered on fishery zones.

Nine

States extended juriSdictions for other reasons, and this, combined
with twenty-one unilateral territorial sea declarations, made
forty-four states that claimed juriSdictions beyond twelve miles.
The creation of the economic zone was a high probability in 1974,

56. See Table I
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with approximately one-fourth of the world's states claiming
these jurisdictions and many more supporting them.
There were various views of a 200-mile extension of jurisdiction floating about the Caracas session.

Developing States viewed

it as essential to their well-being, security and economic developmenta

They had seen the living resources taken from near their

shores and had too often paid for processed products derived from
their offshore fishery.

Developed maritime States were not over-

joyed at the idea, but upon re-examination of the wealth involved,
supported the idea by the end of the second session.
In Caracas and Geneva, definition of the type Of juriSdiction
revolved around two proposals.

The patrimonial sea, sponsored by

South American states, was envisioned as the codification of the
200-mile territorial sea to a greater or lesser extent.

The econ-

omir zone concept, born in the African states group, was eventually
included in the Geneva text.

As a compromise, the concept changed

from a resource control zone to a zone controlling scientific research, the marine environment and all resource-related activities.
The economic zone concept became the exclusive economic zone concept, giving more power to the coastal state.
The landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States also
wer~

very active in these sessions.

They agreed to the concept

of the economic zone only where their rights and interests were
. 1 u d e d 1n
. t erms of resource s h ar1ng.
.
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1nc

Th e many V2ews
.
of the

economic zone were more or less conSOlidated by the fifth session,

57. See Chapter 5 - Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States.
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but a minority of States still wished to discuss the concept.
It is strange that the political realities of today are not
following the geography of marine resources.

Those states receiv-

ing the greatest wealth and largest economic zones will be developed States~8 In Africa, only Madagascar (15th), Somalia (28th),
Mauritius (17th), and South Africa (21st) will receive economic
zones within the top thirty zones of the world.

Most African

States will receive comparatively small economic zones.
In North and Central America, three states will receive economic zones among the top ten zones in area.

One other will receive

zones within the top thirty economic zones.

South America will

boast two states within the top ten and four others within the
top thirty in terms of economic zone area.

Asia will have two

within the top ten and four others within the top thirty economic
zone areas .

Oceania will have two States within the top ten group

and none within the top thirty group, although many nations are
colonially occupied.

Europe will have one State within the top

ten grouping and six within the top thirty grouping, discounting
the newly created economic zone for the European Communities.
Uf the top ten economic zone areas, six will belong to developed or relatively developed States and of the top thirty, thirteen
will belong to relatively developed or developed States.

Develop-

ing States will be shut out of the major zones except in South
America.
This observer is not convinced that the concept of the

58.See Table VII.
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economic zone is the great legal, political and moral victory
that is claimed by the developing world.

Most of the resources

will be controlled by a few States, many of which are already
developed.

If potential oil reserves are taken as an indicator

of potential wealth, thirty-nine developing and fifteen developed
States will have estimated oil potentials in their economic zones
of one to ten billion barrels.

Note that only twenty-two states

have larger oil potentials and, of these, seven are developed or
relatively developed States~9
If fisheries are taken as a sign of wealth, the
~s s~m11ar.

situa~~on

Most large fish stocks are either off developed

States or a few developing States~O

Developing States claim a

victory because some ocean resource will be reserved for their
use.

Much of the existing fisheries potential is located off

the coast of States such as Argentiana or Mauritania.

Many

African States have talKed about a regional economic zone, where
States of Africa would participate in resource exploitation.
Other regions of the world are not likely to consider such a proposal.
regions.

Even under a regional approach, there will be wealthier
North America might share its vast resources with eight

states, while Africans might share more limited resources among
roughlY fifty States.

Would it not be more equitable to devote

59. See Table VIII. 'rhese statistics inClude land-based reserves
as well, but the majority ot tuture oil potential is estimated to l1e
on the continental shelf.
60. See 'Table VIII.
water catches.

These statistics inclUde salt and :tresh

more of the ocean's wealth to the tlconunon heritage of mankind"?
In theory, yes, but states are like children when it comes to
resource sharing; they are unwilling to share their blocks.
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supported by such unilateral extensions.

When the coastal States

have 200-mile territorial seas, will it then be time to start
the onslaught on the "common heritage of mankind"?
Another view hOlds that unilateral extensions or tishery and
other juriSdictions is within the scope of any future Law of the
Sea convention.
and agreement.

These extensions act as a spur to negotiations
r1any of these jurisdictions

~re

temporary and

will be dissolved or incorporatea into the eventual treaty zone.
Admittedly, the loosers under unilateral jurisdiction extensions
will be the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States.
If their interests can be accommodated within the Convention,
unilateral jurisdiction extensions will not matter.
This observer is skeptical.

Roughly one-third of the world's

states are landlocked and geographically disadvantaged.

Declara-

tions of national jurisdictions forces them to negotiate about
facts that have already been legislated.

It is very difficuLt

to obtain changes in legiSlation when laws have been created and
in force over a period of time.

It is doubtful that unilateral

extensions will do anything but cause further disruptions at future
Conference sessions.
Commentary:

Fisheries

Mr. Jacques Yves cousteau
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and others have repeatedly stated

that the seas are vastly over fished.

He observes that catch in

almost every major fishery has dropped by thirty percent over the

62. "C ousteau Proposes High Authority", Ne pt un e , 28 April,
1975, p.l.
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last few years.

Damage to the sea is tremendous and when fish stocks

reach certain low levels, natural predation may destroy any further
reproductive potential.

Mr. Cousteau points out that scientists

have traditionally been silent because they have no control over
what is done with their research and data.
In one sense, Mr. Cousteau may be only too correct.

Although

many scientists believe that there is room for limited expansions of
catch on under-utilized species in most of the world's fisheries,
they admit that data acquisition is sloppy and stock assessments
have little to do with how many fish are physically present at one
time.

In many fisheries, fishery statistics are kept by individual

vessels or processing plants and even where they are governmentgathered, they can not always be relied upon to be accurate.
The present system allows for the publication of fishery
statistics a year or even two years after the fish have been caught.
It is hard to enforce fisheries violations a year after the fact,
but for some stocks the previous year's data can be of great help
in stock assessment.
Inspection is another problem.

Some believe that permanently

stationed independent observers on fishing vessels might be the
answer.

In some cases, conditions on vessels have been so poor

that observers have been taken ill.

The job of an observer is

hard and ·d a n g e r ou s and the effectiveness of observers reporting
statistics and keeping track of fishing catch is uncertain.
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Another problem lies with the maximum sustainable yield concept.
Dr. Sidney HOlt
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would replace it with a different system.

A triplet

of criteria involving the maintenance of a maximum and stable food
supply on a continuous basis from a stock, the minimization of risks
of irreversible damage, and the maintenance of a wide diversity of
options for the future.

Resources should not be wasted, but a margin

of safety must be included in any conservation program to offset unpredictable stock variations.
Such a complicated set of goals is almost impossible to accomplish
with the present state of world fisheries knOWledge.

Maximum sustain-

able yield sets natural mortality of the stoCk and fishing of the
stock equal to the new entrants or recruitment to the stock.

In theory,

the fish - stock size stays the same and the maximum number of fish
are caught for a given stock size.
In reality, determining what stOCK size shOUld be used is
impossible on the basis of present data.

It will take years and

many millions of dollars to approximate these goals.

For some

States, such expenditures may exceed the value of the fishery
stOCK; stocks may never be managed.

The type of maximum sustain-

able yield to be used is also in dispute.

There are vast differ-

ences obtained if an economic interpretation or a biological intert ·
pre t alan

'
0f
maxlmum

'
b Ie Yleld
. .1S used. 64
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63. "MSY Concept Re-Evaluated", Neptune, 21 April, 1975, P.l.
64. See for more informations Albert W. Koers, International
RegUlation of Marine Fisheries, Eyre & Spottiswoode LTD, (Maragate,
England, 1973).
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The law of the sea texts have opted for an even more complicated concept - that of optimal sustainable yield.

optimal yield

includes maximum sustainable yield as a base, but modifies it
with economic, social, and cultural factors in decisions on stock
conservation.

Thus, even when a stock is severely depleted, fish-

ermen and processors can claim unusual economic hardship and force
the opening of the fishery to increased stock

explo~tation.

International fishery regulation has been poor in the past
leading to fish stock control by coastal states.

It is hoped

that these states will construct laws with the goal of stock conservation, and not just involve political aims.
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CHAPTER 4

The continental Shelf
Unlike the economic zone. the concept of the continental
shelf as a separate jurisdictional area has been a basis of international law since 1958 and an important factor in the extension
of unilateral jurisdiction since 1945.
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The Caracas session6 6 of the Law of the Sea Conference devel.
. . .
.
,
. 67
oped four alternat~ve defln~t1ons of the cont1nental rnarg1n.
The first formula defined it as the seabed and subsoil of the areas
adjacent to the coast but outside the territorial sea to the outer
limits of the continental rise bordering on the ocean floor or
abyssal floor.

The second formula extended it beyond the territor-

ial sea to 200 miles from applicable baselines and beyond 200 miles

65. "The Convention on the continental Shelf. Done at Geneva
on 29 April 1958", in Lay et al, P. 101. "Exec. Order 9633, Reserving and Placing Certain Resources of the Continental Shelf Under
the Control and Jurisdiction 9f the Secretary of the Interior",
Lederal ~i§tet, Sept. 28, 1945. (Truman Proclamation).
66. Considered in this chapter will be drafts: A/Conf. 62/
- Caracas; A/C onf , 62/WP8/Part II - Geneva"; and A/C onr , 62/
WP8/Rev.l/Part II - New York.

C 2/WPl"

67. The term used in the discussions has been ambiguous.
The terms continental margin and continental shelf are not used
in a geologic sense anywhere in the texts. Frequently they are
interchangeable and correspond to the widest possible area between
the territorial sea and the abyssal plain.
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throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory of the
coastal state.

The third Caracas formula was identical with the

second, but added that the continental shelf extended to the outer
limit of the continental margin as precisely defined and delimitated
in the Convention.

The last of the alternative formulas created a

continental margin extending from the territorial sea out to an
area adjoining the abyssal plain or out to 200 miles, whichever
was greater.

C2/WPl also contained specific isobath formulas

defining the edge of the continental margin as 500, 2500, and 4000
meters or 200 miles, whichever was greatest.

Another view allowed

States to define their own continental shelves based on their own
geographical conditions.

Still another definition prevented the

continental shelf from exceeding 200 miles.
From this hodgepodge of definitions, the Geneva session distilled a definition resembling that of an anonymous draft circulated in Caracas.

WP8/Part II defined the continental margin as

the seabed and subsoil of the area beyond the territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory of the
coastal State to the edge of the continental margin or to a distance of 200 miles, whichever was farthest.
Another formula needs to be considered here l

although it was

not formally proposed in a draft text but was supported by the
United States of America.
The "Hedbera Formula"
The Hedberg Formula 68 listed eight requirements for the

68. Hedberg 1 H.D. 1 "Ocean Boundaries and Resources"
12 March 1976 1 Pp. 1001-1018.
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1

SC ience l

_ delimitation of a continental margin boundary.

It underlined the

importance of a plan with a logical or natural reason behind it,
giving each State the natural prolongation of its land mass
beneath the oceans and allowing coastal states a substantial ocean
bottom area adjacent to its shore, regardless of the narrowness
of its shelf or steepness of its slope.

The criterion stressed

equitability to all nations and allowed for boundary delimitation
of islands, archipelagos, and national/international divisions
beyond the minimum coastal State limits.

In addition, any plan

was to leave a substantial part of the oceans' valuable resources
in the international domain.
To accomplish these objectives, the Hedberg Formula used
the base of the continental slope as a guide.

A zone, no less

than 100 kilometers wide, would be established near the edge of
the continental slope, within which coastal States could define
o~

their

continental margin boundary.

The final boundary would

be drawn using fixed points of longitude and latitude connected
by strait baselines.

An international boundary commission would

aid and approve the establishment of such boundary delimitation
zones.

Little agreement emerged from all the Geneva discussions.

At the fourth session, there emerged a proposal by the Irish delegation that was the basis for discussion at the fourth and fifth
sessions.
The Irish Prooosal
,
The Irish Proposa1 6 9 defined the continental margin as the

69. See Figure II.
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submerged prolongation of the land mass of the coastal State, including the continental shelf, the continental slope, and the continental rise, but excluding the abyssal plain.

It only dealt

with delimitation of the margin beyond 200 miles.
Two methods were suggested, depending on the geographical circumstances of states.

The first method used strait baselines, not

exceeding sixty miles in length to connect fixed points determined
by coordinates of longitude and latitude.

At these outermost

fixed points, sediment thickness was to be at least one percent of
the shortest distance from such points to the foot of the continental slope.

The second method used the same type of strait base-

lines but fixed points no more than sixty miles from the foot of
the continental slope.

Both methods were subject to the approval

of an international continental shelf 'boundary commission and
acceptance of the boundary by the commission would be final and
binding.
The Fifth Session
Significant progress was made in the fifth

ses~ion

when the

United States of America renounced the Hedberg formula in favor
of the Irish proposal.
als.

Many states were unhappy with such propos-

It was pointed out that sediment thickness was a very rough

measure and that, since all the large sediment thicknesses were
given to a few coastal states, the international community would
receive little from such proposals.

There were suggestions to

delete the first method in the Irish proposal and use the second.
Disadvantaged States remained unsatisfied by the explanations of
wide margin States and continued to look at this proposal as
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geologic trickery.
Disadvantaged States wanted a formula that would give substantial amounts of revenue to the international community from exploitation beyond 200 miles.
~Irish

If the wide margin States wanted this

proposal, they would have to include substantial revenue

sharing provisions in the convention.

Wide margin states would

have to make the initiatives; and, if no revenue sharing was forthcoming, disadvantaged States would insist on a continental margin
of no more than 200 miles from the territorial sea.
Coastal States Sovereignty
Several formulas defended coastal state sovereignty over the
continental shelf in C2/WPl, giving sovereign rights to coastal
States over the resources of the shelf or sovereign rights over the
entire shelf.

WPB/Part II clarified these sovereign rights to

include those for exploring and exploiting natural resources.
The coastal state alone would determine who would develop the area
and by what means.

Coastal state rights did not depend on occupa-

tion or ~n any express proclamation and did not affect the legal
status of superjacent waters or the air space above those waters.
WP8/Rev.l included the same articles and discussion in the fifth
session did not modify them.

The rights of the coastal State over

the resources of the continental margin were not disputed.

The

width of the continental shelf and the sharing of benefits from
the zone were hotly disputed, however.
Larina of Pipelines and Cables
The article concerned with the laying of submarine cables and
pipelines in WP8/part II amalgamated all the alternative texts of
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C2/WP1.

The Geneva text gave all states the freedom to lay sub-

marine pipelines and cables, but States were to pay due regard to
the existence and repair of other cables and pipelines.

Coastal

States could not impede the laying or maintenance of these pipelines and cables except where it interfered with coastal state
rights to the resources of the shelf.

The coastal States were

allowed to deliniate the course of the pipeline or cable and had
jurisdiction over them entering the territorial sea.

Coastal

States were given the exclusive right to authorize and regUlate
drilling on the continental shelf.

No changes were made in these

articles in the New York text or succeeding discussions.
Installations
Articles on freedom of navigation in C2/WPl covered a wide
range of topics.

They prohibited interference with navigation,

fishing, the conservation of the living resources of the sea,
fundamental marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea.
Succeeding articles entitled coastal states to construct, maintain,
and operate installations or devices necessary for the exercise of
their rights, and to establish safety zones.
Another approach gave coastal States the right to authorize
and regUlate construction used for economic purposes.

Safety zones

were to conform to international standards set by the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization or international standards.

The creation or military use of installations without the

permission of the coastal state was prohibited.

Installations

could not have jurisdictional zones around them.
Most of the above ideas were subsumed into various portions
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of the Geneva text.

WPS/Part II did brieflY consider artificial

islands on the continental shelf.

These artificial islands, in-

stallations, and structures were subject to coastal state control,
and appropriate measures to protect the

mar~ne ~nv~ronment

be taken according to international standards.

were to

Coastal States'

rights to exploit the subsoil by tunnelling were not affected by
these articles.

The New York text included identical articles,

and no change resulted from discussions in the fifth session.
Revenue Sharing
The other major conflict concerning the Continental shelf
centered on the distribution of revenues beyond 200 miles from the
coast. 7 0

In Caracas, several formulas appeared concerning revenues

to be paid to an international body.

One formUla proposed that

revenues were to be paid to the Authority from coastal State econornic activities in an unspecified zone.

A graduated system was

created where the contribution would be an unspecified percentage
of the revenues derived from exploitation carried on within forty
miles of the coast.

An additonal percentage of the revenue obtained

from a zone between forty and 200 miles WOUld also go to the Author•
ity for distribution.
Another alternative recommended a lump sum payment to the Authority.

The articles contained in WP8/Part II incorporated two other

Caracas alternatives on revenue sharing.

The coastal state was

required to make payments or contributions in kind of a portion of

70. Delimitation between opposite and adjacent States was
also a key issue concerning the continental shelf, but was subsumed
in economic zone deliberations. See the discussion in Chapter 3
on this subject.
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of the non-living resources of the continental shelf beyond 200
miles.

The rate of payment would be a percentage of the value or

volume of product at the production site.

The Authority would

determine the distribution of revenues on the basis of equitable
sharing, taking into account the interests and needs of developing States.
Revenue sharing was not a popular subject among wide margin
states in Geneva.

They talked about sharing of revenues derived

from beyond the 200 mile limit where it did not derogate their
sovereign rights.
mentioned.

A revenue sharing figure of one percent was

Another, of one to five percent of the well head value

of oil from beyond 200 miles was suggested.
The Fourth session produced substantial revisions in the text,
allowing for annual contributions keyed to production at a site
after the first five years of production.

In the sixth year, the

payment or contribution would be an unspecified percentage of the
value or volume of production at the site.

The rate would increase

by a certain percentage for each subsequent year, until the tenth
year when it would remain at a fixed percentage thereafter.

Prod-

uction was not to include resources used in connection with exploitation.
One suggestion at the fourth session allowed for one percent
-of the value of production in the sixth year and an increase .of
one percent per year until five percent was reached.

In the fifth

session, many delegates considered these figures much too low.
A seven percent figure, to be attained after ten years, was proposed.

A more detailed proposal required a three percent payment
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or contribution per year until fifteen percent was reached.

The

Authority was empowered to reduce the rate of payment to stimulate
exploration and exploitation of the continental margin beyond
200 miles.
Suggestions of revenue sharing for non-living resources within
and outside of the economic zone were presented.

This brought

little comment from wide margin or oil rich states.
cent revenue sharing figure was suggested.

A fifty per-

All operational expenses

would be subtracted from revenues accruing, and the rest would be
divided equally between the wide margin States and the international
community.

This proposal was criticized due to the difficUlty of

determining net revenue.
At the end of the fifth session, most delegations seemed
willing to accept some form of revenue sharing.

Revenue sharing

had to be substantial if disadvantaged states were going to recognize wide margin State claims to vast seabed areas.

Many dele-

gates indicated that it was a question of finding the right percentages for the formula in WP8/Rev.l.
commentary
On the eve of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea, sixty states had Claimed continental shelves of 200
meters or to the limit of exploitability, sanctioning the 1958
Geneva convention. 71

Twenty-one States claimed areas either under

the catch-all of the territorial sea or as a separate jurisdictional
zone. 72

71. Limite in the Sea:

iiQn, No.36

National Claims to Maritime Jurisdic-

72. See Table I.
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Only a few States were concerned with acquiring jurisdiction
over areas beyond 200 miles.

If coastal states were granted

resource control over the continental margin beyond 200 miles, six-

teen of the world's States would control ninety-one percent of the
value of the resources in that area.

In addition, twenty-eight

states with margins beyond 200 miles would receive only minor resources.
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A growing group of states at the "f i f t h session felt that a
ZOO-mile exclusive economic zone was enough for states to control
and that something should be left for the international community.
M ~st

observers doubted that there were many resources beyond 200

miles.
Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States questioned
the validity of coastal State control even out to 200 miles.

Mr.

Chao Hick Tin expressed the position of these States very well.

74

He indicated that the 1958 continental Shelf Convention was unjust
because it conferred on a minority of States sovereign rights
resources on wide shelves next to their coasts.

to

The 1958 Conven-

tion referred only to continental shelves and not to continental
slopes or rises, and these additional areas could not be claimed
under existing law.

Coastal states were required to be adjacent

to the shelf in question and this did not imply jurisdictional extension over huge continental margin areas.

Rock types knew no

73. See Table III.
74. Statement of Chao Hick Tin, Deptury Leader of the Delegation of Singapore, July 29, 1974. This statement is still valid
today.
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borders, and the imposition of a politically defined continental
shelf on the geological one was unjustifiable.
Mr. Chao contested the definition of the continental margin
as the natural prolongatio~ of the territory of the coastal state
because, in reality, the margin was the prolongation of the entire
continent and all States of that continent should benefit from its
resources.

Those States that based their arguments on the 1958

Geneva convention seemed to keep what was convenient for their
interpretation of international law and discard the rest.

Many

delegations understood that the object of the Conference was to
change in toto the Geneva Conventions.

Rights granted beyond and

even within a 200-mile economic zone would destroy the hope of
success of the "common heritage of mankind" principle.

In reality,

the only legal basis for wide continental margin claims were unilateral sovereignty extensions, such as the Truman Proclamation of 1945.
The articles so far proposed at the Law of the Sea Conference
are disturbing to this observer for many reasons.

They are based

on legal and political criteria and have little relationship to
geography or the geology of the continental margin.

The major pro-

blem lies in determining where the continental slope gives way to
the continental rise, and where the rise becomes the abyssal plain.
Little data is available on such delimitations, and differences in
slope of only a few centimeters per kilometer make casual delimitation impossible.

Present methods of sediment thickness are not

very accurate, and there is suspicion that areas previously thought
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to be basement rock are

' by
underla~n

sed'lmentary struc t ures. 75

The

only way to establish conclusive boundaries is to drill, and this is
very expensive.

It is doubtful whether many States will be able to

afford the costs of boundary delimitation.

This will lead to arbi-

trary boundary creation and conflicts will arise.
Sediment thickness delimitations, as suggested in the Irish
proposal, seem designed to overwhelm delegations with masses of
technical data as a method of obscuring which States will benefit
from the proposal.

Under a sediment thickness criteria, few States

would gain substantial areas beyond 200 mi1es.
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Some of these few

States will gain areas extending hundreds of kilometers from their
coasts.

The appropriation of what meager resources are left beyond

200 miles will only serve to undermine any viable international
regirn~.

Proposed formulas at the Law of the Sea Conference must be
applicable to all types of continental margins.
margins fit an idealized type.
not there at all.

Few continental

Some are deformed, submerged, or

Where formulas are not universally applicable or

continental margin delimitation is not possible, a loophole is
created that could make any future convention as unworkable as the
1958 Convention.

A more logical approach to defining the continental margin is
to use the continental shelf break as a reference point.

This dis-

tinctive change in slope between the continental shelf and slope is

75. Hedberg, "Ocean Boundaries for the Ba w of the Sea", MTS
Journal, June 1976.
76. See Table IX - Note these estimates are very rough.
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the most continuous feature on continental margins.

One simple

formula could use ·a stra~c ~~ne distance down slope from the shelf
break to fix reference points.

Hore uniformity might be achieved

by fixing a boundary a number of kilometers down slope equal to
half the width of the distance from the territorial sea baseline
to the continental shelf break.
Alternatively, the formula might use a depth criteria coupled
with revenue sharing.

At a certain depth or distance, revenue

deriVed up slope from the depth or distance could be divided into a
sixth percent/forty percent ratio, coastal State share to the Authority's share.

Down slope from the depth or distance point, a forty

percent/sixty percent revenue partition could be fixed, Coastal
State shares to Authority shares.
The international Authority would be required to make percentage
investments in exploitation projects equal to the percentage of revenues derived.
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Thus, coastal States unable to finance continental

shelf exploitation could be aided and guided by the Authority . on a
business basis.
Many observers would like revenues from within the economic
zone to be accessible to the international Authority.

John Logue

78

is in favor of a mixed economic zone in which coastal States would
be required to contribute a portion of the revenues from mineral
exploitation to a common heritage fund.

contributions would be

77. See Figure III.
78. John Logue is director of the World Order Research Institute
at Villanova University. Personal communication.
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proportional to the per capita income of the coastal State.
States would get assistance from this fund in inverse proportion
to their per capita income.
Professor Charney
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has speculated that no more than three

percent of offshore oil is located beyond 200 miles from any coast.
It will be hard to exploit, and by the time it did become available, alternative sources of energy would have made such exploitat ion impractical.

The best estimates require twenty-three years

before the start of serious drilling beyond 200 miles.

If the

Authority is to succeed, revenues must come from within the 200meter isobath.
Clearly, there are many arguments against wide margin State
claims.

They, however, must agree to limit their activities in

these ocean areas or all the protesting in the world will have no
effect.

Failure of the Third United Natbns Conference on the Law

of the Sea will only lead to the extension of jurisdiction by wide
margin States over all economically interesting areas out to the
mid-ocean ridges.

A comprehensive Convention may insure the rights

of all States, but wide marg in and disadvantaged States must both
sign, ratify, and abide by the Convention.

Several wide margin

States may refuse to cooperate with any future international regime.
rlaims will be made, but conflicts will appear only when exploitation actually begins.

79. Charney, "Charney Speculates on oil Production", Neptune,
28 April, 1975, P.3.
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CHAPTER 5

Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged States
The positions of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
States 8 0 have been briefly discussed in previous chapters.

The'

purpose of this chapter .i s to present more fully the views of this
group that comprises almost one-third of the States at the Conference. 8 1
In Caracas, the cause of the landlocked States was considered
little more than a joke by many delegations.

Coastal States had

the resources, the mode of transit to the sea, and the power of
life and death over the economies of landlocked States.

Yet, land-

locked State demands became increasingly more important politically
in Geneva as some coastal States found it within their national
interests to support landlocked State views.

'I'hese geographically

disadvantaged States realized that they would obtain little from
extensions of national jurisdictions of their neighbors and desired
to make an equitable Convention that would protect their interests.

80. Considered in this chapter will be! A/Conf.62/C2/WPl from
Caracas, here C2/WPl; A/Conf.62/C3/L17 from Caracas, here C3/Ll?;
LGDS draft from Geneva; Anonymous draft from Geneva; A/Conf.62/C3/L26
from Geneva, here C 3/L26; A/e onf. 62/C 3/L28 , from Geneva, here C 3/L28;
A/Conf.62/C3/L29 from Geneva, here C3/L29; A/Conf.62/C3/L13/Rev.l from
Geneva, here C3/L13/Rev.l; A/Conf.62/HPEjPart III; A/Conf.62/WP8/Part
II from Geneva, here WP8/Part II and WP8/~art III; A/C onf. 62/WP8/Rev.
l/Part II from New York, here WP8/Rev.lj A/Conf.62/WP8/Rev.l/Part Ill.
81. See Table IV.
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certain basic definitions concerning landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States, or LGDS, first appeared in WP8/Part
II and were expressed in WP8/Rev.l.
as States with no sea coast.

Landlocked states were defined

Transit states were coastal or other

States situated between a landlocked State and the sea through
whose territory traffic in transit passed.

Traffic in transit

included persons, baggage, goods and means of transportation across
the territory of one or more transit states, when passage across
such territory, with or without transshipment, warehousing, breaking
bUlk, or change in mode of transport was only a portion of the journey which began or terminated within the territory of the landlocked
State.

The means of transport was railway rolling stock, sea and

river craft, road vehicles, porters and pack animals.
Access to the Sea
C2/WPI derived the right of access to the sea for landlocked
States from the application of the principles of freedom of the high
seas and the designation of the area beyond national jurisdiction
as the "common heritage of mankind".

r'lP8/p.art I I and WP8/Rev. 1

gave landlocked states the right of access to and from the sea for
the purposes of exercising their rights as described in the Convention, relating to the principles of freedom of the high seas and
the "common heritage of mankind".
The Caracas formula gave a blanket right of access to the sea
to landlocked States as a separate principle of international law
while the Geneva and New York texts limited that right by a C onvention definition.

All the texts indicated that access to the sea

was a right and not a gift of the coastal states, although some
83

coastal States had insisted in the past that such a right was incompatable with their ±nterests.
Free Transit
One formula in C2/wPl incorporated free transit as a portion
of this right of access to and from the sea.

Another formula re-

quired landlocKed states to give coastal States a similar right of
transit across their territory in exchange from the right of transit
to and from the sea.

The modalities were to be settled through

bilateral agreement.

The Geneva and New York texts gave landlocked

States freedom of transit to reach the sea but left the terms and
conditions of. such transit to bilateral, regional, and subregional
agreements.

Transit States were allowed

to take all measures

necessary to ensure that these rights would not impinge on their
legitimate interests.
Negotiations continued in the fifth session of the Conference
in a specially established group within the Second Committee.

SOIDe

hope of a solution appeared when landlocked States agreed to discuss reciprocity.

They were quiCk to point out that discussions

on reciprocity were to take place in a larger context than law of
the sea.

An expanded type of reciprocity might be created where

transit States could gain access to third countries while landlocked States gained access to and from the sea.

Such arrangements

have proven to be very beneficial in Europe.
Dr. Caflisch 8 2 explained landlocked State objections to the
obligation of reciprocity.

Two types of reciprocit~3were involved.

82. Dr. Caflisch of the Institue Universitaire des Hautes Etudes
Internationales in Geneva, Switzerland, and member of the Swiss
84

The first, called specific reciprocity, gave transit rights to
landlocked States for access to the sea in exchange for a similar
right of the coastal State to transit the coastal State for a spe- c i f i c purpose.

The second type, called general transit , granted

both States rights of transit throughout the territories of each
State for mutually agreed purposes.
Coastal States were wil ling to grant landlocked States the
right of access to the sea, a specific purpose, in exchange for
a general right of transit through the landlocked State.

Land-

locked States viewed this as unfair because coastal States were
using their geographical position to extract unreasonable rights
of general transit from landlocked States.

Landlocked States would

be willing to agree to a general transit provisions on an equal
basis between neighboring States.
Many coastal States felt that general rights of transit would
impinge on their sovereignty.

Mr. Caflisch pointed out that the

concept of innocent passage in the territorial sea was also a
triction of sovereignty and coastal States accepted that.

res~

He

countered claims by coastal States that such transit would burden
coastal States and hamper their competitiveness with States not
having landlocked States near their borders.

other geographical

advantages far outweighed such disadvantages as had been shown in
~urope.

delegation gave an evening seminar at Quaker House on Wednesday, April
16, 1975, during which he discussed these issues.
83. Many landlocked States argue that coastal States do not
need reciprocal rights because they already have access to the sea.
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Generally speaking, landlocked states bargained from a position
of weakness in bilateral negotiations because coastal states needed
o~ly

to refuse to negotiate if their. terms . were not met.

Codifi-

cation of their rights in an international Convention of this type
and agreement by all states was essential.

Landlocked states

would then be able to negotiate bilaterally.
The Sharina of Living Resources
The Caracas session signified the start of a campaign by landlocked states to gain access to the living resources of economic
zones declared by neighboring coastal States.

In Geneva, the

LGDS became very vocal on this point, and most coastal States saw
their demands in the Group of 77 and LGDS drafts as going too far.
These drafts gave LGDS the right to participate in the exploration
and exploitation of the living resources of the economic zone.

The

LGDS draft went further in giving LGDS rights to the non-living
resources in the economic zone as well.
The Anonymous draft sided with the coastal states in providing
that coastal States negotiate with LGDS using equitable principles
concerning access to the living resources of the economic zone.
LGDS refused to be dependent on the generosity of coastal States
and would not be limited to an unequal share of the resources of
the sea in an area where they formally had equal rights with coastal
84
states.

84. Under the previous international law, the area of the
economic zone was considered high seas and thus all states had
equal rights to navigate, fish,etc., including landlocked States.
With the extension of zones of jurisdiction, LGDS are demanding
some form of compensation ana access to resources.
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The LGDS draft elaborated more fUlly LGDS wants and needs.
LGDS would not be able to transfer their rights to third parties
but might seek international assistance in technical and financial
matters.

Where the neighboring coastal State's economic zone had

only limited resources, arrangements were to be made with the next
most adjacent neighbor for resource exploitation.

This type of

regional arrangement could only take place within areas defined
by the united Nations as a regional economic commission.

Regional

or sUbregional economic zones might be negotiated at the request
of any State in the region.
The Group of 77 draft tried to compromise.

It agreed with

most of the LGDS draft and defined developing geographically disadvantaged states as developing States which, for geographical
reasons, could not claim an economic zone, for biological or ecological reasons, derived no substantial economic advantage from
exploiting the living resources of their economic zones, and whose
right of access to such resources was limited by the economic
zones of other states.
Participation in resource exploitation was defined on the
basis of

LG~S

sharing a common border with the coastal State, being

adjacent to the coastal State, both States bordering a closed or
semi-enclosed sea or being situated within reasonable proximity
of the coastal state.

Account was to be taken of all relevant

regional., geographical circumstances.

Equitable and economically

meaningful participation was defined by allowing LGDS to obtain a
given percentage of the total non-living resources extracted
annually from the economic zone concerned.
The Geneva text was not as specific, only granting LGDS
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participation in the exploitation of the living resources of the
economic zone.

It provided that coastal States could grant LGDS

equal or preferential rights for exploiting these resources.

LGDS

could seek financial and technical assistance but could not transfer
their rights to third parties.

There was no change in these articles

in the New York text.
The fifth Conference session produced tentative agreement on
LGDS participation in living resource exploitation.

A group of

twenty-one interested states created outside the structure of the
Conference agreed that landlocked and geographically disadvantaged
states had the right to participate in the exploitation of the
surplus catch of the economic zone's living resources, on an equitable basis.

Accounting for the relative geographic and economic

circumstances of the concerned States, terms and conditions of
participation were to be agreed through regional, subregional
and bilateral agreements.

LGDS were given preferential rights

over third states, and where no surplus existed, the states would
establish an equitable arrangement by agreement for LGDS participation.
The need to avoid detrimental effects to the fishing communities
or industries of a state was underlined as· well as the nutritional
needs of the concerned states.

The extent to which coastal States

were already accommodating other LGDS or to which LGDS were
already participating in zones of other states was an important
consideration.

The proposal clearly prevented the overburdening

of a coastal State from too many LGDS agreements.

Developed LGDS

were only allowed to participate in economic zones of other developed States.

Rights granted to LGDS could not be transferred
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without coastal State approval but technical and financial assistance was possible through third parties or international organizations.

The tentative acceptance of these articles produced

what some delegate felt was the most significant break through of
the fifth session.
Maritime Interests
Caracas' deliberations produced several formulas regarding
landlocked States l vessels.

One formula gave these vessels the

right to use maritime ports of coastal States and equal or more
favorable treatment than coastal State vessels for access to and
exit from port facilities.

In addition, use of installations and

equipment was provided under the same terms and conditions as for
the coastal State.
Another formula of C2/WPl allowed landlocked States to appoint
their own customs officers in free ports of transit arranging
berthing of vessels whose cargo was bound for or coming from landlocked States.

These officials were to supervise loading and un-

loading and ensure documentation and other procedures for smooth
traffic transit.

The coastal State was required to provide ade-

quate means of transport, storage, and handling at points of entry,
exit and intermittent stages.

The Geneva text deleted most of these specifics.
I I and,

WP8/Par t

later, WP8/Rev.l allowed for the creation of free zones

and other facilities at ports of entry and exit in the transit
State.

These zones would be exempt from customs regulations, but

would be under the police and health jurisdictions of the coastal
State.
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WP~ev.l amended previous texts in providing that the Convention
did not entail the withdrawal of transit facilities greater than
those provided and did not preclude the granting of such facilities in the future.
The Geneva and New York texts took the teeth out of provisions on transit facility sharing.

Coastal States felt that a .

general convention was no place for specific transit proposals.
Many coastal States wanted to control means of access, designate
specific routes, and facilities to be used.

Landlocked states saw

such actions as ensuring that they could obtain the use of only
the most antiquated facilities.
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l did not allow taxes, tarriffs, or
charges on transit traffic higher than those levied for nationals
of the transit state.

Security problems were raised because

freedom of passage would be a greater right of movement than
many States gave their own nationals.

It would seem that certain

corridors might be created for transit use at specific times.
The most telling argument against the landlocked states was
the claim that coastal state facilities were overburdened, not
allowing landlocked State transit.

A SOlution was proposed in

Caracas and incorporated later in the Geneva and New York texts
allowing transit states to request landlocked states to aid in
the construction and improvement of the available facilities.

All

action was left in the hands of the coastal State, and no coastal
state could be forced to make improvements

aga~nst

its will.

It

was generally agreed that the economic advantages of good transport facilities would encourage cooperation among States.
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This

observer is skeptical.

States have only been able to cooperate

in such measures when the political climate was favorable, which
was not often.

Cooperation usually did produce substantial bene-

fits.
All the texts agreed that in cases of Force majeure the
transit State was to take all measures necessary to avoid delays
in or restriction of transit traffic.
Transfer of Technology
WP8/Part III and WP8/Rev.l/Part III

85

were the only texts to

deal with transfer of technology to developing landlocked States.
They provided that international organizations coordinate their
activities of technology transfer to include the needs of developing States, particularly landlocked and geographicallY disadvantaged
States.

Mention of LGDS was frequent under articles relating to

the transfer of technology from the international Authority or
through bilateral, regional or mUltilateral agreement.

Participa-

tion in regional centers was encouraged.
Marine Scientific Research
C3/L17 reflected views incorporated in later drafts.

C3/L26

and C3/L29 provided that such research be conducted with regard
to the rights of the coastal State but considering landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged States.

C3/L13/Rev,l called for pre-

ferential treatment for the above states.

85. These are third committee texts:
and A/Conf.62/WP8/Rev.l/Part III.
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A/Conf.62/WP8/Part III

C3/L28 developed the formula that was used in WP8/Part III
and WP8/Rev.l. 8 6

Account was to be taken of the rights and inter-

ests of LGDS of the region

neighbor~ng

the area concerned.

Research-

ers were to notify LGDS of any proposed projects and qualified
nationals of LGDS could participate in the projects.
These general articles might in the
benefits for LGDS.

lo~g

run. obtain tangible

The problems of notification and providing

space for LGDS representatives as well as defining the word
"qualified" wil l make active participation in research for LGDS
very difficult.

86. These texts were produced in the Third committee.
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C ommentaa

Articles espousing a regional approach, accommodating landlocked and geographicallY disadvantaged States, pose many problems.
One landlocked State might be able to make agreements with several
coastal states to exploit resources in their economic zones and
in effect gain more benefit than the coastal States.

Coastal

states would be unhappy to see landlocked states gaining such bene- ..
fits but many observers feel that the LGDS need all the help they
can get,

Protections in the texts against overburdening the coastal

State and fishing surplus stock are adequate to ensure coastal
States dominance of the fisheries resources.
Such an approach seems one step away

fro~

a truly regional

zone where all States of a region could participate in the economic
zones of the region.
new,

The idea of regional economic zones is not

Some of the first proposals of the Organization of African

Unity considered this approach and some observers feel that an
African regional economic zone might be created regardless of the
outcome of the Conference.

These ideas are based on the geogra-

phic realities and eventual political realities of Africa.

Four-

teen of the-twenty-nine landlocked States are found in Africa.
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The European community has been successful in creating such a zone.

88

Hany coastal States face similar problems because their jurisdictional zones will be cut off by their neighbor's jurisdictional

87. See Table IV - Not included in this list are the Holy
See and Zimbabue (Rhodesia),
88. Henry Sturcke, "Fishing For A Common Policy", European
community, Dec. 1976, Pp. 30-33.
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extensions.

Depending on who ~ s counting as many as sixty-one

such States exist and five others will be without access to one
of the oceans on which they face.

Effective management of ocean

resources of these zone-locked States will be impossible and the
benefit derived from such areas will most likely be very small.
The Americas contain six such States, Asia and Oceania contain
eleven, Europe contains seventeen, and the Middle East and Africa
contain twenty-seven.

89

Regional zones take on a new perspective when viewed in this
light.

On most continents, coastal states with fUll economic

zones would outnumber those

withou~

large economic zones.

In

Africa, and the Hiddle East forty-one out of sixty states would
be disadvantaged States.
States

~ou l d

In Europe, twenty-two out of thirty-one

be disadvantaged.

In Asia and Oceania, sixteen out

of thirty-three States would be disadvantaged, and, likewise, eight
gO
out of thirty-three in the Americas.
An anonymous delegate provided one formula for a regional
'
d t hat
'
'
zone.91 H
e c Ia~me
reg~onal
zones wou ld guarantee t eh
malnten-

ance of high seas rights by replacing many 200-mile zones with
areas of joint management.

states of the region would share res-

ponsibility and benefit from activities in the joint zone.

lnter-

national Conventions would provide criteria, such as population,
size, length of coastline, economic situation and previous activities

89. "Fate of the Landlocked Shelf Locked and Zone Locked"; Neptune, 4 April, 1975, Pp. 4-5.
90. See Table VII.
91. "Regional Zones Proposed to Replace EEZ", Neptune, 21

April, 1975, P.I.
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in the area, for issuing contracts to exploit the living resources
of the zone.

Special provisions for LGDS could be eliminated.

Problems of islands far out from the mainland would be solved.
Regional management of research and fisheries problems would be
insured.
This delegate defined several geographic areas including the
Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the sea between Indonesia

a~d

the

Phillipines, the Arctic Ocean north of the seventieth parallel,
the Antarctic Ocean south of the sixtieth parallel, the Atlantic
Ocean split along the mid-Atlantic ridge and other areas.

Such

regional partition was considered difficult but possible with the
good faith of all States.
Such a view was bound to draw a rebuttal.

George Kent

92

pointed out that regionalism would not end the political and power
differences within a region.

There was no real partition of the

world that was natural and the location of regional boundaries
would create more problems than existed at the Conference.

Some

regions would be richer than others and states would still pursue
narrow nationalist interests.

Regional management was not necess-

arily better than national management.

He suggested that certain

areas might be placed under the international Authority's jurisdiction such as the Antarctic and the central Pacific.
Most delegations at Geneva and other sessions felt that this
talK of regionalism was little more than political maneuvering
and did not represent a serious proposition.

Developing states

92. George Kent is a professor of political science at the
University of Hawaii and wrote in Neptune: George Kent~ "Regions
EvoKe Reserva t ions", Neptune, 28 Apr il, 1975, P p. 3.
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saw it as a scheme of developed state to gain access to economic
zones of developing states.

It was not considered within the scope

of the Conference to create regions.

Landlocked and geographically disadvantaged States are the
most vulnerable to the results of a collapse of the Conference.
They would have to negotiate bilaterally for access to already
established economic zones and would be guaranteed few rights.
On the other hand, some delegations have considered their demands
so extreme that a Conference failure seemed assured at certain
points.

Landlockeq and geographically disadvantaged States rights

will only be granted if there is a Convention giving coastal States
significant benefits.

•
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CHAPTER 6
Special Circumstances
Archipelagos
The definition of an archipelagic State has been one of the
major issues to be settled at the Conference because it affects
the delimitation of each of the previously discussed zones of
jurisdiction.

The Caracas session highlighted the major elements

of the question.

One formula in C2/WPl stated that states with

one or more offlying archipelagos were qualified to use the Convention provisions concerning archipelagic States.

93

Another

formula equated the method of drawing strait baselines for archipelagos and for coastal States containing archipelagos.

A further

formula relied on a land/water ratio to determine if a group of
islands might be an archipelagic State.
The Geneva text elaborated the definition of an archipelago
as a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting
waters, and other natural features, which were so closely interrelated that such islands and features formed an intrinsic geographic, economic, and political entity or had been historically
regarded as such.

An archipelagic state consisted of one or more

93. Considered in this chapter will be drafts: A/Conf.52/
WP8/Part II, from Geneva; A/Conf.62/C2/WP1, from Caracas; A/Conf.
62/WP8/Rev.l/Part II, from New York.
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archipelago~

and other islands.

states that had archipelagos

within their borders were excluded from claiming the rights of
archipelagic states.

Many metropolitan powers had wished to claim

archipelagic states for their dependencies, but this proposal
was firmly rejected by the Conference.

The New York text reflected

identical articles.
Baselines
C2/WPl outlined the formula that was accepted in later texts.
Archipelagic States might draw strait baselines joining the outermost points on the outer-most islands and drying reefs, provided
that such baselines enclosed the main island and the area contained
within a water to land area ratio of between one to one and nine
to one.

Baselines were not normally to exceed eighty miles, but

under special circumstances could reach 125 miles.

94

The drawing

of baselines was to follow the shape of the archipelago and could
not be drawn between low tidal elevations unless permanent installations were present.

Land areas included waters lying within

fringing reefs or islands and atolls.
Baselines were not to be applied so as to cut off access of
another state to the sea.

Where baselines enclosed an area tradi-

tionally used by an adjacent neighbor for access to and communication with parts of its territory, the archipelagic State was
obliged to recognize direct access and communication.

94. See Figure IV.
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C2/WPI gave archipelagic states total sovereignty over areas
enclosed by baselines, including the airspace above the water
column and the seabed below the archipelago.

The Geneva text

agreed with this Caracas version and specified that the territorial
sea contiguous zone, economic zone, and continental shelf were to
be measured seaward of these baselines.

Existing rights of fish-

ing were to be regulated through agreement and were not to be transferred to third parties.
The New York text included the a.bove but also an additional
duty.

Archipelagic States were to respect existing cables and pipe-

lines in its waters and allow access to them for their repair.
Sea Lanes
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l went on to grant all States the
right of innocent passage through archipelagic waters.

Suspension

of that right was possible where the security of the archipelagic
State was threatened.

Archipelagic States could designate sea

lanes and air routes for safe and expeditious passage of foreign
vessels, including normal passage routes across archipelagos used
for international navigation.

The width of the sea lanes was to

be determined by the distance between the nearest points on islands
bordering the sea lane.
Archipelagic States could also provide traffic separation
schemes after the approval of the competent international body.
Ships in transit were required to observe the sea lanes and traffic
separation schemes and changes could be made after due publicity.
The Geneva and New York texts obliged vessels to refrain from
any threat of force against archipelagic States or violation of
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the united Nations Charter.

Activities not specified as innocent

passage were prohibited unless rendered necessary by Force majeure
or distress.

Aircraft were required to observe the rules of the

International civil Aviation Organization and monitor assigned or
emergency frequencies.

Foreign research or survey activities were

prohibited without archipelagic state consent.
WP8/Rev.l amplified previous texts concerning the duties of
archipelagic states not to hamper innocent passage.

Appropriate

publicity was to be given to dangers to navigation and overflight.
It changed previous texts to prohibit suspension of sea1ane passage.
The Geneva and New York texts allowed the archipelagic state
to make non-discriminatory laws and regulations concerning safety
of navigation, pollution prevention, discharge, fishing vessels,
stowage of fishing gear, and the taking on board or putting overboard of any commodity, currency, or person in contravention of
customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regUlations of the archipelagic state. 9 5
All the drafts agreed that the flag State of a ship or aircraft acting in a manner contrary to the Convention and having
sovereign immunity was liable for any loss or damage caused the
archipelagic State.
The Fifth Session
The fifth session of the Conference was little different

95. Note that this reaulation is identical with those of the
territorial sea and strait~regimes as expressed in Chapters 1 and
2. The articles on warship passage are also identical and will not
be repeated here.
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philosophically from the Caracas seSSlon.

Maritlme powers still

wished the right of free transit through archipelagic waters.
Archipelagic states c laimed that those rights had too often been
abused.
Bilateral consultations on this issue were conducted throughout all the Conference sessions.

In the fifth session, general

agreement appeared on the concept of the archipelagic state coupled
with sea lane passage.

The problem of plugging in the widths of

those sea lanes remained.
of up to eighty miles.

Haritime states wanted wide sea lanes

Most archipelagic states felt that this was

ridiculously wide and wanted sea lanes no more than twenty miles
wide.

There were still extremists on both sides of the issue but

agreement seemed near.

Another conflict arose around the suspension

of innocent passage in archipelagic waters.

Maritime States wanted

a non-suspendable right of innocent passage.

Archipelagic States

insisted that they could suspend innocent Rassage where their security was threatened.
Commentary
The archipelagic State concept will provide slightlY more
territory for archipelagic states than just a straight 200-mile
,
economlC
zone around eac h of t h
e '1slands. 96

Wha t

'
1S

.
more lmpor-

tant, water between the islands will become internal waters, thereby
allowing these States more security and control while ensuring
transit of vessels through sea lanes.

96. See Figure IV.
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If no Convention is forthcoming from the Conference, unilateral archipelagic State jurisdictions will be established with
strict controls over passage of ships.

Non-uniformity will be a

problem between jurisdictional zones.

Ten of the eighteen prin-

ciple shipping straits and a vast number of the world's smaller
st

'
ra~ts

,
l~e

i
. h 1n
W1t
arc h i~pe1 agos. 97

without a comprehensive Convention, major conflicts are likely
to arise leading to clashes between strait States or archipelagic
States and maritime states.

Tariffs might be charged for passage

or certain vessels might be excluded for political reasons causing
upsets in world trade.

Without a convention, straits will become an

integral portion of the territorial sea of strait, or archipelagic, States.
Some people feel that this will not matter.

Maritime powers

will negotiate regional or bilateral agreements with the appropria Ee strait and archipelagic States.

To this observer, a Convention

approved by the majority of the world's states, outlining the competences of maritime and strait States, is far preferable to the
chaos of unilateral extension.
ipelagic issue.

Agreement is in sight on the arch-

It would be too bad if recent extensions of juris-

diction by maritime power-s destroyed the climate of compromise evident in the fifth session on this issue.
Special Circumstances - Islands
The Caracas session debated extensively the problems concerning islands and many alternatives appeared in C2/WP1.

Some of

these defined various areas and regulations for different types

97. See Table V.
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of above water projections, in an attempt to maximize the jurisdictional area around the projection.

Huge areas of jurisdiction

were suggested for tiny rocks in the middle of the ocean.

Other

formulas were contented with equating the jurisdictional zones of
islands and continents on the theory that islands were far more
ocean-dependent than continents and thus should not be penalized
by small jurisdictions.
Other alternatives required size, population, and contiguity
to the principle territory as criteria for jurisdictional delimitations.

other considerations included geological and geomorphic

structure, configuration and location on or off the continental
shelf of another State.

It seemed clear that all islands not

belonging to archipelagos were to have a special regime.

There

was some talk of limiting this to island states but this was later
dropped.

Other formulas included the adjective "vast" in defining

islands, and defined islets, rocks, and low tidal elevations
separately.

An additional formula required the necessity of habit-

ability and economic life in defining zones of juriSdiction around
islands.
The Geneva and New York texts simplified this jumble by defining islands as a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which was above water at high tide.
omic

~ne,

The continental shelf, econ-

contiguous zone, and territorial sea would all be deter-

mined in the same manner as for other land areas.

ROCKS

that could

not . sustain human habitation or economic life of their own were to
have no economic zone or continental shelf.
Deleted from WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l. but included in the
Caracas alternatives, were articles on the situation of islands on
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continental shelves of other States.

C2/wPl gave no economic

zone or continental shelf to such islands, in one alternative, if

it did not contain at least one-tenth of the land area and population of the State to which it belonged.

Another formula allowed

agreement between States involved in marine disputes by peaceful
settlement.

In later texts, these articles were probably viewed

as unnecessary due to the articles on delimitation between opposite
and adjacent States.
The simplicity of WP8!Rev.l is admirable, but articles requiring peaceful dispute settlement as outlined in the Convention are
necessary.

Perhaps the most important achievement of this article

is the acceptance of the idea that islands deserve a special regime.
If there is no Convention in the near future, island states
and coastal States with islands will extend their zones of jurisdiction.

This could potentiallY lead to war where islands are

situated on the continental shelves of other States.

A Convention

signed and ratified by the parties would defuse such disputes even
though the present Convention relies on bilateral negotiations to
settle the dispute.
Special rircumstances - Enclosed and Semienclosed Seas
All the texts agreed on definition of enclosed and semienclosed seas.

They were gUlfs, basins,or seas surrounded by two

or more States, and connected to the open sea by a narrow outlet.
In addition, they could consist of territorial seas and economic
zones of two or more coastal States.
WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l went on to require states bordering such seas to cooperate . with each other in the exercise of
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their rights and duties under the Convention.
to coordinate the management, conservation,

These states were

explora~ion,

exploi-

tat ion, and preservation of the marine environment with respect to

the living resources of the area through bilateral, or regional,
measures.

Scientific research pOlicies and projects were to be

undertaken and other states and international organizations were
to take part.
Special criteria for the passage of ships was listed in C2/
WPI.

Alternative formulas gave merchant and government ships

operating for commercial purposes free transit if dealing with a
bordering state.
strait.

Obligations of ships were the same as for any

Warships and other government ships were to have the

right of innocent passage.

WP8/Part II and WP8/Rev.l provided

no special criteria for passage of vessels through enclosed or
semi-enclosed

seas.

There are twenty-five semi-enclosed seas in the world today
representing about seven percent of the water area of the world's
oceans.

Seventy-eight states are located on one or more of these

seas, and fifty-five percent of the continental shelf, out to 200
meters, lies within them.98

Most of the conflicts that might arise

concerning these states are dealt with in other portions of the
Conventiog9so that a special regime is not created for enclosed
and semi-enclosed seas; but, cooperation in management and

98. L. Alexander, "Regionalism and the Law of the Sea: The
Case of Semi-Enclosed seas", Ocean Development and International
Law Journal, 1974, P. 151.
99 See all the previous chapters.
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conservation is required.

Little will change if a Convention is

approved.
Special Circumstances -

Colonial Dominion and occupation

In Caracas, C2/wPl included articles on territories under
foreign occupation or colonial dominion in eac n of the previous
sections concerning jurisdictional zones.

The controversy centered

on whether these territories should have zones of jurisdiction until
they were free and, if so, what powers would the colonial or occupying power have over those areas.
In Geneva, the draft of the Group of 77 vested the resources
of such territories in the inhabitants of the territories to be exercised by them for their own benefit.

This provision was to apply

to liberation movements which engaged in armed struggle to recover
their territory.

These resources could not be used to benefit the

occupying or colonial power, and, where dispute existed over the
territory, rights over the resources would not be exercised until
the dispute was settled in accordance with United Nations General
Assembly resolutions.
WP8/Part II vested the rights to the territory of non selfgoverning or independent territories with the inhabitants of that
territory to be exercised by them on their own behalf.
ov~r

Disputes

the territory were to be settled" in accordance with the pur-

poses and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In no case

could these rights be exercised or infringed by a metropolitan
power administering or occupying the territory.
WP8/Rev. 1 agreed with the above, but included provisions
that where the United Nations had recommended specific solutions
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sovere~gn

rights were not to be exercised except with the consent

of all parties to a territorial dispute.

All continental and

island territories were included under these articles.
During the debates, some states did not want jurisdiction
over resources to be given to occupied or colonialized states
because the occupying power would misuse the resources.

It was

pointed out that many states would never become independent without
the economic stability provided by its marine resources.
This issue is not expected to be a major confrontation because too many States will profit from a treaty and do not wish to
riSk a Conference failure over an issue of principle that will, in
the end, be ignored by occupying and colonial States.

Interpre-

tation of such articles could become a thorny political mess as
many developing states have conquered territory or have had civil
wars within their territory.

Clearly, Indonesia's attempts at

conquering the Republic of East Timor

100

would fall into this cate-

gory, but would Iran's and Iraq's problems with the Kurds be considered in the same category?
It is unlikely that colonial powers will do little more than
charoe others with interfering in their internal affairs and keep
doing what they have always done under the guise of preparing the
colonies for independence.

100, Richard W. Franke, East Timorl
East Timor Defense Committee, 1976).
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The Hidden War, (New York,

CHAPTER 7
Preservation of the Marine Environment
The Geneva text, WP8/Part III, was the first to attempt to
define marine pollution.

This same definition appeared in the New

York text, WP8/Rev.l. 101

Pollution was any human introduction of

SUbstances or energy into the marine environment, including estuaries, resulting in such deleterious effects as harm to living
resources, hazards to human health, hindrance of marine activities
and other legitimate uses of the seas, impairment of sea water
quality and reduction of amenities.
Caracas produced a series of alternatives in C3/Ll5 dealing
with obligations of states.

One alternative obliged States to take

all necessary measures to prevent, reduce, and control pOllution
from any source using the best practicable means available.
This alternative was included with a second alternative in

101. Considered in this section will be drafts: A/C onf . 62/C 2/
WP1 from Caracas, here C2/WPlj A/Conf.62/C3/L15 from Caracas, here
C 3/L15 ;A/C onf , 62/C 3/L14/Rev.1 from Geneva, here C 3/L14/Add.1; A/C onr ,
62/C3/L24 from Geneva, here C3/L24 submitted by: Belgium BUlgaria,
Denmark, German Democratic Republic, Federal RepUblic of Germany,
Greece, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Poland; A/Conf.62/C3/L25
from Geneva, here C3/L25 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republ ics; A/C onr , 62/C 3/L27 from Geneva, here C 3/L27 submitted by
Greece; A/Conf.62/WP8/Part II from Geneva, here WP8/Part II; A/Conf.
62/WP8/Part III from Geneva, here WP8/Part III; A/conf.62/~r8/Rev.l/
Part III from New York, here WP8/Rev. 1.
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later drafts.

Under C3!L1S, WP8/Part III, and WP8/Rev. 1, States

were to protect and preserve the marine environment from all sources
of pollution, but were given sovereign rights to exploit their natural
resources according to their environmental policies, their needs and
their economic development programs.

An obligation to refrain from

unjustifiable interference with activities of other states was ineluded.
These seemingly contradictory articles were hotly debated.
Developed states claimed that these articles would not protect the
marine environment as states could do as they chose.

Developing

States insisted that to put strict environmental controls on their
industries would destroy their development hopes.

Thus, the first

double standard arguments were found in these introductory articles.
Every State wished ultimately to protect the environment but they
realistically had to create their own standards to meet their own
problems.
Trans-national Pollution
Three different wordings of articles on trans-national pOllution were found in C3/L15, all of which were incorporated into later
drafts.

C3!L25 required states to ensure that pollution arising

from activities within their jurisdiction did not spread outside
that jurisdiction or damage other state or the international community.
1.

These articles were incorporated into WP8/Part III and WF8/Rev.
Many states equated trans-national pOllution with an act of agres-

sion but understood that other States were powerless to prevent such
pollution.
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Areas of Competence
Areas of Competence of the Convention were first expressed in

(3/L1S and later used in c3/L24, WP8/Part Ill, and WP8/Rev.l.

These

included measures dealing with the rel~ase of toxic, harmful, or
noxious substances from landbased, atmospheric, vessel,or dump site
sources.

The transfer of pollution from one area to another, or

its transformation from one type of pollution to another, was prohibited in these texts.
C3/L1S included an article that was suppressed from all future
texts.

It provided that, in considering whether a State had dis-

charged its pOllution obligations under the Convention, all relevant factors, including economic and financial ability and the development stage of States, were to be considered.
Included in WP8/Rev.1, and in no other draft, were paragraphs
requiring States to prevent, reduce, and control the use of technologies or the introduction of alien species into the marine environment causing significant and harmful changes.
Global Cooperation
One alternative of c3/L15 required states, through international organizations, to establish international regulations to prevent,
reduce, and control landbased and seabed pOllution.

Such coopera-

tion was emphasized in another alternative of C3/L1S, WP8/part Ill,
and WP8/Rev.l, but the goal was changed.

FormUlation of internation-

al standards, rules, recommendations, and criteria for all pollution was to be accomplished considering regional features.
Some States wanted to make elaborate international standards
a major treaty goal.

Other States were more realistic.
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Few sovereign

States would abide by pollution measures required in an international Convention.

New ideas, such as the introduction of alien species

into the marine environment, were qualified by words that will be
very difficult to define.

These articles will be ineffective; but,

perhaps a precedent will be created so that future conventions can
deal with pollution more stringently.
Cooperation was also emphasized in artiCles , of C3/L15, the
Geneva and New York texts obligating states aware of imminent danger
to the marine environment or of actual pollution damage to notify
other States likely to be affected as well as competent international organizations.

Cooperation of States and international

organ~za

tions in accordance with their capabilities was underlined to minimize damage and to prevent pollution.

Joint contingency plans were

to be developed.
Objectives of cooperation were stUdies, programs of scientific
research, information, and data acquisition, directly or internationally among States, and assessment of pollution - its pathways, risks,
exposures, and remedies.
Technical Assistance
The Caracas draft provided the basis, later used in the Geneva
and New York texts, concerning technical assistance.

Promotion of

international and regional scientific, educational, technical, and
other assistance to developing states for the preservation of the
marine environment was a goal.

Such assistance included the train-

ing of scientific and technical personnel, their participation in
relevant international programs, equipment and facilities, and enhancement of developing State capability to manUfacture equipment
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and to develop research, monitoring, education, and other programs.
Assistance to developing States was provided far minimizing the
effects of major incidents causing harm to the environment and for
environmental assessment.
Monitoring and Environmental Assessment
A/Conf.62/L14/Add.l provided a summary of monitoring proposals
at the Geneva session.

An Austrailian proposal made the states

distributors of monitoring information.

A United states of America

proposal provided that when there were reasonable grounds for expecting activities in a state to create pollution risks, assessments
of the potential effects were to be communicated to interested States
and the appropriate international organizations.

Environmental ass-

essment aid to developing states could be supplied bilaterally or
through international organizations.
WP8/Part I I I and WP8/Rev.l divided monitoring and assessment
into two articles.

states were to endeavor, as far as practicable

and consistent with other states' rights, to individually or collectively observe, measure, evaluate, and analyze by recognized methods,
the risks or effects of marine pollution.

Publications containing

the results of such studies were to be provided to competent international organizations and to all states.
The Geneva and New York texts continued that where reasonable
grounds for expecting that activities might cause pOllution existed,
states should, as far as practicable, assess the potential effects
and communicate assessment reports to international organizations.
WP8/Part I I I specifically mentioned the United Nations Environmental Program, but this reference was deleted in WP8/Rev.1.
112

These articles represented one of the first international
attempts to incorporate environmental planning into marine development.

They were weak and allowed states to determine their own

development path, free of requirements to assess the impacts.
vironmentalists scoffed at these articles as a sham.

En-

Realists

noted that at least some general obligation to include environmental considerations were included.
on later.

It was a first step to be built

Even developed States were unable to fund all the envir-

onmental legislation that they created and abuses continued.

It

was hardly worth creating international regulations with which no
State could comply.

states were going to do what they pleased, and

there was no need to make this issue a Conference crisis.
Landbased POllution Sources
WP8/Part II, WP8/Part III, and WP8/Rev.l treated landbased
pollution with restraint.

states were obliged to establish and en-

force national laws and regulations to preyent, reduce, and control
pollution of the marine environment from landbased sources based
on internationally agreed rules, standards, and recommended practices and procedures.
Such measures were to consider regional features, the economic
capacity of developing states and their need for economic development.

WP8/Rev.l included a periodic re-examination of the practices

and procedures developed.
Seabed Activities
C2/WPI allowed standards more stringent than international
requirements for seabed pollution within national jurisdiction.
WP8/Part III provided that states should establish and enforce
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---nt r ol , and reduce pollution arising
national lawS to prevent, co
from seabed activities and installations under their jurisdiction.
WP8/Rev.l modified this only slightly to include artificial islands,
installations, and structures.

National laws and regulations were

to be no less effective than international rules, standards, and
recommended practices and procedures.

The same articles on regiona l

and global standard setting appeared under seabed activities as
under landbased pollution.
Marine Dumping
Draft C3/L27 was submitted in Gen~va in an attempt to aefine
dumpiqg in the marine environment.

Dumping was any deliberate

disposal of wastes or other matter at sea from vessels, aircraft,
platforms, or other man-made structures.

It did not include dis-

pasal of wastes incidental to or derived from normal ship operations.

International rules on dumping were to be observed and

regional regulations were to be adopted.

Necessary measures were

to be taken by States within their territory, by coastal States
within certain distances from their coasts, by ports states with
respect to vessels loading at their ports, and by flag States with
respect to vessels flying their flags.

WP8/Part III did not define

dumping, and WPB/Rev.l invoked the Convention on the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter to define
dumping. 102

,102. t'The Convention on the Prevention of Na lt"ine POllution by
Dumplng of Wastes and Other Matter, Done at London on 29 December
1972", in Churchill and Nordquist, New Directions in Law of the Sea,
VOl. IV, (New York: Oceana Publications, 1975), P. 331.
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The Geneva and New York texts required States to establish
national laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control pollution from dumping.

Dumping was not to be carried out ~ithout the

permission of the authorities of States.

Coastal States were

to enforce dumping regulations within the territorial sea, the
economic zone, and on the continental shelf, according to C3/L22,
WP8/Part III, and WP8/Rev.l.

Flag States were required to regulate

their vessels and aircraft.

WP8/Part I I I allowed ports where wastes

were loaded to participate in the regulation, but wP8/Rev.l suppressed this in favor of regulation by states of such loading.
Where violations had occurred, C3/L22 did not allow States to
proceed against the violator where proceedings had already been
started in another State.

WP8/Rev.l modified this by not requir-

ing States to ' i n s t i t u t e proceedings against violators when proceedings had already been instituted by another State.

National

laws and regUlations were to be no less effective than international rules and standards.

WP8/part I I I required these measures to be

formUlated as soon as possible through diplomatic conference or
international bodies.

~';P8/Rev.1

provided only that such measures

be taken SUbject to a periOdic re-examination.
The omission in WP8/Rev.1 of the requirement to establish regional and global standards as soon as possible was a disappointment to environmentalists.

This point was heavily discussed in

committee, cumulating with a suggestion by the Chairperson that
a specific time limit be set for the creation of such standards in
the body of the Convention.

This was not favorea by many delegates

and any compUlsion to establish such measures within a time frame
115

was rejected in WP8/Rev.l.

Unfortunately, States have been reluc-

tant to establish comprehensive international marine pollution regulations in the past, and this is not likely to change.

Basic

international standards may be years away.
Atmospheric Sources
The New York text amplified the Geneva text where atmospheric
marine pollution was concerned.

It provided that States should

establish national laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and con-'
trol marine pollution from atmospheric sources, including aircraft
of their registry.

Global and regional rules, standards, and

recommended practices and

proced~res

relating to marine pOllution

from the atmosphere were to be established.
Vessel Source Pollution
Articles included in C3/L15 were expanded in WP8/Part III and
WP8/Rev.l.

They provided for prevention of accidents, emergency

dealings, ensuring safety at sea, preventing discharges, and regulating the design, construction, equipment, and manning of vessels.
Disagreement on the time frame to establish international
measures against vessel sources pollution appeared in the texts.
WP8/Part III required States to establish such measures as soon
as possible through international organizations or diplomatic
conferences.

WP8/Rev. 1 deleted the time constraint and provided

for a periodic re-examination of measures.
Flaa state Enforcement
In Geneva, C3/L29 allowed flag states to enact stringent
measures for its ships and provide effective enforcement of
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regulations.

Investigations of violations upon the documented

request of other states was required.

WP8/Part III reflected the

later WP8/Rev.l requiring flag states to ensure compliance of its
vessels with applicable international rules and standards.
tion of national
measures~

legislation~

Adop-

no less effective than international

and effective enforcement was mandated.

Not included in the Geneva text but present in the New York
text were provisions that forbade a flag State from allowing a ship
of its

registry~

not complying with international measures, to leave

its ports.
The Geneva and New York texts required a flag

State~

at the

documented request of any state, to investigate alleged violations
by its vessels.

Proceedings could be undertaken where

warranted~

and the requesting State was to be informed of its actions and
reSUlts.

WP8/Rev.l required that no matter where a violation occurr-

ed, the flag State was to investigate and proceed against the violator.

Flag States could seek the cooperation of other states and

these States would endeavor to meet flag state requests.

Flag

state penalties were to be adequately severe to discourage violations, regardless of location.

In the fifth session, it was gener-

ally agreed that flag States would have to submit a written request
if it wished to initiate an investigation of one of its vessels
held by another state.
Present in WP8/Rev.l for the first time were requirements for
vessels to carry certificates, and flag State inspection was required periodically.

The certificates were to be accepted by other

states as evidence of the condition of the vessels and have the
same force as certificates issued by coastal States unless clear
grounds were present for doubting that the vessel's condition
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corresponded to that specified on a certificate.

In the fifth

session, an attempt was made to elaborate the concept of certificates required by, and issued pursuant to, international law.
Coastal State Enforcement
WP8/Rev. 1 allowed coastal states to establish laws and regUlations on vessels' pOllution conforming to international rules
and standards.

C3/L24 first introduced the concept of special

areas created by the coastal State based on oceanographic and
eCOlogical conditions.

Special mandatory measures could be estab-

lished by an international organization and coastal States could
give effect to t hese measures through national legislation.
The Geneva text expanded the concept of special areas substantially to give coastal States special regulatory competence over
vessels where internationally agreed rules and standards were not
adequate for the protection of the economic zone due to its oceanographic or ecological condition, its utilization or the traffic
involved.

Special mandatory measures might be required to prevent

vessel pollution.

Coastal States were required to apply to the com-

petent international organization for recognition of the special
area status and be required to establish landbased reception facilities for wastes.
The New York text changed these articles by requiring consultations with other States before implementing rUles, standards, and
navigational practices.

Coastal States were to publish limits

of these special areas and notify the competent international organization of its laws and regulations, submitting scientific and technical evidence in support of the special area and information

118

on the landbased waste reception facilities.
The Geneva and New York texts agreed that such laws and regulations would become effective six months after not~fication of
the international organization providing that the organization did
not determine that conditions did not correspond to the requirements for special areas.
Some delegations viewed the limitation of coastal State power
to declare a special area as one more attempt to prevent their
sovereignty over the economic zone.

Other delegations feared that

too much coastal State power in the economic zone with regard to
pOllution would lead to world trade restrictions and the creation
of 200-mile territorial seas.
C3/L25 provided that coastal states might establish regulations on pollution within the territorial sea in conformity with
international regulations.

WP8/Part III reflected C2/WP1 in allow-

ing coastal States to establish more effective laws and regUlations in the territorial sea than international laws on vessels
source pOllution.

The consistence and uniformity of rules govern-

ing international navigation was stressed and coastal States were
not to

hamp~

passage through the territorial sea.

Vessels could

be inspected or arrested in the territorial sea if violations
were suspected on reasonable grounds.

The uniformity requirements

were supressed from WP8/Rev.l and the re-worded article strengthened coastal state control over vessel source pollution in the
territorial sea.
In the fifth session, vessel source pollution in the territorial sea was the focus of attention.
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Many coastal states, supported

by the united states of America" wanted control of

mann~ng, con-

struction~ design~ and eguipm~nt of vessels in the territorial

sea.

Most maritime states wanted no such control.
In the economic zone~ WP8/2art III and WP8/Rev.l provided that

coastal states could require a vessel to give information regarding
identification, port of

regi~try,

its last and next port of call,

and other information relevant to establishing whether
violations of national laws had occured.

WP8/Rev.l required flag

States to ensure compliance with such requests.

The Geneva and New

York texts allowed coastal states to inspect a vessel where information supplied was at variance with the facts or where the
vessel refused to give information.
Vessels committing violations were to be allowed to proceed
if the flag state had made specific undertakings to ensure compliance with international measures and assumed liability,or provided
compensatory insurance schemes, for marine POllution damage.
WP8/Part III held that a vessel might be detained as a result
of a court order.

Immediate release was mandated where responsible

persons paid the imposed fine.

If detention of the vessel resulted

from arrest, safe and convenient anchorage was to be provided.
WP8/Rev.1 protected the coastal state from grave and imminent
danger or threat of danger to its coastline by allowing it to act
beyond the limits of the territorial sea and to take measures in
proportion to the actual threat or damage.
Port state Enforcement
In Geneva, C3/L29 allowed port states to start a full investigation of a vessel in its port within six months of a violation
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The flag State was to be informed.

Where violations and damage

had been committed, the port state could arrest and proceed against
the vessel.
WP8/par t III required reasonable grounds to be present for a
State to investigate any vessel within its ports or offshore terminals.

Immediate transmission of the results of the invest i-

gation to the flag State was required and to any State affected
by the alleged violation.

Where reasonable grounds existed for

suspecting that a vessel had discharged within an unspecified
mileage from the coast, the port State might institute proceedings against and arrest the vessel.
WP8/Rev.l simplified these articles by allowing a State to
investigate vessels within its ports and where warranted proceed
against it where viOlations of international measures had occurred.
WP8/Part III allowed for port state investigations at the
request of other States where a vessel had viOlated international
measures by discharging within an unspecified mileage from the
coast.

Both States had to be parties to the convention contain-

ing the rules and regulations alleged to be violated.

Arrest of

ships and requests for investigations were subject to immediate
•

notification of the flag state.

Reports drawn by the port State

were to be forwarded to the flag State.
WP8/Rev.l reduced these articles to require only that port
States endeavor to comply with requests from other States or flag
States for investigations of violations believed to have occurred
within and landward of the economic zone of the requesting State.
No proceedings were to be taken unless the flag State, requesting
State, or State damaged or threatened requested that they be taken
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or unless damage or threat of damage to the port state was involved.

Discussions In the fifth session indicated that only damaged

or threatened states could request other States to investigate
vessels.
WP8/Part III prohibited port state proceedings other than arrest
until the expiration of six months from the date of notification
of the flag State.

No proceedings were allowed if the flag State

had commenced proceedings and flag States were not to be prevented
from exercising their competences.
WR8/Rev.l provided that proceedings initiated by a port state
might be transferred to a coastal state at the coastal

~tatets

request when the violation had occurred within the jurisdiction
of that state.

All records, evidence, and bonds were to be

transferred and proceedings of the port State discontinued.

Port

States could proceed against vessels violating its national laws
and regulations in accordance with the Convention within its zones
of jurisdiction.
The fifth session debates left unresolved the universal character of port State juriSdiction and the degree of acceptance needed
for the creation and application of international standards.
Safeauards
All States were to take measures to facilitate the hearing of
witnesses and admission of evidence submitted by the authorities
of another State or international organizations and facilitate
attendance of representatives of international organizations,
flag States, or state affected by the pollution.
WP8/Re~

1 gave powers of enforcement to officials, naval

122

vessels, military aircraft, or other clearly identified vessel in
government service.

Both the Geneva and New York texts prohibited

States from endangering safety or navigation or causlng hazard

to vessels.

Unreasonable risk to the marine environment was not

to be caused as a result of enforcement.

WP8/Rev.l obliged States

not to delay foreign ships longer than was essential for an investigation.
WP8!part III and WP8jRev.l required immediate release of violating vessels sUbject to reasonable procedures of bonding or
financial security.

The release of a vessel could be withheld if

it represen ted an unreasonable threat to the environment and routing of the vessel to the nearest repair yard was possible.

States

could not discriminate against vessels of other States.
Criminal proceedings against a polluting vessel beyond the
territorial sea were to be suspended upon the taking of criminal
proceedings by the flag state within six months unless a case of
major damage to the State was involved or the flag state had
repeatedly disregarded its enforcement obligations.

A three-year

statute of limitations was placed on criminal proceedings.

Penal-

ties were restricted to monetary sums where violations occurred
beyond internal waters and the accused recognized rights were to
be observed in any criminal proceeding.
States were also

to~pply

recourse in their courts for damage

resulting from inspection, enquiry, or measures where they exceeded
those reasonable in light of the available information
Included in WP8/Rev.1, but not in previous texts, was an
article dealing with ice-covered areas.

Coastal States were given

the right to establish and enforce non-discriminatory laws and
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regulations for the prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from vessels in these areas within the economic zone.

These

areas had to be ice-covered for most of the year and represent
hazards to navigation.

POllution of these areas could cause

irreversible harm, and the best scientific evidence available was
to be used to protect the environment.
Responsibility and Liability
In Geneva, C3/L24 allowed recourse in a State's courts for
marine pollution damage caused by persons under the State's jurisdiction or other persons.

WP8/Part II held States liable for

marine pollution damage to other states.

WP8/Fart III gave States

the responsibility to ensure that pollution did not result from
a~tivities

under its jurisdiction and assigned it liability for

trans-national pollution.
WP8/Rev.l deleted the above articles and gave States responsibility for the fulfillment of their international obligations
concerning protection and preservation of the marine environment.
States were liable where violations of those obligations resulted
in damage.

states were to cooperate to develop international law

relating to determination of liability, damage assessment, payment
of compensation, and dispute settlement.
Sovereiqn Immunity
WP8/Part III and WP8/Rev.l did not apply the above artiCles
to warships, and vessels and aircraft owned by a State and used
for non-commercial service.

Each state was to insure that its

vessels acted in a manner consistent with the Convention.

All

disputes were to be settled by the dispute settlement mechanisms
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provided.
Commentary

The shipping industry received a great deal of attention at
the third session of the Conference due to oil spills then current
in the news.

Noel Hostert 103 described the poor seamanship and

the safety risks that the supertankers take in bringing oil to
market.

captain Dick Gandhi 1 0 4 rebutted these ideas by fixing the

responsibility for lax standards on flag-of-convenience states.
He noted that standards were frequently set by insurance companies
and had little relevance to international convention law.
Some observers felt that differences between flag-of-convenience
states and other maritime States were not necessarily so great.
All ships lacked adequate enforcement regulations and standards
largely due to the economies of the shipping trade.

Many develop-

ing States were just as interested in keeping pollut ion standards
low.

They felt that developing States should have the right to

pollute until they reached a certain level of development.

Devel-

oped states had had a free hand to pollute and that was a major
reason why they were so successful.

Now, developed states wished

to hold developing States back through strict pollution laws when,
in reality, they were the ones that had the responsibility to clean

103. In addition, Mostert claims that one-third of the world's
_tonage is registered in flag-of-convenience states. Noel Mostert,
"Supership", (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Lnc , , 1974).
104. Gandhi, "Ship Hazards:
Neptune, 14 April, 1975, P.3
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Birnie and Gandhi Take Sides",

up the world's pOllution.
It would be impossible to have the same pollution standards
allover the world.

Certainly, some basic environmental quality

standards should be set, but emmission standards could vary in
time and space depending on the needs of the individual states.
All states might subject marine development plans to an environmental impact evaluation.
expensive.

This would be wonderful but terribly

Developing States find it almost impossible to find

money for critical development projects.

To force them into en-

vironmental impact studies would ensure their backward condition
for years to come.

If environmental assessment is considered

worthwhile, funds should be allocated within projects for the
studies.

This would mean that developed states would have to give

more aid, and they are not inclined to do so.
Most states admit that strong environmental practices would
benefit the entire world in theory.

The pOlitical problems of

creating a non-discriminatory world standard is far beyond the
scope of the Law of the Sea Conference.

This Convention is only

setting out a few basic building blocks of environlnental awareness.

Later treaties will strengthen

environm~tal

needs.

Failure

of this Conference will only retard this process for a little
while.

The drive is there, and shortly more environmentally sound

practices will come into being.
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CHAPTER 8
Marine Scientific Research and Technology Transfer
Marine Srientific Research
Four alternative definitions were included in the Caracas
draft, C3/L17. 1 0 5

One researching State defined marine scientific

research as any study of and related experimental work in the
marine environment, designed to increase man's knowledge and .c on ducted for peaceful purposes.

It excluded activities directed

at marine resources.

A developing state proposed that marine research include any
study or experimental work conducted in the interests of peace
and human welfare and aimed at increasing mankind's knowledge.

A further developing State had marine scientific research as all
investigations dealing with natural phenomena in the oceans and
atmosphere.

It talked of methodologies for specific purposes.

Marine scientific research was considered contradictory to

105. Considered in this chapter will be: A/C onr , 62/C 3/Ll?
from Caracas, here C 31L1 7; A/C onr , 62/C 3/L12/Rev.1 from Geneva,
here C3/L12/Rev.li A/Conf.62/C3/L13/Rev.l from Geneva, here C3/
L13/Rev.l, presented by Iraq for the Group of 77; A/Conf.62/C3/
L26 from Geneva, here C3/L26, submitted by the Eastern Socialist
Sta tes; A/e on f , 62/( 3/L29 from Geneva, here C 3/L29, submitted by
Colombia, El Salvador, hexico, and Nigeria; A/Conf.62/C3/L28 from
Geneva, here C 3/L2 8, au bmi t ted by the i\ etherland s for LGDS i AI
C onf • 62/C 3/L31 from Geneva, here C 3/L31; A/e on r , 62/WP8/Part III
from Geneva~ here WP8/part III; A/Conf.62/WP8/Rev.1/Fart I I I
from New York, here WP8/Rev. 1
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non-peaceful purposes and direct exploitation of marine resources.
The proposal incorporated into drafts C3/L29, WP8/Part III,
and WP8/Rev.l was proposed by a deve loped State.

Marine scienti-

fic research was a study or related experimental work designed to
increase man's knowledge of the marine environment.

The Geneva

and New York texts established the right of all states to conduct
marine scientific research.
Agreed at the Caracas session and reflected in drafts C3/L17,

C3/L26, C3/L29, and WP8/Part III were requirements that all States
promote development of and conduct marine scientific research for
their own benefit and that of the international community.

WP8/

Rev.! expanded this pbligation to include international organizations.

These drafts went on to oblige States to cooperate on all

levels in creating favorable conditions for research and to integrate scientific efforts studying the essence and interrelationships between phenomena and processes in the marine environment.

C3/L26, C3/L29, WP8!Part III, and WP8/Rev.l included sentences to
facilitate access to harbors and ports for research vessels.

WP8/

Rev.1 added that states were to establish guidelines and criteria
to ascertain research implications.
All the drafts agreed that marine scientific research was to
be conducted for peaceful purposes and was not to hinder other legitimate uses of the seas.

WP8/Part III held that appropriate

scientific methods, vessels, aircraft, devices, equipment, and
installations should be used.

WP8/Rev.l .r e q u i r e d only the use of

appropriate scientific methods and means.

All the drafts negated

claims to parts of the marine environment based on research activities.
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c3/Ll7 provided two pathways when considering the rights of
coastal States.

One alternative. later used by c3/L13/Rev.l,

called for research to be conducted, subject to the rights of

coastal States with zones of national jurisdiction.

The other

alternative, followed in C3/L26, C3/L29, WP8/Part Ill, and WP8/
Rev.l, required that research be conducted subject to coastal
State rights.
Coastal State Riohts
All drafts gave the coastal State the right to conduct and
regulate marine scientific research in the territorial sea.
was confirmed in the fifth session subject to articles not
agreed.

This
~et

Certain information was required of a state wishing to do

research in the economic zone or on the continental shelf.

WP8/ '

Rev.l required the submission of information no less than four
months from the starting date of the research.

This information

included the nature and objectives of the research project, the
method and means to be used, the name, tonnage, type, and class
of vessels and a description of the scientific equipment.

The

precise geographical location and name of the sponsoring institution, its director, and person in charge of the project were to
be indicated.
C3/L17, C3/L29, and WP8/Part III included the expected date
of first appearance and final departure of the vessel or equipment.

WP8/Rev.l added deployment and removal of equipment to

these requirements.
Researcher's Duties

C3/Ll? established two alternative routes in considering
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a researcherts obligations.

One provided for active participation

by coastal states in research projects.

This was rejected in

succeeding drafts in favor of an obligation for the researcher

to ensure the rights of coastal States to participate or be represented in a research project on the continental shelf or in the
economic zone if they so desired.

C3/LZ6 specifically mentioned

participation of scientists in projects of the

Intergoverp~lental

Oceanographic commission and other international organizations.
C3/LZ9, WP8/Part III, and WP8/Rev.1 added that coastal States were
not to be paid by the researching State.
C3/L17 established through C3/L13/Rev.l and the Geneva and
New York texts that the researcher was to provide the final results
and conclusions.

WP8jRev.l modified this to include preliminary

reports and results requested by the coastal State.

The initia-

tive was again placed on the coastal State for securing the cooperation of the researcher.

with the exception of C3/L26 and C3/L28,

the drafts obliged the researcher to supply raw and processed data
and samples to the coastal State.

WP8/Rev.l added that division

of data and samples at the request of the coastal state was to
be without detriment to the scientific value of the project.
WP8/Rev.l seemed to provide excuses for non-compliance with data
sharing.

Researchers could claim that partition of the results

was detrimental to the project or that a request had not been made.
On the other hand, coastal States should not destroy the value of

a project because they wanted data.

This could develop into a

major focus for future disputes.

C3/L17 also established through C3/L13/Rev.l, C3/LZ9, and the
Geneva and New York texts, that the researcher should assist the
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coastal States upon request in assessing data, samples, and results.
The Caracas draft supplied two oppos ing lines of thought as
to publication of results.

The first,

included in C3/L13/Rev.l,

required the consent of the coastal state for all data publication.
The second, included in the Geneva and New York texts, provided

pUblication as soon as feasible through national and international
channels.

WP8/Part III specifically mentioned International Data

Centers in this distribution.

This was deleted from WP8/Rev.1.

It is unclear whether this question was resolved at the fifth
session.

Some states felt that their security was threatened if

unlimited publication of research data was possible.

Others could

not understand why data should be curtailed.
The Caracas draft spawned still another alternative that made

its way to the Geneva and New York texts by way of C3/L29.

This

required coastal States to be informed immediately of changes in
research programs.

~~8/Rev.l

further stipUlated that all scienti-

fic installations or equipment be removed on research completion,
unless otherwise agreed.

WP8/Part I I I and WP8/Rev.l channelled

communications rega rding research projects through appropriate
official channels, but WP8/Part III was the only draft to require
that the coastal State acknowledge receipt of communications
immediately.
Status of Installations and Equipment
C3/L17 expressed a short-lived conflict over who would have
juriSdiction over research installations.
such Jurisdiction to the researching State.
coastal State consent for such

One alternative gave
Another required

ins~dllations.
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The Geneva and

New York texts sidestepped the dispute by indicating that deployment and use of any scientific equipment or installation would be
sUbject to the same conditions as was marine scientific research.

C3IL17, C3/L26, WP8/Part III, and WP8/Rev.l prohibitea such equipment from having jurisdictional zones but required safety zones,
not exceeding 500 meters around them.

International shipping

routes were not to be obstructed.

C3/L26 and the Geneva and New York texts indicated that identification markings of the state or international organization were
to be on equipment and installations and internationally agreed
warning signals were to ensure navigational safety.
Deleted from HP8/Rev.l, but present in C3/L26 and WP8/Part 111,
were articles assigning

r~ghts

of operation, management, and res-

ponsibility for research equipment and installations to the researcher deploying them.

Coastal

state~

could inspect the equip-

ment and installations and take appropriate measures in areas
where consent was required.

states and international organiza-

tions conducting marine scientific research were held liable for
damage resulting from that research.

Liability for damage within

the jurisdiction of a coastal state was to be governed by the laws
of that state.

Recourse in the legal system of the coastal State

was to be available for damage from marine scientific research
activities.
WP8/Rev.l gave responsibility and liability to States and international intergovernmental organizations for contravention of the
Convention, marine scientific research actions of persons under
their jurisdiction, or damage reSUlting from such measures.
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Dispute Settlement
C3/L29 took any violation of the Convention to the appropriate
United Nations body within six months of the violation.
was to render an opinion.

This body

If the opinion confirmed the coastal

State's findings, it could suspend or terminate a research project.

C3/L28 required coastal States to inform researching States

of violations.

After a certain period of time, each party was to

choose an expert from a list established by Ul':ESCo
was to appoint a third member.

1 06

,

and UNEXO

These experts were to assist the

parties, and, where no settlement was reached, the experts could
give their opinions and dispute settlement procedures could be
invoked by either party.
I'iP8/part I I I simplified all this by resolving disputes through
dispute settlement machinery provided in the Convention.

WP8/Rev.l

required negotiation, conciliation, or other procedures of settlement.

Where disputes relating to the nature or objectives of the

research was not settled, it was to be
procedures.

sUbm~tted

to conciliation

Each party was to nominate an expert from a list of

experts supplied by the appropriate United

l~ations

organ.

The

experts were to assist the parties in reaching an agreement and, if
after two months, disagreement continued, then a third expert was
to be nominated by the appropriate United
of the parties.
procedures.

A

~ations

body at the request

four-month time limit was placed on these

Wnere no argeement was reached, recourse to the Con-

vention dispute settlement procedures was provided.

Pending con-

ciliation or settlement, the researcher was not allowed to commence

106. United Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization..
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or continue research without the approval of the coastal State.
Pure Vs. Economic Research

The articles previously discussed presented only minor problems
in the discussions.

The crux of the marine scientific research

question centered on the power of the coastal State to control
all research in the economic zone.
ting positions.

C3/L17 included the conflic-

One called for coastal State consent for research

in the economic zone.

This was amplified in C3/Ll3/Rev.l so that

research would be done under strict coastal State control and
viOlations would result in suspension or termination of the research.
The Caracas draft expressed the other side of the question in an
alternative allowing all States to conduct marine scientific research beyond the territorial sea respecting the rights of coastal
This was reflected in WP8/Part III.

States.

C3/Ll3 also contained what some thought was a compromise
solution.

This divided research into resource related, subject

to coastal State consent, and non-resource related, or pure researl-h, to be free of coastal State consent.

C3/L26, C3/L29, and

WP8/Part I I I tried to push this separation as a compromise.
Resource Related Research
C3/L26 gave the coastal State total control over resource
oriented research on the continental shelf and in the economic
zone.

C3/L29 and WP8/part I I I set criteria for such research

inclUding explicit consent of the coastal state and coastal State
consent for publication of results.

Coastal States could request

a preliminary interpretation of research and all information
requests were to be fUlfilled as soon as possible by the researcher.
In addition, requirements created for non-resource related research
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were to be observed.
Non-Resource Related Research

In Geneva, C3/L26 allowed non-resource marine scientific
research after notification of the coastal State.

This notifica-

tion was to include detailed descriptions of the research programs,
objectives, methods, instruments, location, time schedule, and institutional information.
WP8/part II required those intending to undertake marine
research to indicate to the coastal state whether its was resource
or fundamental research .. criteria for establishing the difference
were to be developed through international organizations.

C3/

L29 provided the pathway to WP8!Part III in requiring coastal
states to reply within 120 days were it agreed that the research
was fundamental and of its intention to participate in the project.
WP8!Part III did not fix a specific time limit.

If there was no

reply, the researcher might commence the research.
C3/L29 allowed states to object if it did not agree that the
research was fundamental.

Upon informing the researcher, both

parties would choose a person from a list of United Nations designated experts.

If agreement was not obtained, a third member

might be appointed by the United Nations.

Where these methods

failed, the coastal State could withhold consent.
WP8/Part III deleted the above and provided that where the
c o a s t a l State objected to the research as being resource oriented,
settlement through the established procedures was required.

C3/

L29 and WP8/Fart III made all non-resource related data public.
These compromises were clearly unacceptable to developing
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States during the fourth session.

WPB/Rev.l made no distinc-

tion between fundamental and resource related research, pro-viding for coastal state consent.

States were not to withhold

congent except for specific reasons.
The New York text allowed researchers to proceed four
months after submission of the necessary data unless, within
two months, the State had communicated its lack of consent,
the information was inaccurate - not conforming to the factsor supplemental information was needed.

The Fifth Session
Such a strict consent regime was unacceptable to developed
states.

They were willing to accept a consent regime for re-

source related research but insisted on a notification regime
for other research.

The Group of 77 floated a proposal early

in the fifth session deleting mention of consent but giving
coastal States a right of refusal for resource exploitation or
research requiring economic structures.

It was sin

1ilar

to

a previous united states of America proposal but included a
requirement that research be done for peaceful purposes.
Developed States rejected this proposal, and the United
States of America proposed an amendment that developing states
interpreted as a return to the 1958 Geneva Conventions.

Such

a hard line approach was immediately rebuffed by developing
states which proposed a total consent regime for marine scientific research in the economic zone or on the continental shelf.
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Until this time, developed State opposition to a total consent
regime had been strong; but, in a shocking move, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics accepted the consent regime as proposed
in the Chairman's compromise, provided that certain criteria were
met in other Conference areas.

This caused great distrust among

developing states until the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
explained that it wanted friendly negotiations.
Four Proposals
By the middle of the session, four proposals had emerged as
d om1nant
om i
.
1n the confrontat10n.

h
ha
i
Tee
a1rman's
proposal 107 was

c on s i d e r ed a trial baloon providing a limited consent regime.
Coastal States could regulate, authorize, and conduct marine
SC1entific research in their jurisdictional zones and consent was
required.

Consent was not normally to be withheld, and coastal

States were to create rules and procedures to ensure that consent
was not delayed or denied.

Consent could be withheld in cases

involving resources, drilling, blasting, conflict with coastal
state use of the area, introduction of harmful substances into
the marine environment, construction or use of artificial islands
and structures.
Most researching states objected that consent could be withheld too easily under these criteria.
that it did not go far enough.

Developing States claimed

Several States, previously support-

ing the Chairman's text, insisted on amendments after hearing developed state complaints.

They suggested that coastal State

107. The proposal of the Chairperson of the Third
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Corr~ittee.

jurisdiction be made exclusive and require express consent.

They

modified the requirement for specific rules and procedures by
adding ~~far as practicable, leaving the coastal state with wide
discretion.

They included provisions allowing for rejection of

research not for peaceful purposes and deleted reference to
resource related research.

These proposals gave the coastal

State powers to reject all marine scientific research on broad
grounds.
The delegation of Australia presented a compromise but asked
delegates to study and not discuss it.

It allowed for research

ar.tivities in coastal State jurisdictional zones upon consent of
the coastal State, providing that consent not normally be withheld
except where the research involved resources, drilling, blasting,
construction, or use of artificial structures.

The proposal was

not well received, due to the adverse climate of the

Committe~,

but it might be a negotiating basis in the sixth session.
The fourth proposal was by the United States of America and
provided coastal states with consent power over economic zone
research r.oncerning resources, drilling, blasting, or construction,
and use of artificial structures.

All other research activities

in the economic zone or on the continental shelf required only
notification of the coastal state with that State participating
in projer.ts and sharing samples and data.

The proposal improved

coastal and researching state protections through a "tacit" consent regime, which ,was not defined, and binding dispute settlement.
Little negotiating room was evident between these closely-worded
proposals and compromise was seen as difficult.
138

Transfer of Technoloay
In Geneva, A/Conf.62/C3/L31, A/Conf.62/C3/L12/Rev.l, and WP8/
Part III provided, as did the New York text, that states promote
directly or through international organizations cooperation and
programs to develop and transfer marine technology and sciences
at fair and reasonable terms, conditions, and prices within their
capabilities.
WP8/Part III and the other Geneva drafts promoted marine
srientific and technological capabilities in developing States,
including landlocked and geographicallY disadvantaged States.
Their needs and economies were to be considered with regard to
exploration, exploitation, conservation, and management of marine
resources, and preservation of the marine environment with a Vlew
to accelerating the social arid economic development of developing
States.
WP8/Rev.l modified these articles slightly to include scientific research.

Such capacities were to be transfered to States

that needed and requested technological assistance.

Included in

WP8/Rev.l , and not in other drafts, were provisions for States to
foster favorable economic and legal conditions for equitable marine
technology transfer, beneficial to all parties concerned.
All the drafts agreed that all states were to promote the development of marine technology, human

resources~

training, and

education with special regard to nationals of lesser developed
States.
The Geneva text emphasized

acquisition~

evaluation, and dis-

semination of marine scientific and technical knowledge.

WPB/

Rev.! added facilitation of access to information and data.
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WP8/Part III included, but wP8/Rev.l deleted, reference to the consideration of the economy and needs of recipient states during this
process.
The Geneva and New York texts created duties of States.

States

were to establish technical cooperation programs for marine technology transfer to states needing and requesting technical assistance, especial ly those not able to establish their own technological and scientific capacities and infrastructures.
WP8/Part III and WP8/Rev.l agreed to promote favorable conditions for the conclusion of agreements, contracts, and similar
arrangements on equitable and reasonable bases, holding conferences,
exchanging students, technologists and experts, undertaking projects,

joint ventures, and other forms of cooperation.

All drafts agreed that guidelines, criteria, and standards
for bilateral technology transfers and transfer-s through international organizations should be established by states.
Regional Centers
The Geneva and

~ew

York texts emphasized the creation of re-

gional marine scierlific and technological research centers to stim-

.

ulate and advance research in developing States.

WP8/Rev.l added

that all states in a region were to cooperate with the regional
centers to ensure effective achievement of their objectives.

The

functions of the regional centers included training and educational programs at all levels and aspects of marine science and technology, especially marine biOlogy, conservation, and management
of living resources, oceanography, hydrography, engineering, geological exploration, seabed mining, and desalination.
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studies relating to management, preservation of the marine environment, pollution control, conferences and meetings, acquisition and processing of data and information, dissemination of
results, and technical cooperation between States in the region
was included.

Deleted in WP8/Rev.l, but present in WF8/Part rII,

was a provision for the regional centers to serve as repositories
for marine technologies covering patent and non-patent technologies; instead, WP8/Rev.l included the functions of publicizing
national technology transfer pOlicies and compilation and systematization of information on marketing of technologies, contracts.
and patent arrangements.
WP8/Rev.l included articles not found In other drafts compelling international organizations to ensure the effective discharge
of the functions and responsibilities
vention.

assign~l

them under the Con-

Transfer of technology was discusseO only briefly in

the fifth session, dealing with the role of the Authority in such
transfers.
Commentary
Many of the basic articles on the mechanics of the scientific
research regime were proposed at Caracas and accepted by the first
New York session of 1976.

Articles that would engender conflict

at the fourth and fifth sessions were quite apparent in Caracas.
The choice was, as usual, to negotiate the easy things first and
put off the hard questions until later.
By the end of the fifth session, the delegation of the United
States of America had become increasingly isolated on its freedom
of scientific research position. The Union of soviet Socialist
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Republics accepted a limited consent reg~rne early in the session.
At the end of the session, there was evidence of a split among
Western European researching states

~ith

many of them willing to

accept some form of a consent regime for all types of marine
scientific research.
From the scientists' point of

v~ew,

freedom of marine scien-

tific research over fundamental research was essential for the
well-being and advancement of mankind.

Yet, few states had enough

scientists to significantly affect governmental policy decisions.
Many developing states had seen only one aspect of marine scientific research.

They claimed that, for years, scientists had

gathered data near their shores and used it either to commit
acts of war or economic aggression.

They claimed that companies

had gained information from scient ific institutions and used it
to obtain a favorable position over coastal states not having such
information.

They felt it was an unfair advantage and an insult

to their sovereignty as States.
Marine scientists observed that, where foreign navies needed
information, they would obtain it through equipping their warships
to do the needed work.

Warships would not be substantially affect-

ed by the wishes of coastal States under the new Convention.

Com-

panies used their own data-gathering sources to obtain a favorable
position over developing States and had little to do with scientific institutions.

Developing States were unable to distinguish

what vessel was doing what research and to what ends under the
present system.

They insisted on more control.

There was another

level of consideration that was rarely talked about but that might
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prove to be important to some developing states.

Marine scien-

tific research could be used by developing States not equipped
with fancy researching methods as an information source in military activities against other developing states.
The security question was accented in the texts by requiring
that research be conducted for peaceful purposes.

Few scientists

opposed this philosophic approach but worried that, because their
funding frequently came from naval and other governmental sources,
their research efforts could be misconstrued as being non-peaceful.
In many researching States, the scientific community was an extension of the government.

This added to the deterioration of credi-

bility of all marine scientific research institutions in the eyes
of developing States that found it hard to distinguish between the
researching establishments in the various developed States.

Scien-

tists felt that the amount of information obtained by the navy from
scientific institutions was miniscUle compared to their own sources.
Developing States were still not convinced of the harmlessness of
researching institutions.
The conduct of researching organizations was a sore point with
some delegations.

They claimed that the rights of coastal States

had rarely been observed.

They were afraid that environmental

harm might be done or that the laws of the coastal State might be
broken.

Research vessels of many nations prowled the seas and much

of their work was resource related.

How could a developing State

distinguish among these vessels and protect itself without strong
regulatory powers?
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Developing States pointed out that there were few cases in the
past in which developing state representatives were allowed to
participate in research off their coasts and that, in the same
cases, information and samples were not supplied.

Many scientists

agreed that their behavior in the past had not been good but
pointed to recent expeditions as an example of future cooperation.
Developing states did not think that researchers had tried enough.
When a coastal State controled all research within 200 miles of
its coasts, it could be assured that it benefited and that its
laws were not violated.
Perhaps the most important portion of this argument centered
on applications of the research.

Developing States pointed out

that they had so many needs that research off their coasts should
be attuned to their development plans.

The only way to be certain

that research was integrated into their national needs was to control all the research off their coasts.
Researchers looked at such restrictions with horror.
vessels rarely had a planned approach to any research.

108

Research
Indivi-

dual scientists in western countries received grants for their
projects.

Shipboard time was then rented to individuals for speci-

fic projects.

Strong restrictions requiring coastal state consent

would upend this system.

Tremendous lag times would be introduced

and researching funds would be hard to obtain for areas where
coasta i States had rejected previous projects.

Despite the pro-

visions of the texts, scientists viewed such consent as subject

108. This may not be the case for research conducted in Eastern
Socialist states.
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to the whim of the coastal state.

They saw directed research as

unfortunate because many important discoveries had been made by
accident.

A scientist might wish to do one thing but stumble upon

another of tremendous significance because he was at the right
place at the right time.

Must he then inform the coastal State

in detail of a change in plans and wait for approval?

By that time,

the opportunity might be lost.
Scientists found it difficult to envision a system where every
det~il

of planned research woula be spelled out in its request

for coastal state permission.

Yet, developing states point out

that for years terrestrial scientists have been required to seek
such permission.

It had done them little harm, and their results

had been excellent.

Researchers noted that the sea was a completely

different environment, hostile and little-Known.

Such restrictions

would make research in many areas of the world impossible.

They

pointed to the relatively small amount of research done in developing states caused by restrictive developing State practices.

The

bureaucracy had always been very bad in most of these states, and
private fiefdoms had been established in the government services.
Scientists

n€~er

knew who they would have to bribe or when they

might be thrown in jail and their equipment confiscated.

Little

was accomplished in these States, and to subject marine scientific research to such a system would be disasterous
Developing states denied that this was so

tru~

and charged

that researchers were unwilling to enter developing States because
facilities were so poor.

Frequently, scientists had only cared

about their own little projects that were at variance with the
needs of that state.
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Some developing States regarded free publication of scientific
results as a direct threat to their security.

The express consent

of coastal states would ensure such data was not published without
coastal State consent,
opportunities.

This was viewed as destroying researching

Scientific and institutional reputations were built

on published results.

More importantly, scientists would never

spend money to do research that they could never use.
States claimed that researchers had the advantage.

Developing

Apart from the

equipment necessary, few States would dare to do research off the
United states of America or the union of Soviet socialist Republics
without the consent of those states.

It was a fact of life that one

did not tempt fate by challenging .the super powers.

western scien-

tists responded that they would be happy to have any State conduct nonresourre related research off their coasts.

The reason why more re-

search had not been conducted by foreign vessels was that most of the
research had already been done.

It was unclear whether permission

was really required by such governments.
Developing states claimed that, in reality, they required permission and other considerations at present for marine scientific
research off their shores.

They looked on the Convention as a cod-

ification of already existing practice.
this was true in some cases.

Scientists admitted that

What did these States really obtain

from their insistence on consent?

Did they really receive the

research help or the training that they desired?

Developing States

admitted that they did not, at present, receive all that they would
like; but, when all States had similar consent laws, researchers
would be forced to aid them if they wished to conduct research
searchers retorted that developed States, in particular, were

146

Re -

not set up to provide what developing states needed. 109
It seemed at the fifth session that marine scientific research
would be a necessary casualty of the extension of national jurisdiction over the oceans.

There was little doubt that some scientists,

although a minority, had abused their privileges in developing
S~ates.

Far more frequent was the unintentional and unrealistic

contravention of developing state sensibilities.

~ost

important

was the need of developing states to add one more increment of
power to their sovereignty.

Their security and economic aggress-

ion fears had been justified in the past, and their concern for
the benefits of projects lost to them was real.

Scientific re-

search was looked on as an extension of the domination of developing states by developed States because it was unilateral in nature
and did not traditionally consider developing states' wants and
needs.

The power difference between the huge scientific establish-

ments in developed states and the miniscule scientific establishments in developing States was not lost on coastal States.

Many

States did challenge the use of statistics from developed States
as biased and prejudicial to their interests. 1 1 0
There seemed to be only two outcomes of the present debate on
marine scientific research.

The Conference might adopt articles

strengthening the consent regime, or, this and other factors would
lead to the failure of the Conference.
If articles were incorporated into the text calling for a

109. Alexander, M., Feb.l, 1977, personal communication.
person, Lept. of Geography, University of Rhode Island.

Chair-

110. In the Second Committee, the use of Japanese tuna and whale
statistics was challenged.
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consent regime, certain developed states might refuse to sign or
ratify the convention, and it would become a useless piece of paper.
Only in the united states of America did the scientific community
seem powerful and organized enough to cause non-ratification of the
Convention.

Some delegates suspected that the harsh position of

some developed states on marine scientific research was fabricated,
to be used as a bargaining chip to obtain more important concessions.

Some felt that the scientists might be sold down the river

in favor of Committee I gains.
If the Convention failed due to the various conflicting forces,
coastal States would extend their zones of jurisdiction and place
controls on scientific research.
If such unilateral zones were established, developed States
would have to either recognize them or not recognize them.

If

the zones were recognized, there would be little conflict as
researchers would have to abide by the consent regime imposed.
If the zones were not recognized, governments would refuse to
seek permission for research activities in the jurisdictional
zones of coastal States.

Researchers could conduct projects at

will in these zones, but at the risk of confiscation of equipment
and

jailing of the scientists.

The most that a government could

do would be to promise reimbursement for equipment and immediate

action to obtain release from jail.

Most governments would be

unwilling to send naval forces to protect marine scientific research projects.
find, at

Funding for such research would be difficult to

b ~st.

An additional possibility would be the creation of flags-ofconvenience researching ships under States having special relations
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with other States or States not recognizing the zones of jurisdiction of the coastal States involved.

This seems unlikely in that

funding would be very difficult to obtain for such ships and there
would be few guarantees of safety for the ship and crew.

In any

case, where conflict arose, funding for research projects would be
very difficult to obtain.

A state of hostility would be of use

to none of the parties involved.
Under either of these alternatives, the results will eventually
be the same.

Resea~ching

institutions will have to accept some

type of a consent regime for marine research in the economic zone
and on the continental shelf that is non-resource related.

It

is unrealistic for developed States, now extending fisheries and
other jurisdictions off their coasts, not to expect equal and supplemental extensions of jurisdiction off the coasts of developing
states.

After all, they set the precedent.

Private researching institutions in the United States of America estimated that 45 to 50 percent of

th~ir

research time was

spent in the economic zones of other States. III

Under either alter-

native, continuation of such research will depend on cooperation
between researching and developing states.
The structure of researching facilities will have to change
radically in the future in Western developed states.

Centralized

bodies will be needed to deal with permission requests and other
requirements.

Leaving this to the individual scientist or insti-

tution would be disasterous.

A re-orientation of research towards

111. Dr. Knauss, Dean of the Graduate SchOOl of Oceanography,
University of Rhode Island, delegate of the United states of America to the Law of the Sea Conference, Feb.l, 1977, personal communication.
149

the needs of developing states might be tempered with deals to
do more fundamental research.

Institutions could agree with coastal

States to do two developing State oriented projects in exchange for
one more fundamental project.
Bilateral agreements between researching and non-researching
States will be one mechanism for promoting marine scientific
research.

Regional agreements could be another vital means of

promoting cooperative ventures.

Restrictions on such research

may promote closer cooperation between the scientific establishments of various states.

Joint ventures could be arranged where

research would be completed in the process of building facilities
in, and training personnel of, developing states.

Exchanges be-

tween universities and private researching institutions could
flourish, and concentration of efforts to train scientists in their
own countries could take place.
It will not all be a rosey future.

Bilateral agreements will

depend on the political relationships between States.

Regional

agreements may be viOlated where researching states conduct resource related research while claiming to do something else.
Coastal states might be whimsical in their acceptance of research
projects.

These short-run problems will

depe~d

on the goodwill

among States and the successful completion of cooperative projects.
In the long run, few developing States can afford to loose research
and training opportunities of any kind, and few developed States
will wish to forego the data obtained, if enough money is available.
Projects will take on a priority ranking with less necessary
projects not being done.

Essentially, the Convention or the uni-

lateral extensions will create the

mechani~n
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long clamored for in

the developing world to broaden the research base from a few
well-equipped deyeloped States to many maybe not so well-equipped
States.

Developing States insist that this is more equitable, and

will lead to increased development opportunities.
Some scientists look on the Convention as the death of scientific research near coastal States.
is an exaggeration.

This observer feels that this

Scientists do not know whether unilateral

extensions or a Convention codifying those extensions is better.
There is a vague hope that, after a few years, developing States
will be more hurt by this type of action than helped, and they will
insist on freedom of marine scientific research.

This is a false

hope.

When have States ever given up sovereign power over terri-

tory?

Coastal states are much more interested in resource exploi-

tation than fundamental research.

There will always be researchers

willing to do this type of research because money will be available.
It is hard to believe that a hundred unilateral actions, establishing varying sets of rules and regulations could be preferable
to one uniform international Convention.

scientists are insistant

on freedom of scientific research and opposition to any Convention not guaranteeing

t~at

right.

There is little doubt that the

present structure of marine scientific research will change.

When

scientists examine the issues in the cold light of scientific
reason instead of the hot flame of emotional passion, they will
realize that they have little choice.

For this reason, scientific

research is a false issue of confrontation because free scientific
research will die a slow death regardless of how developed states
act.
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CONCLUSION
The Future of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea
Five basic possibilities exist for termination of the Conference on the Law of the Sea.

The developed world cOUld force

the conclusion of a treaty favorable to their interests.
would includes

This

limited coastal state powers in the economic zone,

freedom of scientific research, limited technology transfer, moderate pOllution control measures, a weak international Authority,
and guaranteed access to the deep seabed for mining.
The developing States might achieve a treaty favorable to their
interests, including a strong Authority, strong coastal state
powers in the economic zone, minor pollution control, massive technology transfer, and controlled scientific research.

The conse-

quences of either group forcing their position on the Conference
would be lack of ratifications to bring the Convention into force,

.

and lack of application to most of the world's States.

Clearly,

a Convention not including the union of soviet Socialist Republics,
the United States of America, and other developed states will have
little meaning.

A Convention not ratified by 107 of the 157 world

states would be little more than worthless.

Both the developed

and developing States have threatened to call for voting on substantive issues.

Hopefully, this is a scare tactic and will not

be seriously considered until consensus is reached.
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Most technology is in the hands of the mUlti-national corporations.

Exclusion of these companies from the Convention is unreal-

istic and would make enforcement of international regulations
difficult.

Besides, few industrialized States would go against

the interests of their multi-national corporations.
A third alternative is that compromise will be reached and a
Convention will be approved.
national governments.

It will take time and restraint by

At this stage in the Conference, compro-

mise does not seem possible for many more Conference sessions.
The last two solutions amount to basicallY the same thing the failure of the Conference.

One alternative is that the Con-

ference waits so long that unilateral legislation will make a
Convention unrealistic.
of America

l 12

Historically, it was the United states

that started the unilateral extension craze.

Truman Declaration

113

The

was used as the justification for extensions

of national jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles.

Sadly, history is

repeat ing itself in the United States Congress.

Passage of a 200

.
rn~le

l.ah.ilug
f~s

. , t '~n
l~ml

1976 1 1 4 ha s Ie d t 0 a casca d e 0 f

of national jurisdiction out to 200 miles.

.
extens~ons

It is highly likely

that South America with parts of Asia and Africa will create 200
mile territorial seas.

Within the united States,

bastio~

of free-

dorn of the high seas, there is already talk of establishing fiscal

112. I must single out the United states of America because
its actions set precedents for the unilateral development of maritime law.
113, See Footnote #1.
114. Fisheries Conservation and Management Act of 1976.
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and health standards and a pollution zone out to

200 miles. 11S

The creep of jurisdiction has begun.
The other alternative is to request postponement of the Conference for two years.

Clearly, suspension of the Conference

will have the same effect as taking too much time to reach a
convention.

Unilateral extensions will be further stimulated.

In the developing world, 200-mile zones will become the rule of
law.

States with wide continental margins will take what "t h e y

feel is their share of ocean space.
Strait States may charge tolls for passage, thereby restricting international trade.

Landlocked and geographically disad-

vantaged States will be excluded in the rush to control ocean
wealth.

Many conflicts can be predicted, and only those few

States with large marine areas under their control can hope to
benefit.

Is it so unreasonable to imagine terrorists, maddened

by their exclusion from ocean resources in a resource-hungry world,
bombing seabed installations or national capitals to regain what
they believe is rightfully theirs?
Perhaps more tragically, the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea is the first big test of attempts to reorganize the world order.

If it fails, the international system

will be discredited and a resort to force might be the result.
These things may not happen all at once, but over a period of
years.

Hopefully, the conflicts will lead to a Fourth United

Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and not all-out war.

115. "200-rnile pollution control proposed", The StandardTimes, 4 March 1977, P. 1
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OhJ beautiful dream I

You were to be the building block for

future world order and prosperity.

Are you now to sink in the

muck of the East River and be destroyed forever?
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Tables and Figures
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TABLE I
states claiming zones beyond* 12 miles and 200 meters
as of 1973
Terri-

torial FishCountry

Date
Claimed

Argentina 1967
Bangladesh

ing
Sea
n,rn,+ n,m,

1968

Brazil

1970

Canada
costa
Rica
Colombia

1970

1931

Chile

1953

tion
n,In,

Cant inen tal
Margin to
Defense other Coast

200
112

1966
1950

Benin

Pollu-

100 fathoms
100 n.m.
200
100
200

1972

20 n,rn.
200 n.m.

200

China,P.c,

East China and
Yellow Seas

Ecuador
1966
£1 Salva1950
dor

200

Gabon

1972

100

Gambia,The1971

50

Ghana

1973

30

Guinea
Iceland

1964
1972

130

India

1956
1973

Iran
Korea, Rep.
of
1952
Maldives 1968
1970
Madagas1973
car
Maurita- 1972
nia
1973
Morocco
Nicaragua 1965

200

200 n.m.
150
100

100 fathoms

50
112
50
20200

20-200 n.m.

3-55
100-150
50
30
70
200
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TABLE I (cont'd)
Territorial Fishing
Sea
n,m.
n,m.

continental
PolluNargin to
tion
Defense other C cast
n.m.

Country

Date
Claimed

Nigeria

1971

Oman

1972

50

Pakistan

112

Panama

1950
1966
1967

200

Peru

1947

200

Saudi
Arabia

1958

Senegal

1972

Sierra
Leone

1971

200

Somalia

1973

200

Sudan

1970

18

m

18 no m

Syria

1964

18 n. m

18 no m

Tanzania

1973

30
100 fathoms
200 n.m.
200 n.m~
18 n.m. 18 nom.
110

50

Uni ted
1935
States of1939
America 1939
Uruguay

1969

Do

100 no m smuggling
200 no m.. neutrality
300 n. m
200

15 n. m

Venezuela 1956
20-50

Vietnam
Yemen
(Aden)

1970

18 n. m

Yemen
(Sana)

1967

18 no m,

*From: Limits in the Sea: National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction,
No. 36, Office of the Geographer, Bureau of Intelligence and
Research, 1974

+ nautical miles
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TABLE II - Official Group Meetings
Fifth Session - Law of the Sea
C onference+

Bureau
Plenary
Committee I plus Negotiation Groups
Committee II plUS Negotiating Groups 1-5
Committee III plus two Negotiating Groups
Permanent Representatives of Commonwealth Countries
Arab Group
African Group
Asian Group
Latin American Group
Coastal states Group
Landlocked and Geographically Disadvantaged states
Group of 77
Western European and Other States Group
Territorialist Group
Group of 21
Meeting of the Members of the Group of states of the Islamic
Conference

+This in no way represents all the group meetings at the
fifth session; only those announced.
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TABLE III
states with Continental Margin Areas
Beyond 200 Nautical Miles
Liberia

Argentina*
Australia*

Madagascar*
Mauritius*
Mexico

Bahamas

Barbados

..

Brazil*
Burma

Netherlands
New Zealand

Canada*

Norway

Denmark

Oman

Ecuador

Pakistan

Equatorial Guinea

Peru

Fiji

Portugal*

France
Gabon

Senegal
Sierra Leone

Ghana

Somalia

Guinea

South Africa-

Guinea-Bissau

Spain*

Iceland
India*

Sri Lanka*
Tanzania

Indonesia*

United Kingdom*

Ireland

united States of America*

Kenya

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics*
Uruguay
Yemen

*16 nations with 91% of the value of estimated oil resources
beyond 200 miles. Neptune, April 28, 1975, P.3.
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TABLE IV
Members of the Group of Landlocked and
Geographically Disadvantaged
States - 1976
Afghanistan*

Laos*

Algeria

Lesotho*

Austria*

Liechenstein*

Bahrain

Luxembourg*

Belgium

Malawi*

Bhutan*

Mali*

BOlivia*

Mongolia*

Botswana*

Nepal*

BUlgaria

Netherlands

Burundi*

Niger*

Byelorussian Soviet Socialist
Republic

Parguay*

Central African Republic*

Poland

Chad*

Qatar

C zechos lovakia *

Rwanda*

Ethiopia

San Marino*

Finland

singapore

The Gambia

Sudan

German Democratic Republic

Swaziland*

Germany, Federal Republic of

Sweden

Greece
Hungary*

Switzerland*

Iraq

Uganda*

Jamaica

United Arab Emirates

Jordan

Upper Vol ta*

Kuwait

Zaire*

Turkey

Zambia*

*Landlocked States
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TABLE V

straits Used for International Navigation Affected by
a Twe~ve Nautical Mile Territorial Sea

Bering Straits
Litke strait
Kuril strait
Shirinki Kaikyo
Harumukotan Kaikyo
Shasukotan Kaikyo
Koromi Kaikyo
Rashowa Kaikyo
Miniamiuruppus Suido
Yetorofu Kaikyo
Kunashiri Kuido
Shikotan Suido
Taraku suido
Notsuke Suido
Tsugaru Kaikyo
Banjo Kaikyo
Pia ti 'S t r a i t
Ketoi Kaikyo
Diane Strait
Severnyy Proliv
Soya Kaikyo
Rishiri Suido
Okushiri Kaikyo
Sado Kaikyo
Pohai strait
Huksan Jedo
Macrnul Sudo
Cheju Hachyop
West Korea Strait
Yakushima KaikyO
Tokara Kaikyo
Nakanoshima Suido
osumi Kaikyo
Tanegashima Kaikyo
Suwanose Suido
Pescadorres Channel
Lamma Channel
Hainan Strait
Surigao Strait
l-lindoro strait
Sibutu Strait
Balabac Strait
Koti Passage
Sera san Passage
Api Passage

Malacca Strait
Berhala Strait
Bangka strait
sunda strait
Gaspar strait
Selat Lombok
Sapie Strait
Roti strait
ombai Strait
Boston Passage
Manipa strait
Greyhound strait
Bangka Passage
Isumrud strait
Dampier strait
St. George Channel
Bouganville Strait
Manning Strait
lndespensable strait
A1'IERICAS

Turks Island Passage
Mouchoir Passage
Virgin Passage
Dominica Channel
Martinique Channel
Saint Lucia Channel
Saint Vincent Passage
Aruba-Paraguana Passa
Estrecho de la Maire
EUROPE.
The Hole
Little lvlinch
North Channel
Dover strait
lle d 'Yeu
Gulf of Finland
Bornholmsgat
Kara Strait
Corsica-Elba
F reu de Menorea
strait of Gibraltar
Kithira
I<arpathos

Kaulakahi Channel
Kaiwi Channel
Pailolo Channel
Etolin Strait
AFRICA-NIDDLE EAST
Agattu Strait
Adak strait
Cameroon Bay
Tanage Pass
Pemba Channel
Seguam Pass
.Bah Al Handeb
Yunaska Pass
Strait of Hormuz
Herbert Pass
Samalgor Pass
Unimak' Pass
Shelikof Strait
Hecate strait
Strait of Juan de Fuca
Robenson Channel
Kennedy Channel
Barrow Strait
strait of Belle Isle
Jacques cartier Passage
Northumberland strait
Old Bahamas Channel
Guatemalan Caribbean Entrance
Providence Channel
Mayaguana Passage

Source: Map, World Straits Affected by a 12 Mile Territorial Sea, Office
of the Geographer, Dept. of State, U.S.Government
Underlined straits are the principle shipping straits.
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TABLE VI
Highly Migratory Species

1. Albacore Tuna:

Thunnus alalunga

2. Bluefin Tunas

Thunnus thynnus

3. Bigeye Tuna:

Thunnus obesus

4.Skipjack Tunas

Katsuwonus pelamis

5. Yellowfin Tunal

Thunnus albacares

6. Blackfin Tunal

Thunnus atlanticus

7. Little Tuna.

Euthynnus alletteratusi Euthynnus affinis

8. Frigate Mackeral:

Auxis thazardj Auxis rochei

9. Pomfrets:

Family Bramidae

10. Marlins:

Tetrapturus angustirostris;
Tetrapturus belOnej
Tetrapturus pfluegeri;
Tetrapturus albidus;
Tetrapturus audax;
Tetrapturus georgei;
Makaira mazaraj
Makaira indica;
Makaira nigricans

11. Sailfishes:

Istiophorus platypterus;
Istiophorus albicans

12. Swordfish:

Xiphias glad ius

13. Sauriesl

Scomberesox saurus;
C ololabis saira;

Cololabis adocetusi
Scomberesox saurus scombroides
14. Dolphin I

Coryphaena hioDurus;
Coryphaena eguiselis

15. Oceanic Sharks I

Hexanchus ariseus j C etorhinus maximus;
Family Alopiidae; Family Carcharhinidaii
Family Sphyrnidaei Family Isuridae
Rhincodon typus
.

16. cetaceans:

Source:

Annex:

Family Physeteridae, Family Balaenopteridae; Family Balaenidae; Family Eschrichtiidae; Family Monodontidaei Family ziphiidae; Family Delphinidae.
A/Conf.62/WP8/Rev.l/Part II.
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TABLE VII (cont'd)

Nation
.3

Total Land
Area
(S9. mi. )

Rank

Total Area of
200 Hile
Economic Zone
(sg. naut. mL)

Rank

Zone as a
Percentage
of
Land Area

36,324

105

.3
Mall

464,800

22

Mauritania

397,900

27

45,000

74

1170

720

142

345,000

17

47,916%

Morocco

166,000

50

81,000

55

48'10

Mozambique

303,070

34

163,900

32

54~o

Namibia

317,836

32

145,900

40

4510

Niger 3

458,000

23

Nigeria

356,669

30

61,500

63

17%

150,333

52

10,166

127

Senegal

76,100

76

60,000

64

76%

Sierra Leone

27,925

111

45,400

72

162%

Somalia

270,000

38

228,300

28

84~~

South Africa

471,445

21

296,500

21

6~~

967,500

9

26,700

87

2%

6,705

132

363,328

29

65,100

60

17r...

Togo

21,600

115

121

1%

Tunesia

63,362

83

25,000

88

39}b

91,134

70

105,800

61

905,063

11

300

122

290,586

36

Malaw~

Mauritius

Rhodesia
Rwanda

Sudan

3

3

4

•.

3

Swaz~land

Tanzania

Uganda

3

Upper Volta 3
Zaire

3

Zambia 3

300
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TABLE VII (cont'd)
Total Land
Area
(sq. m i , )

Nation

Rank

Total Area of
200 Mile
Economic Zone
(sq. naut. mi. )

Rank

Land Area

Zone as A
Percentage

of

America. North
and Central
5,386

133

221,400

27

4,11010

166

150

48,800

68

29,397'10

8,866

128

9,000

104

101%

21

157

123,000

43

585,71~

3,560,238

3

1,370,000

5

38%

costa Rica

19,653

116

75,500

57

384%

Cuba

44,206

95

105,800

46

2391c.

290

146

5,800

111

2,00OO,.{.

48,442

93

78,400

56

161~

8,236

129

26,800

86

325'1~

133

151

Guatemala

42,042

100

28,900

83

68%

Haiti

10,700

126

46,800

69

437%

Honduras

43,227

97

58,600

65

135%

9,411

127

86,800

53

922%

761,530

13

831,500

9

109'A>

390

145

Nicaragua

54,296

89

46,600

70

85%

Panama

29,201

110

89,400

52

306~

1,864

139

22,400

91

1,201%

3,553,118

4

2,222,000

1

Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bermuda
Canada

Dominique
Dominican Republic
El Salvador
Grenada

Jamaica
Mexico

Netherlands Antilles

Trinidad and
Tabago
United states
of America

-----

-----
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TABLE VII (cont'd)

Total Land
Area

(sg. roi.)

Nation

Rank

Total Area of
200 Mile
Economic Zone
(~g. naut , mi.)

Zone as a
Percentage
of

Rank

339,500

18

31%

28%

Land ·Area

America. South
1,084,120

8

424,160

25

3,286,000

5

924,000

8

Chile

286,000

37

667,300

10

233"~

Colombia'

456,535

24

175,900

30

36~

Ecuador

104,505

62

338,000

19

323",-¢

83,000

74

38,000

76

45%

61,705

85

496,093

18

229,400

26

4610

Surinam

70,087

80

29,500

81

42%

Uruguay

72,172

78

34,800

78

46%

352,143

31

106,100

45

30%

250,000

40

400

143

1,500

119

375~o

Bangladesh

55,126

87

22,400

90

40"A>

Bhutan 3

18,000

117

2,226

138

2,600

267,789

39

148,600

37

55%

3,704,400

2

281,000

22

7%

3,572

136

29,000

82

811~

1,178,995

7

587,600

12

49;0

575,450

17

1,577,300

3

274,.:.

Argentina
Bolivia

3

Brazil

Guyana
Paraguay

3

Peru

Venezuela

Asia
Afghanistan
. 2
Ba h ra~n

Brunei
Burma
China, PRe
Cyprus
India
Indonesia

3

167

118

116%

TABLE VII (cont'd)
Total Land
Area
isg. mi-)

Nation

Rank

Total Area of
200 Mile
Economic Zone
(Sq. naut. mi. )

Zone as a
Percentage
of
Rank

Land Area

Asia
4

628,000

15

45,400

71

Iraq 2

169,240

49

200

123

7,933

130

6,800

109

85%

142,765

53

1,126,000

7

788ro

37,730

104

200

124

69,898

81

16,200

98

2s/i>

Korea", Dem. People's
47,225
Republic of

94

37,800

77

80%

38,452

103

101,600

47

264%

24,280

114

3,500

115

14%

91,000

71

3,400

137

6,600

110

194%

50,806

91

138,700

41

272%

115

152

279,700

23

243,2].7,,,

604,095

16

Nepal 3

54,600

88

Oman

82,000

75

163,800

33

199%

Pakistan

310,403

33

92,900

51

29'/0

Philippines

115,600

58

551,400

13

476'10

4,274

134

7,000

108

1631<>

927,000

10

54,300

66

5'"/ 0

225

148

100

125

Sri Lanka

24,959

113

150,900

36

604'10

Syria

71,772

79

3,000

116

4~

Iran

Israel
Japan
Jordan

2

Khmer Republic

2

" Korea, Republic of
. 2
Kuwa~t

Laos

3

Lebanon
Malaysia

4

Maldives
, 3
j\longol~a

Qatar 2
SaUdi Arabia 4
Singapore 2
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TABLE VII (cont1d)
Total Land
Area
( sg. mil.)

Nation

Rank

Total Area of
200 Nile
Economic Zone
(sq. naut. mi. )

Rank

Zone as a
Percentage
of
Land Area

Thailand

198,250

46

94,700

50

47<'/0

Turkey

301,302

35

69,000

58

22%

32,278

109

17,300

97

5~o

United Arab
Emirates
Vietnam 2

127,563

210,600

6010

Yemen, Peoples'
Republic of

61,890

84

160,500

35

259"ft>

Yemen Arab
Republic 4

75,000

15

9,900

101

1370

11,101

123

3,600

114

32%

190

149

32,366

108

11,778

121

800

120

6%

42,823

99

9,600

102

22'ib

C z echo s Lovakf.a

49,362

92

Denmark
.
2

16,629

118

20,000

95

120)10

F~nland

114,050

59

28,600

84

25%

France

212,919

45

99,500

48

46~o

German D~ocratic
Republic

41,722

101

2,800

117

6'}'o

Germany, Fed
Republic of 2ral

95,975

11,900

100

1270

Greece

50,942

90

147,300

38

289"ti>

Hungary 3

35,911

106

Iceland

39,758

102

252,800

25

635%

Europe
Albania
Andorra
Austria
Belgium

3
3

2

BUlgaria

. 3

66
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TABLE VII (cont'd)

Total Land
Area
(sq. mh.L

Nation

Rank

Total Area of
200 Mile
Economic Zone
{sq. naut. mi , )

Rank

Zone as a
Percentage
of
Land Area

26,600

112

110,900

44

416:;0

116,300

57

161,000

34

138~"

62

155

999

141

95

153

19,330

96

20, 347'i"o

15,784

120

24,700

29

156~

Norway

125,247

54

590,500

11

471'10

POland 2

120,633

56

8,300

105

610

Portugal

34,861

107

517,400

14

1,484%

Romania

91,699

69

9,300

103

10}..

24

156

Spain

194,833

47

355,600

16

182;:0

sweden 2

158,845

51

45,300

73

28%

15,941

119

89,038

72

274,800

24

308%

98,725

65

15,730

99

15%

union of Soviet
8,650,000
Socialist Republics

1

1,309,500

6

15%

2,967,909

6

2,043,300

2

68/0

7,055

131

330,900

20

4,690;:0

103,736

63

1,409,500

4

1,3587'0

Ireland
Italy
Liechtenstein
3
Luxembourg

3

Malta
Netherlands

San

.

2

3

Har~no

Switzerland

3

united Kingdom
y

. 4

ugoslav~a

Oceania
Australia
Fiji
i\'ew Zealand
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TABLE VII (cont'd)

Nation

Total Land
Area
(sg. mi , )

Rank

8.2

158

Nauru

Total Area of
200 Mile
Economic Zone
(sq. naut. mi.)

125,700

Zone as a
Percentage
of
Land Area

42 1,532, 926,b

-----

86,100

73

270

147

173,800

31

64,370;0

Western Samoa

1,097

140

28,000

85

2,55270

1. "What's at Stake:
Pp.4-6.

Oil, Fish, Ocean Space", Neptune, April 14, 1975,

Papua New Guinea
Tonga

2. Shelf-Locked States.
3. Landlocked states.
4. Mostly shelf-locked States, some continental margin deeper than 200 meters.
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Marine Resource Potentials
TABLE 1/111

Nation

Fish
Catch
.1000
Metric
Tons

(1973)1
1000
Dollars
(U .S.)

Oil Production 2
Nillion Barrels
per year
(1975)

3
Potential Oi1
Resources
Billion Barrels

Africa:
Algeria
AngOla

31.2

15,830

32.9

470.2

10,821

59.9

Bo t swana

1.2

Burundi

8.3

Cameroon
C entra1 African
Republic
Chad

71.6

105.0
20.9

Dahomey (Benin)

32.9

Egypt

79.7

Ethiopia

26.8
4.0

Gambia

6.0

Guinea

152(1972)

8,382(1972)

5,574(1972)

0.1-1

13.9

0.1-1
0.1-1

81.4

10-100

195.5

0.1-1
1,532(1972)

0.1-1
72.6

1-10
0.1-1

57,031

1-10

5.0

0.1-1

51.0

15,363

Kenya

29.0

4,578

Lesotho

0.0

0

Liberia

23.0

Madagascar

-----

16,700

Ivory Coast

Libya

-----

1,430

4.0

Gabon

Ghana

1-10

3.5

Congo

Equatorial
Guinea

.01

1-10
0.1-1

0.1-1

5.7

538.0

49.1

100-1000
1-10
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TABLE VIII (cont'd)

Nation

Fish
Catch
1000
Metric
Tons

Halawi

40.4

Mali

90.0

Mauritania

25.0

Maur i:tius

7.5

Noroeco

397.2

Hozarnbique

13.3

Nambia

30.0

Niger

12.5

Nigeria

2.0

Rwanda

1.3

sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland

(U • S! )

Oil Production 2
Nillion Barrels
per year
(1975)

Potential Oil 3
Resources

Billion Barrel§;

4,389

1-10
.01
20,986(1972)

.4

1-10
1-10
0.1-1

664.8

Rhodesia

Senegal

(1973)1
1000
Dollars

645.7

323.8

91,170

51.3

7,350

10-100

1-10
0.1-1

5.0
1,331.7

0.1-1
76,307

0.1-1

22.6

0.1-1

0.0

0

167.7

25,805

0.1-1

Togo

10.9

7,495

0.1-1

Tunesia

31.5

Tanzania

Uganda
Upper Volta
Zaire
Zambia

34.7

169.0

35,602

3.5

890

1-10

123.9

0.1-1

-----

33.3
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TABLE VIII (cont'd)

Nation

Fish
Catch
1000
Metric
Tons

(1973)1
1000
Dollars
(U.S.)

.
.
2
01.1
Prod uctl.on
Million Barrels
per year
( 1975)

Potential Oil 3
Resources
Billion Barrels

America, North
and Central
Bahamas

3.1

Barbados

4.0

Belize

1.7

Bermuda
Canada
costa Rica
Cuba

5,083

0.1-1
2,040(1972)

0.1-1

161.9
1,151.6

300,119

11.4

3,570

527.8

10-100
0.1-1

139.Q

0.1-1

Dominique

.5

------

Dominican
Republic

9.2

4,632

El Salvador

0.01-0.1

0.1-1

17.3

0.1-1
1,650(1972)

Grenada

1.8

Guatemala

5.0

0.1-1

Haiti

2.5

0.1-1

Honduras

4.5

Jamaica

18.0

Mexico
Netherlands
Antilles

482.1

1-10
1-10

144,969

255.5

100-1000

1.0

Nicaragua

13.9

Panama

84.6

Trinidad and
Tabago

13.0

United States
of America

7,163(1972)

2,669.9

1-10
13,462

1-10
75.6

907,400

3,052.9
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1-10
100-1000

TABLE VIII (cont'd)

Nation

Fish
Catch
1000
Metric
Tons

(1973)1
1000
Dollars
(U.S.)

2
Oil Production
Million Barrels
per year
(1975)

Potential Oi1 3
Resources
Billion Barrels

America. South
Argentina
Bolivia

141.6

10-100

63.5

1-10

9.1

1-10

91.2

58.8

1-10

105.2

57.3

1-10

302.1

68,935

2.2

1,040

Brazil

589.9

Chile

664.4

Colombia
Ecuador
Guyana
Paraguay
Peru

17.6

9,562(1972)

0.1-1

2.7
2,299.3

surinam

4.5

Uruguay

17.5

Venezuela

9,157

162.4

85,940

26.6

1-10

0.1-1
39,288

876.0

10-100

22.6

1-10

Asia
Afghanistan

1.5

Bahrain

1.5

Bangladesh

247.2

1-10

Bhutan

1.0

Brunei

3.9

2,968

Burma

463.4

93,097

China, PRe

574.0

Cyprus

1.4

India

1,958.0

1-10
7.3

1-10

542.8

1-10

2,460

1-10

443,282

60.2
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10-100

TABLE VIII (cont'd)
Fish
Catch
1000
Metric
Tons

Nation
Indonesia

(1973)1
1000
Dollars
(U.

s,)

' ProductJ.on
. 2
0J.1
Million Barrels
per year
(1975)

.
. 3
Potent1al O~l
Resources
Billion Barrels

1,300.0

475.9

10-100

Iran

20.0

1,965.5

10-100

Iraq

17.5

823.4

1-10

Israel

27.2

295.7

1-10

4.7

1-10

Japan

10,701.9

Jordan
Khmer Republic
Korea, Oem.
Peoples' Republic
Korea, Republic
of
Kuwait
Laos
Lebanon

20,438
2,049,184(1972)

0.1
84.7

1-10

800.00

1-10

1,654.6

264,333(1972)

7.7

5,977(1972)

10-100
760.6

10-100

20.0
2.5

1-10

Malaysia

444.7

274,662

Maldives

33.7

4,682

100.7

10-100
0.01-0.1

Nongolia
Nepal

2.2

----

Oman

100.0

Pakistan

214.2

68,701

1,248.5

513,254

Philippines
Qatar

123.4

1-10

2.2

1-10
1-10

1.0

155.5

Saudi Arabia

31.3

2,565.2

Singapore

18.6

13,385

0.1-1

sri Lanka

100.7

33,046

0.1-1
J.76

10-100
100-1000

!ABLE VIII (cont'dl
Fish
Catch

1000

Nation
Syria
Thailand
Turkey

Metric
Tons

(1973)1
1000
Dollars

(u . s. )

1.3

1,661

1,692.3

357,095

166.1

Oil Production 2
Hillion Barrels
per year
( 1975)

1-10

612.4

Vietnam
Yemen, Peoples'
Republic of
Yemen Arab
Republic

1-10

10-100
1-10

133.5

1-10

7.5

1-10

4.0

1-10

Europe
Albania
Andorra
Austria

2.2

4,160

Belgium

52.7

33,205

1-10

33,140(1972)

1-10

BUlgaria

Czechoslovakia

102.2

15.1

Denmark

1,464.7

Finland

67.0

France

796.8

German Dern.
Republic

365.8

Germany, Federal
Republic

475.2

Greece

238,904

1.1

12,093(1972)
505,472

1-10
0.1-1

7.3

1-10
0.1-1

180,653

74.9

40.1

1-10
1-10

177

3

Resources
Billion Barrels

63.5

21.9

united Arab
Emirates

Potential Oil
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TABLE VIII ( cant 'dl

Fish
Catch
1000

Nation

Metric
Tons

(1973)1
1000

Dollars
(U.S.)

Oil Production 2
Million Barrels
per year
(1975)

.

. 3

PotentJ.al OJ.l
Resources
Billion Barrels

Oceania
Aq.stralia
Fiji
New Zealand

150.4

121,006

5.1

1,361

0.1-1

66.4

29,952

0.1-1

-----

Nauru
Papua New
Guinea

1-10

-----

48.5

-----

Tonga

Western Samoa

10-100

123.5

0.9

----1-10

1-10

S92

1. From FAa's 1973 Yearbook of Fisheries statistics, in Neotune, April 14, 1975,
Pp.4-6
2. Adapted froms
3. From:

The Oil and Gas Journal, in Neptune, August 1976, Pp.6-7.

US Geolocrical Survey Paper No.8S5, in Neptune, April 14, 1975. Pp.4-E.
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TABLE IX

Estimated Sediment Thickness at the Base of the
continental Slope and on the Continental Rise

Distance Base
Base Slope
Sed. Thickness

A.t:.e..a.

of Slope from
Coast

Rise Sed.
Thickness

Distance from
Shore-Rise Mea~.

western North
Atlantic l

N.E. Newfoundland
Canadian Maritime
Provinces
Gulf of st. Lawrence
Sable Island
Nova Scotia
Georges Bank
New York City
Cape Hatteras

6-8 km

.5-5

7 km
6-8 km
3.5 km

s.

kIn

2 kIn

1100 km
800 km

2 km

1.5 km

900 kIn

1.3 krn
4.0 km

700 km
500 km

1.0 km
3.0 kIn

1000 km
700 km

3.0

km

1600 km

.5 kIn

200 km

4 km

3.5 km

America

Dominican Republic undeterminable
Eastern Mexico - in
the Gulf of Mexico
2
Venezuela
2
North of Tabago
. 3
Nort h ern Braz~l

1.7
8.5
6

500 km

kIn
km

700 kIn

5 km

40 kIn

km

km
km

2 km

kIn

2 km

kIn

Rio de Janeiro

2

km

Uruguay -- Punta del
Este

1

km

350

4 km

11

1 kffi

35
600
850

Argentina

600

800 km
500 km
600 kIn

Blake Outer Ridge undeterminable
Caribbean -

kIn

5.10

km

180

1200
km

kIn

TABLE IX (cont'd)
Distance Base
Sed. ·Thickness

Coast

Rise Sed.
Thickness

.5-1 krn

80

.5-1 km

c al~fornla

.z

50 km

Baja California
6
Chile-Peru Trench

.8-1 km
0-2 km

Western Pacific
6
South Kurals
. 8
C h iana Ba s i.n

akIn

Base Slope

of Slope from

Distance from
Shore-Rise Meas.

Eastern Pacific
.

Sea

Ber~ng

.

6

,7

kIn

km

150 km

45 xm
55 km

200 krn

2km

0.5-1.0 kIn

2 km

600 km

Europe
British ISles

Iberian Penn.

6

100-215 kIn

1 km

1-1.5 kIn

.5-1.0 kID 140-220

kIn

55-250 kIn

Africa

sahara
,

9
. 9

Maur~tan~a

.

Slerra Leone

6

3.5 xm

100 kIn

1.5 xm

70-100 krn

1.0 kIn

900 km
600 kIn

4 km

400 km

2 krn

Narn i,i.b ia.a 10

5 kIn

400 km

2 km

South AfricaDurbun

2 km

150 kIn

2 km

Indian Ocean
India, Bombay

2kro

300 km

1 kIn

181

650 krn

Footnotes to Table IX

1. K.O.Emery and Elazar Uchupi, "Western North Atlantic Ocean
Topography, Rocks, Structure, Water, Life, Sediments",
American Association of Petroleum Geologists Memoir 17, (1972).
2. N. Terence Edgar et al, "Seismic Reflection and Refraction

in Caribbean Sea", American Association PetrOleum Geologists
BUlletin, (June 1971): 833-876.
3. Dennis E. Hayes et al, "North Brazilip.n Ridge and Adjacent
Continental Margin", American Association Petroleum Geologists Bulletin, (Nov. 1970):
2120-2150.
4. R. Leyden et al, "Structure of the Continental Hargin of
Uruguay and Brazil", American Association of Petroleum
Geologists Bulletin, (Dec. 1971)1
2161-2173.
5. W. J. LUdwig et a l.,

"Structure of the Argentine Continental
Margin", American Association Petroleum Geoloaists BUlletin,
(Dec. 1968): 2337-2368

"e ontinental Margins from the Viewpoint of
the Petroleum Geologist", American Association of Petroleum
Geologists BUlletin, (Jan. 1970): 3-43

6. Hollis Hedberg,

7. W.R.Normark, "Growth Patterns of Deep Sea Fans", American
Association Petroleum Geologists BUlletin, (Nov. 1970):
2170-2195.
8. M.L.Parke et aI, "Structural Framework of Continental Margin
in Sou th China Sea", American Assoc iation Petroleum Geologists
BUlletin, (May 1971): 723-751
9. P.A.Rona, "Continental Margins of Cape Hatteras and Cape

Blanc", Ameri~?n Association Petroleum Geologists BUlletin,
(Jan. 1970): 129-157
10. R.O.Emery et al, "Continental Margin off Western Africa,
Cape St. Francis (South America) to Walvis Bay South West
Africa", American Association Petroleum Geologists BUlletin,
(Jan. 1975): 3-59.

11. Ludwig et al, "Refraction Measurements S.E., African Hargin"
Journal of Geophysical Research, (15 June, 1968)1
3707-3719.
12. R.N.Harbison and B.G.Bassinger, "Harine Geophysical Study
off Western India", Journal of Geophysical Research, (10 Jan.
1973): 432-440.
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